THE SOUFAN CENTER SPECIAL REPORT

CITIZENS FOR LEVERAGE:
Navigating State Hostage-Taking in a Shifting Geopolitical Landscape

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• The use of human beings as political bargaining chips is an appalling practice that has no place in the twenty-first century. Often referred to as “hostage diplomacy,” or state hostage-taking, a number of states today—like Iran, Russia, and China—are unlawfully detaining foreign nationals within their criminal justice systems for use as foreign policy leverage.

• The following countries have been parties to publicly reported cases: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the latter of which has reported the largest number of such cases. A number of states, as well as the European Union (EU), have issued advisories to their nationals cautioning them about travel to countries engaging in the practice.

• The issue of state hostage-taking requires consistent attention and should not only be driven by headlines or high-profile cases. Each case of state hostage-taking is tragic, lengthy, and complex; and individual and collective cases require further research to inform evidence-based policy making.

• State hostage-taking exerts profound costs on the individuals detained and their families, as well as on the foreign policies of governments whose citizens are targeted. Last year, US President Joseph Biden declared hostage-taking and the wrongful detention of US persons a national emergency. In 2021, Canada launched the Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations, endorsed by over seventy states, as well as the European Union.

• The rise of state hostage-taking has not taken place in a vacuum, but in tandem with shifting power dynamics and in a geopolitical climate where great power rivalry overshadows multilateral cooperation. Conditions remain ripe for the practice of state hostage-taking to thrive and endure.

• There is no single playbook for perpetrator states: every case of state hostage-taking is unique and requires a case-specific response. While only a handful of authoritarian countries engage in this practice, there is concern that if the practice is not strongly condemned, more states may see it as an effective tool or current perpetrators of the practice may choose to use it more often.

• In addressing state hostage-taking, governments need to focus on two equally important imperatives: to bring their detained citizens home and to deter the practice. While deterrence must be a priority, it cannot come at the expense of current hostages. Securing the release of individual hostages often requires engaging in difficult negotiations. To offset possible concessions, governments must do more to raise the costs on the perpetrator states outside of individual cases.

• Impacted countries will require strengthened national response capacities, including an accountable entity within government separate from regular consular work. Families should be treated as trusted partners working alongside their governments.

• Victims deserve justice, and perpetrator states must be held to account through greater use of existing tools such as Magnitsky sanctions, travel bans, financial penalties, and asset seizures.

• Each case of state hostage-taking is a human tragedy. Governments must prepare to manage hostage-taking in all its forms. Today’s complex geopolitical landscape provides the conditions for both state and non-state perpetrators to commit these crimes.
INTRODUCTION

A number of states today are unlawfully detaining foreign nationals within their criminal justice systems for use as foreign policy leverage. Often referred to as “hostage diplomacy,” or state hostage-taking, this form of coercive diplomacy is not new in international politics, but its growing prevalence has raised alarm bells among many states, especially Western nations and their allies. This cruel practice places individual citizens at the center of a complicated calculus where their own governments must balance the individual’s freedom against political, security, economic, and other national considerations. The issue is fraught with challenges and complexities, further compounded by the often opaque political and judicial systems of abductor states.

Although data on specific cases is limited, a number of high-profile cases in the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Australia, Canada, and elsewhere have brought greater attention and much-needed scrutiny to the issue. Further, a range of actions at the national and multilateral levels underscores the growing concern from much of the international community. Last year, US President Joseph Biden declared hostage-taking and the wrongful detention of US persons a national emergency. His Executive Order (EO) 14078 noted how the practice posed an “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.”

A range of other states—Australia, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, as well as the European Union (EU), among others—have also issued warnings and advisories to their nationals in recent months warning about travel to certain countries known to engage in the practice.

This growing concern, largely among Western states and their allies, has also led to the development of an important multilateral framework. In 2021, the Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations was launched by the Government of Canada. Endorsed by over seventy states from every region of the world, as well as the European Union, the declaration encourages like-minded nations to denounce the practice and provides a potential framework for multilateral cooperation. The Group of Seven (G7), made up of seven of the world’s most advanced economies, has also affirmed their support for the Canada-led multilateral declaration.

Figure 1: List of Endorsements in the Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations

Albania
Andorra
Antigua & Barbuda
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bulgaria
Canada
Cook Islands
Costa Rica
Croatia
Cyprus
Czechia
Denmark
El Salvador
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Guatemala
Guyana
Honduras
Haiti
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Kosovo
Latvia
Kosovo
Latvia
Lebanon
Lithuania
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Malawi
Malta
Marshall Islands
Moldova
Nauru
the Netherlands
New Zealand
Niger
North Macedonia
Norway
Palau
Panama
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Republic of Korea
Romania
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent & the Grenadines
San Marino
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Suriname
Sweden
Switzerland
The Bahamas
Tonga
Tuvalu
the United Kingdom
Ukraine
the United States

The European Union has also endorsed the declaration.
Endorsements as of May 11, 2023.

Source: Government of Canada
Global concerns about state hostage-taking must be understood in the context of the return of great power competition and rising geopolitical tensions between the United States and key authoritarian states like Russia, China, and Iran. In other words, the rise of state hostage-taking is not taking place in a vacuum, but in tandem with challenges emanating from the shifting power balances in the international system. The practice of state hostage-taking is becoming part of the foreign policy toolkit and statecraft of some authoritarian states that are increasingly challenging the rules-based international order established by the United States and its allies after the Second World War.

The UK government, in no uncertain terms, has noted the link between state hostage-taking and the politics of authoritarian rule: “Arbitrary detention is a hallmark of authoritarian regimes and its use is a tool of political intimidation.”9 In leveraging the liberties of foreign nationals, the practice serves as a tool for authoritarian regimes to assert dominance and recalibrate the international order in their favor.10 Reports on past agreements and conditions from abductor states for the release of foreign nationals in their detention have included high-level prisoner releases,11 historic debt settlements,12 and deferred prosecution agreements.13 In a geopolitical climate where great power rivalry overshadows multilateral cooperation, conditions remain ripe for the practice of state hostage-taking to thrive and endure.

Despite growing national and multilateral concern about state hostage-taking, data on the issue remains limited. States have not provided exhaustive figures on the number of cases they are managing related to state hostage-taking, and it is very possible many states do not know these figures themselves. A range of issues complicate data collection, including individual privacy concerns, as well as diplomatic and national security considerations regarding specific cases. Further, identifying and classifying these cases remains a challenge for most states.

Data limitations and knowledge gaps not only limit awareness and understanding of the scale of the problem, but also create accountability gaps around individual and collective cases. Crucial research from the not-for-profit and academic communities can shed some light on the scale of the problem. According to data from the James W. Foley Legacy Foundation, over the last decade, the number of American nationals wrongfully detained increased by 175 percent.14 At present, the advocacy group estimates there are fifty-nine publicly known cases of American persons held hostage or wrongfully detained abroad.15 Another study by Professor Carla Ferstman and Dr. Marina Sharpe focused on Iranian state hostage-taking found that sixty-six foreign and dual nationals were known to have been arbitrarily detained in Iran between 2010 and 2021.16

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Because of limited data and research, there are more questions than answers about contemporary state hostage-taking. For individual victims, the cost of inaction remains high. For states working to secure their release, these cases can be lengthy and costly to resolve. For abductor states, the risks and consequences of engaging in this practice are perceived as minimal compared to the gains from prisoner swaps or other policy concessions. Recent high-profile cases in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada illustrate the seriousness and complexity of the challenge. These cases also demonstrate the need for democratic states to engage seriously on this issue given the profound costs to their citizens, as well as the impacts on their foreign and security policy.

This special report offers an analysis of contemporary state hostage-taking from an international perspective in terms of cases, trends, and policies. It builds upon the existing literature, much of which focuses on a specific dimension of the issue, like the legal protection gap, or offers a look at country-specific approaches or detailed analyses of particular state hostage-taking cases. This report provides a general overview of the topic that will examine definitions and the challenges states grapple with in classifying cases of state hostage-taking. The report will present the key players, from the abductor states utilizing the practice to the states and citizens impacted. Through an analysis of three countries—the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom—this paper will also explore and compare national trajectories and policy responses. The report will conclude by offering recommendations for national and international action to prevent, deter, and respond to the growing challenge of state hostage-taking.

“The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights made clear over 72 years ago that arbitrary detention in all its forms is to be abolished. Canada’s initiative against arbitrary detention in state-to-state relations, with support from every region of the world, is a welcome reaffirmation of these human rights principles. All states should abide by their obligations to end and deter arbitrary detention for diplomatic leverage, and all foreign nationals arbitrarily detained should be immediately released.”

- Ban Ki-moon, Former Secretary-General of the United Nations
WHAT IS STATE HOSTAGE-TAKING?

State hostage-taking, where states use their judiciary to detain foreign citizens as a tool of foreign policy leverage, presents unique challenges from legal, moral, and international relations perspectives. While functionally hostages, victims of this practice are caught in the limitations of international law and norms of international relations where their home states are generally reluctant to weigh in on the internal functioning of another state’s judicial system. This section explores issues of definitions and criteria and presents the key players, from perpetrator states to the states and citizens impacted by the practice.

Defining the Problem

The practice of states using their judicial systems to detain foreign citizens for diplomatic leverage or to extract political, military, or economic concessions from another state is fraught with competing definitions. Within both national and international contexts, a range of terminology is used by various actors to discuss the practice. Commonly used terms include wrongful and unlawful detention, arbitrary detention, arbitrary detention for diplomatic leverage, arbitrary detention in state-to-state relations, hostage diplomacy, and state hostage-taking. Each of these terms has advantages and disadvantages. Currently, there is no internationally agreed upon definition or criteria for external actors to determine that a state has engaged in this practice.

Although arbitrary deprivation of liberty is prohibited under international law, the challenge with using the term arbitrary detention when dealing with states detaining foreign nationals for leverage is that the perpetrators do so using their domestic laws and often hide behind baseless national security charges. In other words, perpetrator states try to create a veil of legitimacy or legality around their hostage-taking actions. Furthermore, while detaining foreign nationals for leverage or to extract concessions from their home governments clearly falls within the definition of hostage-taking under the United Nations International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, the Convention only addresses hostage-taking by non-state actors and does not explicitly deal with the actions of states.

Given this international legal protection gap, the United States Congress in December of 2020 passed the Robert Levinson Hostage Recovery and Hostage-Taking Accountability Act, codifying the term wrongful detention in US law and laying out eleven criteria which the Secretary of State can apply to determine if a US national is being held wrongfully by a foreign government. Once the designation is made, the US government has the responsibility to do everything possible to secure the freedom of the individual. The signing into law of the Levinson Act in the US is a landmark achievement, not matched by any other country to date. No other country has attempted to pass national legislation or put in place publicly available criteria to make a determination on whether its nationals are being detained by foreign states for leverage.


18 The Robert Levinson Hostage Recovery and Hostage-Taking Accountability Act (the Levinson Act), signed into law on December 27, 2020, as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 (P.L. 116-260), codifies key elements of hostage and wrongful detention policy and provides a framework for the Secretary of State to review cases and make wrongful detention determinations where appropriate. The Levinson Act, named in honor of former FBI agent Robert Levinson, abducted in Iran and the longest held hostage in US history. (https://www.state.gov/about-us-special-presidential-envoy-for-hostage-affairs/)
Based on its own experience, Canada led an international effort to bring attention to the practice of states detaining foreign nationals for leverage by launching the Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations in February of 2021. The declaration, which to date has been endorsed by over seventy countries, is an important political tool to condemn the practice and to build international cooperation and solidarity around deterrence and responses to the practice. However, it is not a legally binding instrument, does not spell out what defines arbitrary detention in state-to-state relations, and does not include any criteria or process to determine that a state has engaged in the practice.

Furthermore, the declaration implies a distinction between cases of arbitrary detention of foreign nationals by state actors without clear foreign policy objectives versus arbitrary detention cases linked to diplomatic leverage. In the former, arbitrary detention of some foreign nationals may be linked to the detainees’ exercising of fundamental human rights, to the conditions of their detention, such as torture or lack of legal access, to forms of corruption, or due to soured business or personal relations with powerful entities in a foreign state, among other reasons. Though a clear diplomatic leverage element may not always be present, some caution is warranted in making these distinctions, as state actors are rarely forthcoming about their intentions in detaining foreign nationals for leverage.

In this report, the authors will use the term state hostage-taking. Hostage-taking falls under the broader category of “arbitrary” or “wrongful” detentions, where an individual is inappropriately seized or detained. In other words, a detention does not need to be carried out with the objective of attaining foreign policy concessions to be considered arbitrary or wrongful, but that condition is necessary for it to be considered a hostage-taking case. Using the term arbitrary detention, instead of state hostage-taking, also casts a veil of legitimacy over the actions of perpetrator states and ignores the primary driver for their action, which is deemed to be leverage over another state. The term “wrongful detention” in the US context is a detention that the Secretary of State has determined to be wrongful consistent with section 302(a) of the Levinson Act. This term would not necessarily have the same legal meaning when dealing with cases outside of the United States. Importantly, the term hostage also best describes the experiences of the victims and is also used within the growing community of advocates working on this issue.

While defining terminology is important, perhaps even more critical is the need for clear criteria and an expeditious and transparent process for designating cases of state hostage-taking. Such criteria can be established at the national level through the adoption of domestic laws, like the US Levinson Act, or at the international level, either through the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention or as part of the strengthening of the Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations.

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Citizens for Leverage: Navigating State Hostage-Taking in a Shifting Geopolitical Landscape

Terminology on Wrongful & Arbitrary Detention

ROBERT LEVINSON HOSTAGE RECOVERY AND HOSTAGE-TAKING ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

“The Secretary of State shall review the cases of United States nationals detained abroad to determine if there is credible information that they are being detained unlawfully or wrongfully, based on criteria which may include whether—(1) United States officials receive or possess credible information indicating innocence of the detained individual; (2) the individual is being detained solely or substantially because he or she is a United States national; (3) the individual is being detained solely or substantially to influence United States Government policy or to secure economic or political concessions from the United States Government; (4) the detention appears to be because the individual sought to obtain, exercise, defend, or promote freedom of the press, freedom of religion, or the right to peacefully assemble; (5) the individual is being detained in violation of the laws of the detaining country; (6) independent nongovernmental organizations or journalists have raised legitimate questions about the innocence of the detained individual; (7) the United States mission in the country where the individual is being detained has received credible reports that the detention is a pretext for an illegitimate purpose; (8) the individual is detained in a country where the Department of State has determined in its annual human rights reports that the judicial system is not independent or impartial, is susceptible to corruption, or is incapable of rendering just verdicts; (9) the individual is being detained in inhumane conditions; (10) due process of law has been sufficiently impaired so as to render the detention arbitrary; and (11) United States diplomatic engagement is likely necessary to secure the release of the detained individual.”

DECLARATION AGAINST ARBITRARY DETENTION IN STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS

“The arbitrary arrest or detention of foreign nationals to compel action or to exercise leverage over a foreign government is contrary to international law, undermines international relations, and has a negative impact on foreign nationals traveling, working and living abroad. Foreign nationals abroad are susceptible to arbitrary arrest and detention or sentencing by governments seeking to compel action from other States. The purpose of this Declaration is to enhance international cooperation and end the practice of arbitrary arrest, detention or sentencing to exercise leverage over foreign governments.”

DAVID RUTLEY, PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, UK FOREIGN, COMMONWEALTH & DEVELOPMENT OFFICE

“[T]he Government uses the term ‘arbitrary detention for diplomatic leverage’, rather than ‘state hostage-taking’, to describe the detention or use of individuals to exert leverage over the UK. That reflects the degree of international consensus around that term and the international condemnation which the UK has worked to reinforce.”
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ARTICLE 9

“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.”

UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AGAINST THE TAKING OF HOSTAGES
(NEW YORK, 17 DECEMBER 1979)

“The act of hostage-taking for the purposes of the Convention refers to any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain a hostage in order to compel a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage. Any person also commits such an offence if that person attempts to commit an offence as set forth above or participates as an accomplice of anyone who commits or attempts to commit an act of hostage-taking.”

UNITED NATIONS WORKING GROUP ON ARBITRARY DETENTION

“The notion of ‘arbitrary’ includes both the requirement that a particular form of deprivation of liberty is taken in accordance with the applicable law and procedure and that it is proportional to the aim sought, reasonable and necessary. ‘Arbitrariness’ is not to be equated with ‘against the law’, but must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law.”

INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, ARTICLE 9, SECTION 1

“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.”

CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

“Arbitrary or unlawful detention occurs when an individual is arrested and detained by a government without due process and without the legal protections of a fair trial, or when an individual is detained without any legal basis for the deprivation of liberty.”

TRIAL INTERNATIONAL

“Arbitrary detention is the violation of the right to liberty. It is defined as the arrest and deprivation of liberty of a person outside of the confines of nationally recognized laws or international standards. International treaties may be implored to guarantee the right to liberty if national laws protect the individual in an incomplete or partial manner.”
**Perpetrator States**

There is no single playbook for perpetrator states, also referred to as abductor states, and every case of state hostage-taking is unique and requires a case-specific response. Even cases stemming from the same perpetrator state may require different response strategies. While currently only a handful of countries engage in this practice, there is concern that if the practice is not strongly condemned by the international community, more states may see it as an effective tool or current perpetrators of the practice may choose to use it more often.

Data and statistics on specific cases of state hostage-taking are very limited. Research from the US not-for-profit community offers some information on the primary perpetrators of this practice and the possible spread of the practice globally. The James W. Foley Legacy Foundation found that detentions in China, Iran, Russia, and Venezuela accounted for 79 percent of US nationals detained in 2022, and that over 90 percent of the captors of Americans are now nation states.21

In July 2022, the United States listed six countries—Iran, Russia, China, Venezuela, North Korea, and Myanmar—under its newly created travel risk indicator (“D”) highlighting the elevated risk of wrongful detention of Americans by these countries.22 Both the US Department of State list and the Foley Foundation data are notable in that the perpetrator states identified are all authoritarian regimes and have strained relations with the United States.

However, US hostage advocates have argued that wrongful detentions do not exclusively happen in countries with strained or adversarial relations with the West, but also in states that are seen as Western allies and strategic partners, such as Egypt, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).23 The United Kingdom is, likewise, working to understand the complexities around the detention of some of its citizens in the UAE, where some British nationals have been recognized as being arbitrarily detained.24 Therefore, it is important to remember that perpetrator states can differ significantly in how they utilize the practice, who they target, and their motivations for doing so. Sometimes they are seeking publicity, prisoner swaps, or leverage for other concessions. Alternatively, they may engage in the practice to retaliate for an action they perceive as an affront to their national interests (like in the case of China).

There are both commonalities and differences in the ways different authoritarian regimes use this tool. In Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela, the practice can be seen as a form of asymmetric warfare, given that these regimes may feel they lack power or other tools to achieve their goals or exert leverage over the United States or its allies, especially given their pariah status within the international system. These states exploit the fact that the United States and other democracies may feel pressure or a greater obligation to protect the rights and well-being of their citizens, and will face moral pressure to secure the release of their nationals.

Iran stands out, in particular, as a country with a large number of publicly known cases of detentions of American, Australian, Canadian, British, and EU citizens for diplomatic and political leverage. It has also

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engaged in the practice consistently since fifty-two American diplomats and citizens were taken hostage for 444 days in 1979. A strong case can be made that there is now an opportunistic and permissive environment for state hostage-taking of American and other Western nationals in Iran. This is underscored by the fact that the United States, United Kingdom, and a number of other countries as well as the EU advise their citizens to avoid travel to Iran because of an elevated risk of wrongful or arbitrary detention. Further, the risk of wrongful and arbitrary detention is especially high for dual nationals of Iran and Western states.

Russia’s use of this practice has almost exclusively targeted the United States in pursuit of prisoner exchange deals and is best understood through the prism of US-Russian bilateral relations. In a report in the *Wall Street Journal* in March of this year, Brett Forrest documented the recent history behind Russia’s turn to hostage-taking of American nationals. In particular, Forrest notes that the road to today’s hostage diplomacy between the two countries began with the arrest of the Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout in Thailand and his subsequent extradition to and conviction in the United States, where he received a twenty-five-year prison sentence. Forrest argues that Bout’s case and the case of Konstantin Yaroshenko, a Russian pilot accused of drug trafficking and extradited to the United States from Liberia, after which he was convicted and sentenced to twenty years in a US prison, made Russia “furious that the U.S. had applied its own laws to Russian citizens in foreign lands ... Russian officials considered the Bout and Yaroshenko cases a diplomatic affront ... and accused the U.S. of kidnapping.”

For nearly ten years, Russian officials pressed the United States for the release of these prisoners. Then in 2018, the United States arrested a Russian national, Maria Butina, on charges of acting as an unregistered foreign agent. According to Forrest’s report, “Butina’s case appeared to prompt Russia to chart a new course and seize American Paul Whelan, a former U.S. Marine, on charges of espionage, which he denied. He was convicted and sentenced to a sixteen-year sentence.” Failing to secure a trade for Paul Whelan from the Trump administration in 2019, Russia seized another ex-Marine, Trevor Reed, sentencing him to nine years. In February 2022, Russia arrested US professional basketball player Brittney Griner on trumped up charges. In April 2022, Russia and the United States agreed on a prisoner swap which saw the United States free Yaroshenko in exchange for Russia freeing Trevor Reed. In December 2022, the United States and Russia agreed on another prisoner swap which saw Brittany Griner return to the United States and Viktor Bout to Russia.

In March 2023, Russia increased its “reserves of American detainees” by arresting Evan Gershkovich, a *Wall Street Journal* reporter, on spying charges which the Journal and the US government have denied. One week after Gershkovich’s detention, the United States designated him aswrongfully detained and has since been advocating for his release. Russia has now detained at least two Americans, Paul Whelan and Evan Gershkovich, that the United States considers wrongfully detained. Discussion of the recent history of Russia’s hostage-taking of American citizens and its intention for doing so should in no way be seen as trying to justify Russia’s illegal and immoral behavior. Understanding why Russia is engaging in this practice is needed out of practical considerations and to find ways to bring these Americans home. Eric Lebson makes this point: “work can and should be underway to understand Russian thinking on this issue, including the basis for the arrest of Gershkovich and the formula that will bring him and Paul Whelan home.”

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back home.”\textsuperscript{27} The United Kingdom is also grappling with the case of Vladimir Kara-Murza, a Russian opposition politician and a British-Russian national, whose case has been discussed by parliamentarians in the context of state hostage-taking and who is recognized to be arbitrarily detained.\textsuperscript{28}

In the last few years, China has been more aggressively using coercive diplomacy tools, including arbitrary detentions of foreign nationals.\textsuperscript{29} China has detained foreign nationals to retaliate against what it perceives as hostile actions by the nationals’ home countries or to coerce those governments to take desired actions. Since the adoption of new Chinese national security and counter-espionage laws in 2014 and 2015, at least fifteen Japanese citizens have been detained in China on national security charges.\textsuperscript{30} There are currently two publicly known cases of Australians detained in China on national security grounds: Yang Hengjun and Cheng Lei. The Australian government considers these cases of arbitrary detention, and for the last few years, its travel advisories for China have warned of these risks.\textsuperscript{31} Increasingly, China has targeted the citizens of smaller countries like Australia, Canada, and Japan, all of which are close allies of the United States. China’s detention of Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor in retaliation for the arrest of a Chinese citizen, Meng Wanzhou, in Canada on a US extradition warrant epitomized this trend and put a global spotlight on China’s turn to hostage-taking for diplomatic leverage.\textsuperscript{32}

**Impacted Countries & Citizens**

While no comprehensive database of past and current cases of state hostage-taking currently exists, the following countries have been parties to publicly reported cases: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States, which has reported the largest number of such cases. Because of limited data and limited research, there are many aspects of state hostage-taking that require further study.

Impacted countries need to engage with the issue seriously when cases of state hostage-taking occur. What is evident from the publicly available information on past cases is that the practice exerts profound costs on the detainees and their families, as well as on the foreign policies of governments whose citizens are targeted. Recent high-profile cases in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada illustrate the costs, severity, and complexity of the challenge. Responses

\textsuperscript{27} Forrest.
have included national policies and legislation like the Levinson Act in the United States, as well as collective actions like the Canada-led declaration, the declaration’s Policy Action Plan, and relevant United Nations frameworks.

Any foreign citizen is at risk of being taken hostage by a state. The practice exposes nationals of all countries who travel, work, and live abroad to some degree of risk. Not only is this practice contrary to international law, but it also undermines global cooperation, travel, and trade. Among the victims and survivors of state hostage-taking, there are marked vulnerabilities for journalists, aid workers, academics, business travelers, and human rights defenders. All that said, foreign nationals with a range of backgrounds have found themselves victims of the practice.

Dual nationals also make up a significant number of victims and are especially vulnerable, particularly in the case of Iran. Countries that do not recognize dual nationality can more easily invoke legal sovereignty as a justification and deny dual nationals consular access and services. Additionally, those with links to a foreign government or those engaging in perceived anti-government activities in a foreign country, such as participating in protests or pro-democracy movements, may be at greater risk of false charges related to espionage, endangering national security, and even terrorism. This can provide a cover for governments to subject victims to closed-door trials, to withhold evidence, and to deny detainees access to legal counsel or even consular officials.

Again, the data on this topic remains limited and non-exhaustive. According to the James W. Foley Legacy Foundation, over the last decade, the number of American nationals wrongfully detained increased by 175 percent. At present, the advocacy group estimates fifty-nine publicly known cases of American persons held hostage or wrongfully detained abroad (by both state and non-state actors). There are reports that hundreds of American cases are kept private. These reports are not surprising, as privacy issues, desires to handle the case through quiet diplomacy, or fears that publicity might “raise the price” of a hostage’s release or complicate negotiations may discourage victims and their families from going public with state hostage-taking cases. Another study by Professor Carla Ferstman and Dr. Marina Sharpe focused on Iranian state hostage-taking and found that sixty-six foreign and dual nationals were known to have been arbitrarily detained in Iran between 2010 to 2021. Hostage advocacy group Hostage Aid Worldwide (HAW) offers a more comprehensive global perspective and has been collecting data on hostages and unlawfully detained persons held since 1979. The Thomson Reuters Foundation also offers a non-exhaustive selection of cases of potential state hostage-taking as of 2018 and within the preceding ten years.

34 James W. Foley Legacy Foundation, “Supporting Hostages and Detainees.”
36 Ferstman and Sharpe, “Iran’s Arbitrary Detention of Foreign and Dual Nationals as Hostage-Taking and Crimes Against Humanity.”
Outside of what can be gleaned from a limited number of high-profile cases documented by the media, much remains to be learned about contemporary state hostage-taking. The evidence for whether state actors target individuals based on their nationality (i.e. based on their home government’s concessions policies or political relationship with the perpetrator state) is mixed.\(^{39}\) There is evidence that some perpetrator states engage in opportunistic “hostage-taking” and that victims’ nationality may not play into their targeting, though more research is required. Furthermore, impacted states differ in their framing of the issue. Some discuss it as primarily a human rights matter, while others have suggested it predominantly needs to be understood through the lens of geopolitics and national security. For example, under the Biden administration, the United States has leaned towards the latter, declaring the wrongful detention of Americans by state actors a national emergency.\(^{40}\) The US government even included the issue in its National Security Strategy for the first time in 2022.\(^{41}\) The Canadian-led initiative on arbitrary detention in state-to-state relations, on the other hand, frames this as a human rights and rule of law issue.


\(^{40}\) The White House, “Executive Order on Bolstering Efforts to Bring Hostages and Wrongfully Detained United States Nationals Home.”

NATIONAL RESPONSES

Presently, no country has an effective approach for deterring and responding to state hostage-taking. Effectively managing and responding to the practice will require countries to shore up their national policies and capacities, as well as develop effective frameworks and strategies for international collaboration. Deterrence, the act of raising the cost of hostage-taking for perpetrators to reduce its prevalence or eliminate it as a tool of coercive diplomacy, remains paramount. This section presents three assessments of national policies and practices from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. It aims to better understand how responses have developed in specific national contexts, as well as what can be learned from similarities and differences in national postures.

At this time, the United States has the most advanced legislative framework and government decision-making structures to address this issue. Known collectively as the US hostage recovery enterprise, this model offers many countries with more nascent national frameworks an example to study and consider. In the American context, elements of the same hostage recovery enterprise are leveraged whether a US national is taken hostage by a non-state or a state actor, a feature which stands out among the country studies. Much of the United States’ hostage policy and response capacity was borne out of reforms following failures to rescue Americans from non-state hostage takers. An assessment of Canada’s response to cases of arbitrary detention illustrates how the country has focused on internationalizing the issue by seeking solidarity and support from like-minded countries, as demonstrated through the Canada-led initiative against arbitrary detention in state-to-state relations. In the United Kingdom, a recent and robust parliamentary review process signifies efforts to review and reform existing British practices. A range of recommendations were identified and presented to the government to improve how the UK manages these cases. All the countries assessed are endorsers of the Canada-led declaration, working to develop a collective defense capacity to better coordinate responses among allies and partners in the face of contemporary state hostage-taking.

The United States

The present-day hostage recovery enterprise of the United States, which responds to the hostage-taking of Americans by both state and non-state actors, has been largely defined by events set into motion in 2014. Early that year, the world watched in horror as the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) terrorist organization publicly murdered American hostages, followed by British and Japanese nationals, among a series of other heinous crimes committed by the group. The captivity, torture, and eventual killings of James Foley, Peter Kassig, Kayla Mueller, and Steven Sotloff underscored the failure of the United States to recover its citizens from the grips of their captors. This failure stood in stark contrast to the outcomes of ISIS’ continental European hostages, fourteen of whom were successfully released following likely negotiations and ransom payments by their governments.42

In December 2014, US President Barack Obama established a team of senior officials to conduct a comprehensive review of the United States’ hostage policy. A letter from then Homeland Security Advisor Lisa Monaco set out that an interagency review team would examine a range of issues raised by the families of current and former hostages during efforts to free their loved ones from captivity in the

preceeding months and years. From the beginning, it was established that the country’s long-standing no-concessions policy would not fall under the scope of work of the review team.\(^\text{43}\)

“Totally unacceptable,” was how Obama described the experiences of some families in navigating their loved ones’ cases with the US government.\(^\text{44}\) In the lead-up to and throughout the 2015 review process, many American families expressed their frustrations with the government’s management of their loved ones’ cases. Among the criticisms raised by families were: a lack of timely and consistent information-sharing; a lack of coordination among the government entities managing their cases; poor communication and a lack of care and/or counseling; relentless bureaucracy with no centralized actor to support families; and threats of prosecution for exploring certain options to help their loved ones, among other concerns.

Families, alongside a range of government and non-governmental stakeholders, were invited to offer input for the review.\(^\text{45}\) The review culminated in June 2015 with a series of reforms set out in Presidential Policy Directive-30 (PPD-30; \textit{U.S. Nationals Taken Hostage Abroad and Personnel Recovery Efforts})\(^\text{46}\) and EO 13698 (\textit{Hostage Recovery Activities}).\(^\text{47}\) The administration set up a more agile American policy response to hostage-taking, alongside significant organizational and structural changes to ensure coordinated government action in the face of a hostage-taking event.\(^\text{48}\)

A key outcome of the reforms was to shore up the government’s coordinated response to hostage-taking across policy, diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, and military strands of work. Notably, this established several new entities within the revamped hostage recovery enterprise: the Hostage Response Group (HRG), which worked in support of the National Security Council (NSC) and was based in the White House; the interagency Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell (HRFC), which was located within the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) but received participation from across the federal government; and a Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs (SPEHA), designated to lead the government’s diplomatic response and based out of the State Department. The review also addressed the lack of mechanisms for sharing and collecting intelligence linked to hostage cases, especially with families and third-party intermediaries. Finally, the new US policy marked a paradigm shift in the relationship between the government and the families of hostages by recognizing families’ role as trusted partners in the hostage recovery process. With accountability paramount, a report on implementation was released one year later. The report included continued consultation with the families of hostages and set out further recommendations to assist implementation.\(^\text{49}\)

The comprehensive review and subsequent reform of US hostage policy introduced a much-needed improvement in how the government manages its response to state hostage-taking. Families of victims and non-governmental stakeholders have commended the good faith reforms, which have resulted in improved coordination and support for families. Former hostages and their families, nonetheless, have

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been steadfast in their message that the ultimate measure of success of American hostage policy is the safe and swift return of all hostages. The first non-governmental review of US hostage policy was conducted in 2019, led by the James W. Foley Legacy Foundation and New America. Among its recommendations, the review called for: sustaining US leadership on and prioritization of the issue; maintaining hostage recovery efforts across changes in administrations and executives; providing greater support to returning hostages; and, particularly, giving greater attention to addressing disparities in the treatment of Americans held hostage by non-state actors and those unlawfully or wrongfully detained by foreign governments.\(^{50}\)

With the review and reform process having been largely viewed with regard to hostage-taking by non-state actors, former hostages and their families recognized the urgent need to expand the hostage reforms of 2015, as set out in PPD-30 and EO 13698, to include a more robust response to wrongful detention. Hostage-taking by terrorist and militant organizations, in particular, had underpinned much of the hostage policy and review process. For example, some funds were only accessible to former hostages considered victims of terrorism-related crimes.\(^{51}\) On assessing the rise of “hostage diplomacy” cases, the James W. Foley Legacy Foundation noted: “Even though they are being held by foreign governments and not terrorist groups or criminals, Americans wrongfully detained are being held for leverage against the United States, making their cases very similar to hostage cases.”\(^{52}\) Many of these disparities were addressed with the June 2020 passage of the Levinson Act,\(^{53}\) \(^{54}\) which sets out specific criteria by which the Secretary of State can determine whether a US national is deemed wrongfully detained. It also codified the 2015 hostage reforms into law in December 2020.\(^{55}\) Subsequent policy documents on the topic have proceeded to include wrongful detention on the same footing as hostage-taking by non-state actors.

The US hostage recovery enterprise has, to date, largely enjoyed bipartisan support, including during the transfer of administrations. Throughout the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations, the issue has remained an American priority regardless of the political party in power. Most recently, in July 2022, Biden issued Executive Order 14078 on Bolstering Efforts to Bring Hostages and Wrongfully Detained United States Nationals Home,\(^{56}\) which reinforced existing commitments while also determining that “hostage-taking and the wrongful detention of United States nationals abroad constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.”\(^{57}\) Alongside EO 14078, the State Department introduced a new risk indicator to its Travel Advisories warning

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\(^{51}\) Loertscher. (Page 60)


\(^{53}\) The Levinson Act is named in honor of former FBI agent Robert Levinson, the longest-held hostage in American history.


\(^{57}\) “Executive Order 14078 of July 19, 2022 on ‘Bolstering Efforts To Bring Hostages and Wrongfully Detained United States Nationals Home.”"
citizens of the risk of wrongful detention by a foreign government. A bipartisan bill introduced in February 2023 (Supporting Americans Wrongfully or Unlawfully Detained Abroad Act of 2023) aims to ensure former hostages and their families have access to the correct resources and financial assistance to advocate their cases.

A review of the US hostage recovery enterprise shows how, in the American national context, elements of the same hostage recovery infrastructure are leveraged whether a US national is taken hostage by a state or non-state actor. Since 2014, much of the review and reform process has been spearheaded by former hostages and the families of hostages, who have also worked to address disparities between hostages and wrongful detainees. The American government leverages experience, tools, and networks across both sets of cases in its effort to bring nationals home as swiftly as possible. Since the creation of the US hostage recovery enterprise nine years ago, the United States has brought home 122 American captives, held by both non-state and state actors. While important strides have been made, hostage advocates have recently called for a comprehensive review to evaluate the efficacy of the 2015 hostage enterprise structure in today’s detainee landscape.

Canada

In Canada, the issue of state hostage-taking is closely associated with China’s detention of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor in retaliation for Canada’s arrest of Huawei Chief Financial Officer Meng Wenzhou on a US extradition request in 2018. That 1,019-day crisis in Canada-China bilateral relations and the high-profile diplomatic negotiations between China and the United States, which led to the eventual release of the Canadian hostages, highlighted the challenges and complexities of the issue and its costs and consequences, both in terms of human suffering and its impact on Canadian foreign policy and national security. It also underscored the limited policy options available to the Canadian government to secure the release of its citizens.

As a result, Canada’s response to the arbitrary detentions of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig focused on internationalizing the issue by seeking solidarity and support from like-minded countries in the G7, EU, and NATO. That experience inspired Canada to launch the Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations on February 15, 2021 as a political statement of opposition to the practice of arbitrary arrest, detention, and sentencing of foreign nationals for diplomatic leverage. Canada also

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60 Diane Foley, “President Biden, It’s Time to Bring Our Hostages Home.”
developed a Partnership Action Plan to coordinate further action on the declaration, which was welcomed by G7 ministers in May 2021 and by G7 leaders in June 2021.62

A conference aimed at further raising awareness of the issue and garnering additional diplomatic support for the declaration will take place on the margins of the Seventy-Eighth session of the UN General Assembly to be hosted in New York City in September 2023. Canada has also set up a dedicated team within Global Affairs Canada (GAC) to raise awareness and advocate for greater international cooperation on the issue and to secure additional endorsements for the declaration. The mandate letter of the current Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs explicitly tasks the minister with “[c]ontinuing to expand the broad coalition of states supporting Canada’s initiative to condemn and eradicate the practice of arbitrary detention and advancing an action plan to coordinate collective international responses to specific incidents of arbitrary detention and the need to focus on the implementation of the Declaration.” It also mandates the minister to “[w]ork with G7, NATO and likeminded partners to develop and expand collective responses to arbitrary detention, economic coercion, cyber threats, foreign interference in democratic processes and egregious violations of human rights, including through the use of sanctions, support for international institutions and coordinated action to reinforce the rules of international trade.”63

The United States and many other countries, as well as the EU, have been vocal supporters of this Canadian-led initiative to create a global norm against using citizens as bargaining chips for diplomatic leverage. US President Biden’s National Security Strategy in 2022 stated that the “U.S. is working with key international partners to promote and implement the Canadian-launched Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations so as to turn the tide against this inhumane practice and forge international norms against it.”64

Even though the Canadian prime minister, foreign minister, and other high-ranking officials publicly labeled the detention of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor as arbitrary, there is no formal mechanism for such a designation within the Canadian system. Unlike the United States, Canada lacks a legal framework or a public process to determine if its citizens are being held wrongfully or arbitrarily abroad. For instance, in a previous case involving China’s detention of two Canadian missionaries, Kevin and Julia Garratt, in retaliation for Canada’s arrest of the Chinese citizen Su Bin on an American extradition request in 2014, Canada refrained from publicly using the designation of “arbitrary detention” during their detention or even after their release in 2016.65

However, GAC does have a classification system for “complex consular cases,” which are determined on the basis of “vulnerability; dual nationality, denial of consular access to a detainee; poor conditions of detention; death penalty; allegations of mistreatment or torture in detention; allegations of espionage or terrorism; and lack of documentation.”66 Arbitrary detentions and detentions for leverage in state-to-
state relations could fall under complex consular cases, but if a process or criteria for making that determination within GAC exists, it is not publicly known.

There are several issues that need to be examined to better understand the national context for Canada’s approach to arbitrary detention in state-to-state relations. First is the legal framework. No Canadian law explicitly mandates the government of Canada to provide consular services to its citizens abroad. Unlike the United States and over forty other nations who view consular service delivery as a legal obligation, in Canada, provision of consular services is a discretionary prerogative of the government. The Foreign Affairs Royal Prerogative, outlined in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Act (1985), governs the provision of consular assistance to Canadians abroad. The act authorizes GAC to provide consular services to Canadians abroad and grants the foreign affairs minister discretionary authority to determine the level of consular assistance provided. Canada’s consular services are also guided by the Canadian Consular Services Charter, a GAC policy paper that outlines the consular services the government may provide to Canadians abroad.67

Critics have argued that this discretionary power can lead to unequal provision of services and discrimination, with dual nationals being especially vulnerable to such discrimination. In 2018, the Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development published a report titled Strengthening the Canadian Consular Service Today and for the Future, based on written submissions and the testimony of various witnesses. This report highlighted the contentious debate about whether a legal framework for consular services should be established or remain discretionary. The committee did not reach a consensus on this question and recommended that “the Government of Canada should continue to review its legal and policy regime governing Canadian consular services, with an aim to ensure no arbitrary treatment or discrimination in service provision.”68

The report also included significant findings about weaknesses in Canadian consular services, especially related to cases of kidnappings of Canadians abroad, providing support to families in complex consular cases, training consular personnel to conduct detention and prison visits, and managing cases of alleged torture of Canadians detained abroad. These capacity issues were also highlighted earlier in 2018 in the report of the Auditor General’s first-ever independent audit of Canada’s consular services. Among other issues, this report pointed out that GAC needed to be much more vigilant and timely in issuing updates of travel advisories to Canadians about risks of travel to certain countries.69

Given the timing of these reports and their findings, it is clear that Canada was dealing with the high-profile detention cases of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor while also trying to address key gaps in its provision of consular services, especially in its response to complex consular cases. Because of the high-profile nature of the cases and their implications for Canada’s relations with China and the United States, and given the absence of a SPEHA-type70 capacity in the Canadian government, the Canadian Ambassador to China, Dominic Barton, ended up playing a key role in the negotiations that led to the eventual release

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70 The Office of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs (SPEHA) based within the State Department. The Office was established by President Obama through an Executive Order and later included in the Levinson Act (2020). It now employs more than 20 staff members.
of these two Canadians after more than one thousand days in detention. The ambassador’s role (which was especially critical given the high turnover of foreign ministers; Canada had 4 different ministers during the 2018-2021 period) and the global campaign of solidarity and support launched by the Canadian government around these cases were highlighted in the UK Parliamentary Committee Inquiry on State-led Hostage Taking as examples of innovations that other countries should study and consider.\(^{71}\)

However, two years since the release of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig from China, GAC has not publicized any findings from its own lessons learned exercises on the government’s handling of their cases and what changes, if any, it has made to better respond to future cases of arbitrary detention. The need to strengthen the Canadian government’s capacity to respond to cases of arbitrary detention in state-to-state relations was highlighted by the Canadian House of Commons Special Committee on the Canada-Peoples Republic of China Relationship in its report on the *National Security Dimensions of Canada-PRC Relations*. The report called on GAC to “designate an individual to serve as a dedicated advocate for Canadians, regardless of where they were born and Canadians who hold dual citizenship, who are arbitrarily detained abroad, whose responsibilities include but are not limited to: Working with countries and multilateral organizations to promote the *Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations* to more jurisdiction; assisting with consular affairs regarding Canadians who are arbitrarily detained abroad; and exploring ways to protect Canadians from the practice of arbitrary detentions, more particularly in state-to-state relations.”\(^{72}\)

Another key issue in understanding the context for Canada’s approach to arbitrary detention for diplomatic leverage or state hostage-taking is Canada’s approach to hostage-taking by non-state actors. US policies on wrongful detentions draw on and expand existing US government policies on hostage-taking by non-state actors. Canada cannot rely on a similar institutional, legal, or knowledge foundation because it has not developed one for itself.

GAC is charged with leading the government’s response to hostage-taking of Canadians abroad. Over the last twenty years, the department has attempted to develop a policy framework to manage international terrorist hostage-taking. Despite these efforts, no formal policy has ever been adopted. In 2016, the *Toronto Star* published a series of investigative reports on Canada’s approach to hostage-taking. The reporting—which was based on interviews with more than 50 individuals, including government and security officials, and former hostages and their relatives—revealed a range of obstacles, including lack of leadership, lack of continuity, unnecessary secrecy, and political paralysis.\(^{73}\) The reporting also noted that while allies like the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, and others have refined how they work to secure the release of citizens taken hostage abroad, Ottawa’s policy has suffered from neglect under Conservative and Liberal governments alike.\(^{74}\)

A 2022 review by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) of GAC’s intelligence and security capacity also highlighted concerns about the department’s capacity to effectively respond to critical incidents, such as terrorist hostage-takings. The NSICOP found “Global Affairs Canada’s

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\(^{74}\) Mitch Potter and Michelle Shephard.
role to be one of facilitation and information sharing, rather than leadership or coordination.” The committee found that “successful governments have failed to establish a general policy framework to guide departmental activities and to provide specific direction at the start of each case. While GAC and its partner departments should improve their approach to these critical incidents by developing formal policies and procedures and a clear model of centralized leadership, those efforts will reach a point of diminishing returns absent accompanying systemic reforms driven from the political level. Critical incidents occur infrequently, but when they do, they have a dramatic effect on the organizations responsible for responding and the victims and their families.”

The committee noted that “over the last decade, Global Affairs Canada has not developed the necessary policy, operational and training mechanisms for relevant government organizations to respond to such events coherently and effectively.” The NSICOP report also identified that the Canadian Department of National Defence, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) lack a shared framework for coordinating a response to the hostage-taking of Canadians abroad. The NSICOP recommended that the government “establish a clear framework to respond to terrorist hostage takings, including to establish principles to guide the Government’s response, identify triggers for Ministerial direction and engagement, establish leadership for whole of government responses to specific incidents, and provide sufficient resources to support operational requirements during critical incidents.”

While the government agreed with all the NSICOP recommendations, no action appears to have been taken as neither the NSICOP’s findings nor its recommendations are addressed in the 2023-2024 GAC Departmental Plan. Interestingly, in speaking to the media after the release of the NSICOP’s report, the Committee Chair, Liberal MP David McGuinty, said the committee highlighted the issue of hostage-taking because GAC brought it to their attention, noting that “Deputy ministers have been saying they know that the way in which we deal with these hostage-taking incidents is inadequate.” He also stressed that “when these critical incidents occur, we need clearer and more robust political leadership.”

While Canada has taken a commendable leadership role on the issue of arbitrary detention in state-to-state relations multilaterally, its handling of such cases domestically has been mixed and leaves much room for improvement.

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76 The Honourable David McGuinty, P.C., M.P.
Citizens for Leverage: Navigating State Hostage-Taking in a Shifting Geopolitical Landscape

**The United Kingdom**

As with other national contexts, the matter of state hostage-taking was brought to the forefront of national attention in the United Kingdom through the human tragedies of publicized cases; this included those of Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe, Anoosheh Ashoori, Morad Tahbaz, Mehran Raoof, and many others. The public and political attention on Zaghari-Ratcliffe’s case, in particular, has profoundly influenced the United Kingdom’s conversation around state hostage-taking in the subsequent years.

Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe was detained by the Iranian government following a family visit to the country on April 3, 2016. She was detained at the airport in Tehran before her departure back home to the United Kingdom, commencing an almost six-year-long ordeal in Iranian detention. Falsely accused of spying by the Iranian government, her case was linked to Iran’s demands that the United Kingdom pay off a decades-old £400 million debt.80 Zaghari-Ratcliffe’s case was but one of a growing number of foreign and dual nationals detained by the Iranian authorities in the past years. The latest research suggests that at least sixty-six foreign and dual nationals have been detained by Iran since 2010. Of those detentions, fifteen have links to the United Kingdom.81

Following the release of Zaghari-Ratcliffe in March of 2022, the Labour MP Tulip Siddiq and the detainee’s husband, Richard Ratcliffe, sought a Foreign Affairs Select Committee (FAC) inquiry to review the case and explore wider lessons for the government.82 Launched in April 2022, the committee reviewed the UK approach to contemporary state hostage-taking to better understand Britain’s handling of state-level hostage situations. The inquiry set out to understand the challenges faced by the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) when “handling countries which use extra-judicial detention as a tool for diplomacy.”83 Of note, the committee issued a global call for evidence from diverse voices and perspectives. As with other high-level hostage review processes, the inquiry was borne out of past mistakes and failures toward victims and their families.

The FAC report concluded that “[h]ostage taking represents both a growing threat to UK nationals and a significant challenge to Government in terms of how it coordinates an effective response in individual cases, adequately supports hostages and their families, and works with allies both to resolve individual cases and strengthen deterrence.” It also presented several key recommendations to the government to shore up its response in the future. Among its recommendations, the committee called on the FCDO to pursue a way forward that “formalizes and publishes guidance outlining criteria for determining whether the detention of a UK national by a foreign state is considered arbitrary and at risk of being used for state leverage.”84 Similar to the criteria the United States set out in the Levinson Act, the United Kingdom could look to formalize its own criteria to classify these cases, offering more clarity and transparency for detainees and their families. Further, the FAC report recommended that the United Kingdom establish a position of Director for Arbitrary and Complex Detentions (DACD),85 which may better anchor the management of the arbitrary detention agenda around a single figure or office.

81 Ferstman and Sharpe, “Iran’s Arbitrary Detention of Foreign and Dual Nationals as Hostage-Taking and Crimes Against Humanity.”
84 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, “Stolen Years: Combatting State Hostage Diplomacy.”
85 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee.
The inquiry also demonstrated that the government had not been consistent in its use of terminology on the subject. David Rutley, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Americas and Caribbean), noted the FCDO’s preferred use of the term “arbitrary detention for diplomatic leverage.” In its response to the FAC report in July 2023, the UK government described itself as adopting a “multi-disciplinary task force approach to complex consular cases,” one that is able to draw on political, consular, legal, and human-rights expertise across government to inform and develop approaches on a case-by-case basis. The response also noted that in the current approach, cases are “led by Ministers, and supported by Ambassadors and senior officials who hold the necessary political and geographic expertise.” The government’s response also highlighted that cases are allocated across the Consular Assistance Department. With respect to strategy, the government pointed out that the United Kingdom works to deter the practice by limiting concessions to abductor states, as well as highlighting the risk of arbitrary detention in travel advisories to British nationals, and through bilateral and multilateral cooperation with partners.

However, the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, MP Alicia Kearns, and a number of advocacy groups expressed their disappointment at the government’s decision to reject several of the key recommendations made in the inquiry. The government, specifically, rejected the recommendation to establish a centralized position or office to oversee British cases, as well as the need for greater parliamentary oversight of such cases. At a parliamentary debate following the release of the government’s response, Kearns expressed her frustration by noting that “the Government did not sufficiently engage with our recommendations and the evidence and experience of detainees and their families. There were some recommendations where there was no response at all from the Government; it was almost as if they wanted to pretend that the recommendation did not exist. That is not the sort of response we normally see from the Government, so I was deeply frustrated by it.”

While the FAC inquiry represented an important milestone, the United Kingdom’s arbitrary detention policy and response model has been the subject of review for several years. A number of non-governmental organizations have also identified several challenges for the United Kingdom, offering recommendations to improve support for victims and families. In the years preceding the FAC inquiry, a range of complaints were raised by former detainees and their families about the management of their cases and the plight of Britons arbitrarily detained abroad. In 2019, then Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt requested that Judith MacGregor conduct a review on how the United Kingdom manages what it called ‘complex consular cases.’

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87 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, “Stolen Years: Combatting State Hostage Diplomacy.”
89 “Stolen Years: Combatting State Hostage Diplomacy: Government Response to the Committee’s Sixth Report.”
The *Review of Complex Consular Cases*[^94] (MacGregor Review) made a number of recommendations, including on information sharing and relations with families. Similar to the complaints made by American former hostages and families during the Obama administration’s review in 2015, the British families in 2019 noted room for improvement in several key areas, including: the recognition, speed, and handling of these cases; the means by which cases are joined up across the FCDO and government more widely; the need for a revised relationship paradigm between families and officials; information sharing; and, the public and media dimensions of these cases.[^95] Families, at times, “found the government to be secretive, inflexible and more intent on containing an issue politically than agreeing a strategy to resolve it.”[^96]

Similar to Canada, for the UK government, there is no legal obligation in international or domestic law to provide consular assistance,[^97] which raises similar concerns around whether discretionary power can lead to the unequal provision of services and discrimination among Britons.

Where the United States’ initial hostage recovery enterprise was built in response to hostage situations by non-state actors, the British context has kept a greater separation between responses to hostage-taking by state and non-state actors. This is evident in several ways. The killings of American hostages by ISIS since 2014 spearheaded both the hostage review and reform process in the United States. American and British hostages of ISIS were held captive together, and Britons David Haines and Alan Henning were executed, along with Americans, by the terrorist group in 2014. The fate of Briton John Cantlie remains unknown.[^98] In the United States, the ISIS killings prompted a government-wide review of national hostage policy led by the president.[^99] An equivalent high-level reform did not take place in the United Kingdom. The differing national responses between the United States and the United Kingdom to the ISIS hostage killings may have contributed to some of the differences in each country’s present-day approach to state hostage-taking.

Further, the United Kingdom may have missed an opportunity to shore up its response to state hostage-taking by not sufficiently addressing past failures or working to implement lessons learned, such as in the aftermath of the ISIS hostage killings in 2014. As such, the United Kingdom may have found itself with a more robust response model to state hostage-taking had it engaged in a review process similar to that of the United States, which laid the foundations for the current American response to hostage-taking in all its forms.

At the same time, it is worth noting that in separating the issue between state and non-state perpetrators, the UK approach may afford some advantages. Given the unusual circumstances of dealing with states that use their judicial systems to detain foreign nationals for leverage, the language that impacted states, like the United Kingdom, use to discuss the practice may allow for a degree of ‘plausible deniability’ that is not afforded when negotiating with non-state hostage-takers. This plausible deniability can in turn be leveraged when negotiating for the release of detainees held by state actors. Separating the issue of state


[^97]: “Stolen Years: Combatting State Hostage Diplomacy: Government Response to the Committee’s Sixth Report.” (Page 13)


and non-state hostage-taking may also be connected to the UK government’s well-known no-concessions policies vis-à-vis hostage-taking by terrorist actors. States, ultimately, negotiate with other states, including hostile ones, and the term state hostage-taking may complicate both negotiations with perpetrators as well as optics with home audiences when concessions or agreements are made.

Regardless of what terminology is used by the United Kingdom, careful attention must be paid to how the issue is positioned within the government. Consular services support the major life events of Britons abroad (i.e. births, marriages, and deaths), the issuing of documents, and efforts to ensure just treatment for lawfully detained Britons, among other benefits and offerings. State hostage-taking is not a routine or complex consular issue, but a cruel form of coercive diplomacy. Britons caught up in state hostage-taking will require political, diplomatic, and other government services and efforts to secure their release.

“Despite their common elements, each case was highly individual—happening in different political circumstances, within particular bilateral relationships and with varying views from family members on how they should be resolved.”

- Judith Macgregor, Former British High Commissioner to South Africa
A GLANCE AT THE EUROPEAN UNION

At the end of May 2023, six European citizens (two Austrian-Iranian, one Belgian, one French-Irish, one French, and one Danish) returned home after being released from detention in Iran.100 Among those released was Belgian aid worker Olivier Vandecasteele, who spent fifteen months imprisoned on espionage charges and was sentenced to forty years in prison on four different charges, including spying on Iran and cooperation with the United States against Iran, which the Belgian government had called “fabricated.”101

His release was secured through a prisoner swap that saw the repatriation of Asadollah Assadi, an Iranian diplomat convicted of terrorism and sentenced to twenty years in prison by a Belgian court in 2021.102 Critics of the prisoner swap deal say it paves the way for a policy of appeasement that would embolden Iran to continue using European nationals as leverage. In a statement, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, an Iranian dissident group, called Assadi’s release “a shameful ransom to terrorism and hostage-taking.”103

The number of EU citizens held by Iran is thought to be in the dozens. According to Le Monde, the Belgian government estimates at least twenty-two Europeans remain detained in Iran. France estimates more than thirty EU citizens are held there.104 The recent high-profile releases of EU citizens from Iran has opened a debate in Brussels on whether the European Union has the appropriate measures in place to counter “hostage diplomacy” and to prevent hostile regimes, like Iran, from using European citizens as bargaining chips. In June 2023, at the initiative of Dutch Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Samira Rafaela and Belgian MEP Hilde Vautmans, the European Parliament held a debate on whether the EU should develop a collective strategy against hostage diplomacy.105

At the debate, Rafaela called on "the Commission to implement a European strategy to counter hostage diplomacy, including a specialised task force that can effectively respond and coordinate when EU citizens are being held hostage by Iran and other regimes because the consulates and the embassies cannot do it alone. So a special task force is needed with special expertise coordinated among the twenty-seven Member States to respond to hostage diplomacy and the blackmailing of EU Member States.” She further noted that “Iran and other regimes using hostage diplomacy can only be stopped through cooperation at the EU level and we can only protect our

citizens if we work together. We must realise that the impact is for the whole EU and not only one single country.”  

In a speech delivered on behalf of High Representative Josep Borrell in the same plenary session, the EU’s top diplomat welcomed the release of EU citizens from Iran, but also noted that “these recent releases happened in the context of a growing number of illegitimate detentions involving European Union citizens in Iran.” He further stressed that “these consular cases are under the national competence of each Member State ... It is also worth stressing that these consular cases are all quite different, often require discretion and that, unfortunately, there is no one size-fits-all solution.” Finally, he observed that “in order to have consular access, be able to intervene, and work for the release of all European Union citizens, we must keep our critical engagement with Iran. The European Union and Member States must keep diplomatic channels open.”

The debate on whether the EU needs a more robust and coordinated strategy to deal with “hostage diplomacy” or whether action has to necessarily be focused on the Member State level need not result in an either-or situation. More can be done both by EU Member States to respond to cases of their nationals detained, and at the level of the EU to coordinate action, lessons learned, and develop collective deterrence and prevention mechanisms. The EU is a strong supporter of the Canadian-led multilateral effort on arbitrary detention in state-to-state relations and has commissioned a study on the legal dimensions of the issue.

In September 2023, the New York Times reported that a Swedish national called Johan Floderus, who worked for the European Union, has been detained in Iran for more than 500 days.

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**A GLANCE AT JAPAN**

In March 2023, China detained a senior executive of the Japanese pharmaceutical company Astellas. The detention was the seventeenth such detention of a Japanese citizen by China since 2015. Five Japanese nationals are currently held in China—two already sentenced, one on trial and two, including the Astellas executive, under arrest or in detention, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has called for the executive’s early release. China has said it handles such cases “in accordance with the law.”

While more attention is being paid to these detentions amid a surge in cases of arbitrary detention of Japanese citizens in China, the issue is not new. In 2010, China...
arrested four Japanese citizens after Japan had taken a Chinese ship captain into custody near islands disputed by the two countries.\textsuperscript{111}

Many China analysts attribute the recent surge in detentions to China’s 2014 adoption of new national security laws that expanded the scope of possible espionage charges. Chinese law takes a broad view of what constitutes a state secret to include information that would be considered innocuous in other countries. This point was also made by Hideji Suzuki, a Japanese citizen who recently returned to Japan after serving six years in a Chinese prison on spying charges, which according to the \textit{New York Times}’ coverage of his account, “stemmed from small talk at a dinner party with a Chinese academic about North Korea.”\textsuperscript{112} For the last few months, Suzuki has been raising the alarm about “seemingly arbitrary” detention of Japanese citizens in China. He has also been critical of the Japanese government’s “weak efforts to help him.” By speaking publicly, he wants to “shame the Japanese government into taking strong action to aid others who find themselves at Beijing’s mercy ... and to create a strong system for crisis management.”\textsuperscript{113}

In April 2023, Japanese foreign minister Yoshimasa Hayashi during a visit to Beijing told reporters that he had raised the detention of a Japanese national with his Chinese counterpart, noting that he “made a protest against the recent detention of a Japanese person in Beijing, and made a strong point of our position on the matter, including the early release of this national.” Hayashi further stressed that “Japan is seeking transparency over the legal process regarding detentions of its citizens in China and has asked for China to secure a fair and safe business environment.”\textsuperscript{114}

Japan has endorsed the \textit{Declaration Against Arbitrary Detentions in State-to-State Relations} and has been active in developing a more coordinated G7 response to China’s coercive diplomacy, especially around economic coercion.


\textsuperscript{113} Ben Dooley and Hisako Ueno.

RESPONSE & DETERRENCE

The issue of state hostage-taking requires consistent attention from impacted countries and their citizens. Government approaches to the practice should not only be driven by headlines or high-profile cases in the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, or elsewhere. Each case of state hostage-taking is tragic, lengthy, and complex; and individual and collective cases require further scholarship to inform evidence-based policymaking. This special report set out to analyze contemporary state hostage-taking dynamics and examine key cases, trends, and policies. Through an analysis of three countries, it has sought to present the distinct national experiences, conversations, and priorities that drive national trajectories and policy responses. This final section of the report identifies some key areas of importance regarding response and deterrence with a view to offering recommendations for national and international consideration.

Punishing Perpetrators, Protecting Detainees

In addressing state hostage-taking, governments need to focus on two equally important imperatives: to bring their detained citizens home and to deter and prevent the practice. While deterrence must be a priority, it cannot come at the expense of current hostages. Deterrence through denial of concessions to perpetrator states has clear limits and has been unevenly applied by the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and other countries facing detentions of their nationals for leverage. At the end of the day, securing the release of individual hostages often requires engaging in difficult negotiations and concessions. To offset these concessions, governments must do more to raise the costs on the perpetrator states outside of individual cases. In other words, government policies should focus on punishing the perpetrators without denying protection to the detainees. Deterrence through punishment—ensuring high costs for countries that engage in this practice—should become the focus of response efforts.

Currently, there are limited costs imposed on perpetrator states, and collective action in this area is lacking. In recognition of this reality, US President Joseph Biden has mandated the United States to develop “deterrence strategies to raise the cost of hostage taking so that it is no longer used as a tool of diplomacy by states engaged in the practice.” Biden has also authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to impose financial sanctions and visa bans on individuals responsible for wrongful detentions using powers granted to the president by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).

Deterrence through punishment will require governments to be creative when developing new tools to raise costs on perpetrator states and to be more courageous in applying the tools that already exist, such as Magnitsky sanctions, legal action, travel bans, and financial penalties. When appropriate—and while working closely with civil society organizations, the media, and the business community—governments should also use public messaging and narratives to inflict reputational costs on perpetrator states. In developing new deterrence tools, governments need to look across the entire spectrum of national power

and bring to bear not just diplomatic tools, but also law enforcement, legal, financial, and military intelligence tools.

In April 2023, the United States imposed sanctions on Russia’s domestic security service (FSB) and the intelligence unit of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the first application of sanctions under EO 14078. In announcing the sanctions, a senior US official told reporters that “this was the first of multiple rounds of sanctions in the works to punish and deter those who would hold Americans hostage.” These important first steps show that the United States is willing to assume a leadership role in developing deterrence tools and levy costs on perpetrator states. But for these national efforts to succeed, they need to be coordinated with allies among the Five Eyes and G7 and collectively applied. A coalition response must recognize that the United States will most likely remain the primary target of state hostage-taking, with close US allies and partners next in line. Only by acting together can impacted states make the cost of taking their citizens hostage unpalatable for abductor states to continue to engage in the practice.

Another key tool in the deterrence and prevention toolbox is travel advisories and travel bans. The United States, Canada, Australia and other states as well as the EU now issue travel warnings about the risk of arbitrary or wrongful detention in countries like Russia, Iran, China, Venezuela, and others. The introduction by the US Department of State of a specific risk indicator of wrongful detention that has been applied toward six countries is an important innovation that other countries should consider adopting. In extreme cases, countries have also instituted complete travel bans, like the United States has done for travel to North Korea. Some NGOs have called for a complete ban on travel to Iran given its systematic hostage taking of US and EU citizens as well as those of other citizens of Western countries. Others have cautioned that such a ban would negatively impact dual nationals who must travel to Iran because of family ties, as well as journalists and others who must travel there for work.

Finally, deterrence of state hostage-taking should be included in the broader discussion on coercive diplomacy, its growing use by authoritarian regimes and the various counter-coercion tools that are currently under discussion in the United States, the EU, and among G7 countries.

With respect to bringing hostages home, negotiations to secure their release are complicated by the fact that many perpetrator states are already heavily sanctioned (like Iran, Russia and Venezuela) and in many cases, diplomatic relations are tense, requiring third party interlocutors such as Qatar and Oman. There is also an evolving debate concerning the moral, legal, and political questions related to whether concessions and ransom payments should be used to secure the release of hostages.

Prisoner swaps—which were used to resolve recent high-profile hostage cases of US and EU citizens—in particular have been debated publicly, with some analysts fearing that they may incentivize additional hostage-taking. The reality is that negotiations for the release of hostages require hard choices and prisoner swaps might be the right tool in certain cases. As in any negotiation, the goal should be to

maximize leverage and minimize concessions. Securing the release of state hostages requires governments to move beyond rigid no-concessions policies and reliance on limited diplomatic tools and traditional consular case management approaches. States should employ policies that more creatively bring to bear both leverage and creative concessions. Creative thinking and shrewd diplomacy are needed to find whatever possible concessions or “carrots”—like lifting of select sanctions (in the case of Iran or Venezuela) or other mutually beneficial outcomes (especially around humanitarian issues)—could also unlock progress on hostage release negotiations, short of prisoner swaps and acquiescing to specific demands.

There is no one-size-fits-all solution when it comes to securing the release of hostages held by state actors. State hostage-taking remains a complicated policy area, without a clear playbook or well-tested solutions. The American example, in particular, shows that a whole-of-government approach, enabled through the Levinson Act and the establishment of the Office of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs, is needed to bring hostages home and to deter future cases. State hostage-taking cases cannot be dealt with like any other complex consular cases; they require dedicated capacity within government and a coordinated, complex, and tailored response involving all relevant stakeholders. SPEHA, a position currently held by Roger Carstens, serves as a focal point and an advocate within the US government on behalf of hostages and wrongful detainees. The office holder has the authority to work with other US agencies and departments to develop a strategy and a plan for securing the release of every single American designated as wrongfully detained. The office is a central repository of information, lessons learned, and data on past and current cases that assists in ensuring continuity and effectiveness in both deterrence and response efforts. But perhaps SPEHA’s greatest value has been its partnership approach to working with families of hostages and wrongfully detained Americans.

**Criteria & Determinations**

States should consider developing national criteria for identifying suspected cases of state hostage-taking. Only the United States, through the Levinson Act, has developed such criteria. This law also requires that, upon identification, such cases become the responsibility of SPEHA to resolve through a whole-of-government hostage recovery enterprise. The UK government, on the other hand, recently rejected the recommendation to formulate and publish criteria for determining such cases, as well as the recommendation to develop a dedicated government post to manage these cases.

Some detained individuals and their families, from a range of national contexts, have expressed frustration and disappointment in how their respective governments previously failed to recognize the nature of their cases. Former detainees and their families have raised concerns regarding the speed in which state hostage-taking cases were identified, the lack of knowledge about the issue among some consular teams, poor communication and coordination across government entities, and a lack of clarity on which entity or authority within their government was responsible for the management of their cases once recognized. Former Australian hostage Dr. Kylie Moore-Gilbert has remarked that “hostage diplomacy is only superficially a consular issue.” Shortfalls in identifying these cases result in critical time being lost when an individual is first detained, as these cases can languish with consular teams who are often managing a far larger number of lawful detention cases, among other routine consular business.

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The lack of designation criteria also complicates multilateral cooperation. Although the practice is difficult to define, some shared criteria or definition is, ultimately, required to strengthen collective response. Beyond US citizens, other detained individuals and their families do not have access to clear criteria and procedures for identifying these cases. This, in turn, hampers the ability of states to discuss trends and collective cases, and makes it harder to hold them accountable for resolving them. Finally, survivors of state hostage-taking require and deserve access to support services once their ordeal is over. Former detainees have faced challenges related to unpaid bills, taxes, and loans, with institutions and even some government entities claiming they lack authority to forgive debts or provide other relief. Former hostages may also face hardships associated with their criminal convictions, even if such convictions were based on false charges. From employment checks to travel visas, former hostages should not have to navigate the obstacles incurred by having a conviction on their record. Clear criteria will not only help bring victims and survivors home, but will also ensure they have access to dedicated support and funding after they return.

**National Response Capacity**

There is limited room for private action or negotiation by family members to resolve state hostage cases with perpetrator states. In some scenarios with non-state actors, especially entities that are not designated terrorist organizations, there is space for private action and negotiation, especially around financial concessions. For individuals taken hostage by states, there is no good-faith legal avenue they can pursue. Only political and diplomatic discussions between their own national government and the perpetrator state will move these cases to a resolution. For this reason, states have an obligation to their citizens to have a national response capacity to state hostage-taking in place. At present, most national response mechanisms and capacities are vague and opaque, with current and former hostages and their families pushing for states to provide clear guidance and resources. The United States offers a clear explanation of the tools and resources it offers families navigating these situations. Ultimately, hostages and their families need to understand their respective state’s response capacity and how they can mobilize the full machinery of government and bring to bear all relevant tools of national power to secure a release.

Without transparency and strong leadership, states cannot learn from individual and collective cases to strengthen future responses. Given that most national efforts to address state hostage-taking are relatively nascent, sharing experiences and lessons-learned among states is important. A common recommendation of the few hostage review processes that states have undertaken, as well as from requests made by former hostages and their families, is to designate an accountable figure (such as the United States’ SPEHA) within government or a centralized national hostage response separate from foreign ministries’ consular departments. There have also been calls to segregate state hostage-taking negotiations from wider bilateral political and diplomatic relationships and priorities with abductor states. From multiple national contexts, there have been criticisms of viewing state hostage-taking as a complex consular case only, rather than one whose resolution requires shrewd political, diplomatic, and economic elements beyond the capacity of consular officials. In other words, states require dedicated capacity

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beyond regular consular services. Multiple cases have demonstrated the negative impact of diplomatic staff turnover, including at the highest political levels. To make the issue “transition-proof,” states should consider shoring up national capacities to afford hostages and their families continuity and leadership over the full duration of their cases, which can be lengthy and complicated to resolve.

Collective Action

State hostage-taking is not only an egregious violation of individual human rights and principles of international law but also an attempt by perpetrator states to undermine the rules-based international order. Given the complexities of both responding to and deterring the practice, no country can effectively face this challenge alone. The international community must come together to strongly condemn the practice and develop collective response and deterrence mechanisms to combat it. Finally, given the fact that some countries may deal with this practice sporadically, an effective multilateral response mechanism could helpfully augment their respective national response capacities.

Although the impact of these practices appears to currently be limited mostly to Western democracies, actions that seek to erode international order based on human rights and international law represent a threat to all states. That is one reason why Canada’s Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations has been endorsed by over seventy countries to date. Smaller states, in particular, depend on a universal respect for international law and rules-based international order to guarantee their national security. This point was made clearly by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Belize at the launch of the declaration.125

The declaration represents an important first step in marshaling a more coordinated and robust international response to the practice of state hostage-taking. Canada and other endorsers should garner additional political support for the declaration and its implementation. However, much more needs to be done to turn the declaration’s aspiration of ending state hostage-taking into a reality. In particular, greater action is needed on the five specific work areas identified in the declaration’s Partnership Action Plan, which was developed by Canada and endorsed by the G7 in April 2021.

The Partnership Action Plan calls on states to voluntarily share information on cases “to explore lessons learned, raise awareness and help in the resolution of future cases.” This point was also made by the UK FAC inquiry report on this matter, which noted that currently there is a “distinct lack of data on state hostage taking among the UK’s international partners. The formulation of effective strategies to both respond and to deter state hostage taking depends on adequate data.” The FAC report further recommended “a central repository be created for information on cases of arbitrary detention and hostage taking, both active and closed, detailing processes followed and learning gained. There should be a systematic approach applied to all cases, not simply a sample.” The FAC report also recommended “biennial meetings of Ambassadors and Deputy Heads of Mission of ‘Five Eyes’ countries in states with a record of state hostage taking to discuss live cases and lessons learnt, and to disseminate best practices.”

Greater international cooperation is also needed to better utilize the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) in addressing cases of arbitrary detention in state-to-state relations. The WGAD was

established by the UN Human Rights Commission in 1991 and has the mandate to investigate cases of deprivation of liberty imposed arbitrarily or otherwise inconsistent with international law standards, instruments, and principles. The WGAD is the only international mechanism with a global mandate to consider individual allegations of arbitrary deprivation of liberty and the ability to render a legal opinion on the arbitrariness of the detention. The WGAD has adopted guidance around five categories of arbitrary detention, though these do not include arbitrary detention for diplomatic leverage or state-sponsored hostage-taking. Some non-government organizations like REDRESS have advocated for the WGAD to update its guidance to include such a category.\textsuperscript{127}

Nonetheless, in recent years, the WGAD has considered and issued opinions on a number of cases of nationals of one country arbitrarily detained in another country. In 2017, recognizing this growing trend, the WGAD devoted a thematic section of its annual report to “Consular assistance and diplomatic protection for persons deprived of liberty.”\textsuperscript{128}

The UK parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee inquiry examined the role of the WGAD in the cases of UK citizens detained in Iran, finding that “the WGAD opinions are an underutilized resource in the UK Government’s efforts to secure the early release of state hostages and those at risk of being used as political leverage.” It further recommended “that the Government should as a matter of practice promote public acceptance of the opinion of the WGAD and consider promoting the concept of an additional category of “state sponsored hostage taking” to the criteria of the WGAD.”\textsuperscript{129} The case of the United Kingdom demonstrates an important point: in the absence of national criteria for making a determination on whether a case of detention is arbitrary, the opinion of the WGAD should be used by the state of nationality in the strategy/efforts for their release. The UK government could lead discussions on this issue as part of its support for the implementation of the Canadian Partnership Action Plan on the Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations.

**Justice & Accountability**

Victims of state hostage-taking deserve justice, and perpetrator states must be held accountable for their crimes. Pursuing justice has been a key priority for a number of former hostages and their advocates, who see it as an important way to restore dignity and find a sense of closure. There is also a growing recognition that accountability for perpetrators must be an important part of deterrence efforts.

However, current avenues for pursuing legal redress through national or international courts are extremely limited. With respect to national courts, options to hold states accountable for their hostage-taking actions are severely limited by the principle of state immunity, which does not allow individuals to sue or bring legal action against states. Some states, like the United States and Canada, have created exemptions for these state impunity laws in cases of terrorism. States most impacted by state hostage-taking should consider putting in place similar exemptions for this practice.

Avenues for pursuing justice through international courts, such as the International Court of Justice or the International Criminal Court, and through various UN bodies face limitations given the absence of specific legal instruments that explicitly deal with the crime of state hostage-taking. In a study examining state hostage-taking by Iran, Carla Ferstman argues that given the systematic, sustained, and targeted way in which Iran engages in hostage-taking of foreign nationals, the actions of certain Iranian officials reasonably meet the threshold of crimes against humanity. Such a designation, if applied, would have important legal implications and would allow existing jurisprudence on crimes against humanity to be applied to the context of state hostage-taking. It also could open up additional accountability, given the legal obligations many states have enacted to address crimes against humanity, including through sanctions legislation.  

There is a need for additional research into the applicability and legal protection gaps of existing international legal instruments with respect to state hostage-taking situations, especially for cases outside of Iran. The legal protection gap experienced by dual nationals deserves further study and attention in order to identify specific tools and approaches for more consistent application of the rights and protections established under the *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations* to dual national cases.

To hold perpetrators accountable, governments should make greater use of existing tools such as Magnitsky sanctions, travel bans, financial penalties, and asset seizures. However, as with all sanctions, impact is most effective when applied collectively and in a coordinated manner. As in the case of Iran, once sanctions and travel bans are in place, there must be robust monitoring and implementation, and countries must ensure they have the necessary capacity to see to it that the sanctions are respected.

**Supporting Hostages & Families**

Among the complaints often raised by families whose loved ones get caught up in the cruel practice of state hostage-taking is that they receive poor treatment from their own governments. Across national contexts, families have stated their desires to be treated as “partners” by their governments and recognized as key stakeholders in the fight for their loved ones’ freedom, rather than simply being “managed” and kept at arm’s length. Data from US hostage advocates suggests that state hostage-taking results in longer negotiations and detentions; half of wrongful American detainees in 2022 had been held for more than four years. While the families and governments of citizens abducted by states may be joined together for years as they work to resolve individual cases, families have often felt let down and sidelined by their states. Moves to position families as trusted partners working alongside their governments, particularly those undertaken by the United States, are a step in the right direction. Further, independent organizations led by and supported by hostage survivors and their families have played a crucial role in understanding and documenting the practice of state hostage-taking more widely. These organizations are an important part of the whole-of-society approach to combating state hostage-taking.

Former hostages and their families have played an outsized role in sounding the alarm on the practice of state hostage-taking and in holding their own governments to account for poor and ineffective policies and strategies. States, therefore, also need to prioritize the myriad needs of families advocating for their loved ones detained overseas. In the United States, the proposed *Supporting Americans Wrongfully or Unlawfully Detained Abroad Act of 2023* aims to address these human needs, from financial support to

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130 Ferstman and Sharpe, “Iran’s Arbitrary Detention of Foreign and Dual Nationals as Hostage-Taking and Crimes Against Humanity.”

families to care and support services for former hostages. Former hostages have noted that many of the government entities working on their cases are those with an external affairs mandate; however, once they return home, there has been the absence of domestic government entities equipped to support post-release and reintegration following state hostage-taking. The whole-of-government approach required to manage state hostage-taking cases necessitates domestic government departments or entities equipped to support long-lasting needs and recoveries that can take years.

**Media & Publicity**

There are well-known media dimensions to all forms of hostage-taking. When it comes to state hostage-taking, there may be less public awareness of the practice compared to hostage-taking by non-state actors. In particular, the propaganda of terrorist groups, to include images and videos of hostages, has generated significant media and public attention in the past. More study is required on the media dimensions of state hostage-taking, especially regarding how abductor states view the importance of messaging and narratives around these cases. Across national contexts, victims’ families have reported facing pressure from their governments to keep cases private and to trust quiet diplomatic efforts. Given that hostage-taking is a crime that denies a person their agency and autonomy, governments should respect and support whatever manner hostages and their families choose to manage the public dimensions of their cases. In retrospect, some families have expressed regret that they did not go public with their cases sooner. Others have noted that governments should be equipped to support both the private and public preferences and efforts of families.

There are several dimensions to consider regarding the importance of narrative. In some cases, engaging the media can increase public attention and keep pressure on home governments to address cases and engage with hostage-takers’ demands. Further, media and publicity can play a role in creating reputational costs for perpetrator states and countering the false narratives they often employ about the foreign citizens they have detained. Media organizations should ensure their reporters interrogate abductor states’ narratives and not amplify the falsehoods they use to justify their crimes. All observers need to understand the difficult decisions hostages and their families grapple with as they consider whether quiet diplomacy or a public campaign is the right approach in their own case. Families, especially, need greater access to media counsel and training, as media campaigns are most effective when they are integrated into a broader strategy, rather than used as ends in themselves.

**Hostage-Taking in all Forms**

The discourse on hostage-taking needs to account for the multifaceted nature of the practice and its evolution in today’s complex geopolitical landscape. While this report has focused on the practice of state hostage-taking, the broader phenomenon is a complex one practiced by a range of actors. Discussions on deterrence and response must account for scenarios where both state and non-state actors can engage in the cruel practice. This paper’s earlier discussion of the US system demonstrates how elements of the same hostage recovery enterprise can be leveraged to respond to hostage-taking in all its forms. However, the review of the United Kingdom’s national discourse illustrates how shared language on hostage-taking can complicate both negotiations with perpetrators and optics with home audiences vis-a-vis concessions. Whether states choose to separate or align their efforts and strategies, they must be prepared to manage

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all hostage-taking scenarios. High-profile hostage events over past decades have perhaps shaped public perceptions so that many observers associate the practice with non-state actors. In that vein, terrorist groups, militia organizations, criminal gangs, and drug cartels may be among the entities most associated with the crime of hostage-taking.

Based on limited research, state actors have now surpassed non-state actors as the primary entities holding US nationals abroad.\(^{133}\) No such data is available for other countries, but the growing concern over state hostage-taking adds complexity to the discourse and demands a host of tools and solutions distinct from those used against non-state perpetrators. Further, the American trendline warrants caution. The downtick in hostage-taking of US nationals by non-state actors the past years may have been shaped by provisional factors.\(^{134}\) For example, restricted and reduced travel due to the COVID-19 pandemic kept more American travelers at home and out of reach of violent non-state actors operating abroad. The return of pre-COVID-19 levels of travel may impact the data in the subsequent years. Additionally, extensive military gains against terrorist organizations holding territory, especially in Iraq and Syria, may have impacted the ability of some terrorist groups to capture and hold hostages. However, deteriorating security conditions today in several terrorism hotspots, especially following Western military withdrawals from the Sahel and parts of Central Asia, may provide violent non-state actors with under-governed or alternatively governed spaces for resuming their hostage-taking. Therefore, states must be prepared to prioritize the management of hostage-taking in all its forms in the future.


\(^{134}\) Loertscher.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Each case of state hostage-taking is a human tragedy. The practice violates the human rights of those impacted and undermines important strides toward global cooperation, travel, and trade. State hostage-taking is an especially cruel form of coercive diplomacy, one that weighs an individual’s freedom against political, security, economic, and other complex national considerations. Abductor states act largely with impunity and see foreign citizens as pawns with which to yield leverage over other states. The practice has no place in international relations and perpetrator states deserve condemnation while being held accountable for their crimes.

Hostages and their families not only must navigate the hardships of arbitrary detention by abductor states, but often struggle to navigate the opaque response systems set up by their own governments. Former hostages and their families, across a range of national contexts, have faced the additional disappointment of being let down by unclear and inadequate national response efforts. As more states come to see the challenges posed by state hostage-taking, they must balance two equally important imperatives: to bring their detained citizens home and to deter and prevent the practice. While deterrence must be a priority, it cannot come at the expense of current hostages’ safety and well-being.

State hostage-taking is best understood in the context of today’s great power competition and geopolitical rivalries. Amidst the rising cases, states must shore up their national responses and multilateral efforts. Governments must prepare to manage hostage-taking in all its forms. Today’s complex geopolitical landscape provides the conditions for both state and non-state perpetrators to continue to carry out these crimes. Whether states choose to separate or align their response efforts and strategies for hostage-taking by non-state actors and state actors, they must be prepared to manage all hostage-taking scenarios.

This special report presents the following recommendations:

1. **Government policies should focus on punishing the perpetrators, not denying protection to detainees.** Deterrence should not be achieved at the expense of people currently held hostage, and deterrence strategies should ensure that high costs are paid by countries that engage in state hostage-taking. Currently, these states face limited costs and consequences for their actions. Urgent collective action is needed to make the cost of taking hostages unpalatable for perpetrator states. States need to be more creative in developing new tools for deterrence and more courageous in using existing tools such as Magnitsky sanctions, travel bans, and financial penalties. Deterring state hostage-taking should be part of the broader discussion on coercive diplomacy, its growing use by authoritarian regimes, and the various counter-coercion tools that are currently under discussion in the United States, in the EU, and among the G7 countries. Another key tool in the deterrence and prevention toolbox are travel advisories and travel bans. The US Department of State’s introduction of a specific risk indicator to highlight elevated risk of wrongful detention is an important innovation that other countries should consider adopting.

2. **To secure the release of state hostages, governments must move beyond rigid no-concessions policies and reliance on limited consular tools to implement whole-of-government policies that more creatively bring to bear both leverage and creative concessions.** Shrewd diplomacy and creative thinking are needed to find possible concessions or “carrots,” recognizing that negotiating the release of hostages requires making hard choices and that prisoner swaps might be the right tool in certain cases. As in any negotiation, the goal should be to maximize leverage and minimize concessions. Whatever concessions
are made should be offset with the imposition of meaningful costs and consequences on the perpetrator states, ideally through a coordinated and multilateral application of such measures.

3. **Criteria should be developed for designating and managing cases of state hostage-taking.** Criteria will assist national and multi-national responses, as well as ensure that detained individuals receive due care and support. To date, only the United States has developed such criteria, which it achieved through the *Robert Levinson Hostage Recovery and Hostage-Taking Accountability Act*. This law also requires that, upon designation, such cases become the responsibility of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs (SPEHA) to resolve through a whole-of-government hostage recovery enterprise. Shortfalls in identifying and designating these cases can result in critical response time being lost when an individual is first detained, as these cases can languish with consular teams without proper identification and designation. In the absence of national criteria, and in cases where the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has issued an opinion on the arbitrariness of a case, impacted states should use that legal opinion as part of the efforts to secure a release.

4. **Governments should put in place a clear national response capacity that affected citizens know how to access and that such citizens can hold to account.** When an individual is taken hostage by a state actor, there is limited room for private action or negotiation by family members to resolve these cases with perpetrator states. Only political and diplomatic discussions at the state-to-state level can move these cases to a resolution. For this reason, states have an obligation to have a dedicated, accessible, and transparent capacity in place outside of regular consular services to work on securing the release of hostages. The US model, with clear case criteria through the Levinson Act and accountability through the SPEHA and the wider hostage recovery enterprise, presents a good example for other countries to draw on.

5. **The international community must come together to strongly condemn state hostage-taking and to develop collective response and deterrence mechanisms to combat it.** Canada and other endorsers of the *Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations* should continue to garner additional political support for the declaration and its implementation. In particular, greater action is needed to implement the declaration’s Partnership Action Plan, which calls on states to voluntarily share information on cases “to explore lessons learned, raise awareness and help in the resolution of future cases.” Under the Partnership Action Plan, Canada should create a central repository for information on cases of state hostage-taking, both active and closed, detailing processes followed and lessons learned. A core group of impacted states should also consider engaging in regular meetings, better coordinating efforts around active cases, and sharing lessons learned and best practices.

6. **Justice for victims and accountability for the perpetrators must be made an important part of deterrence efforts aimed at bringing the practice of state hostage-taking to an end.** Victims of state hostage-taking deserve justice, and perpetrator states must be held accountable for their crimes. Current avenues for pursuing legal redress for state hostage-taking through national or international courts are extremely limited. Options to pursue legal recourse through national courts are limited by the principle of state immunity, which does not allow individuals to sue or bring legal action against states. States most impacted by the practice should consider the feasibility of putting in place exemptions to state immunity laws for state hostage-taking. Additional research and study should be undertaken to better understand
the existing legal protection gap with respect to state hostage-taking. Special attention should be paid to the legal protection gap experienced by dual nationals in order to identify specific tools and approaches for more consistent application of the *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations* to dual national cases.

7. **Families should be treated as trusted partners working alongside their governments to release loved ones from perpetrator states.** A successful response strategy is one that includes partnership with and support to families. Families across national contexts have stated their desires to be treated as “partners” by their governments and recognized as key stakeholders in the fight for their loved ones’ freedom and not just “managed” and kept at arm’s length by their governments.

8. **Decisions to publicize state hostage-taking cases should be led by hostages (where possible) and their families. Governments should advise, not influence, families and should support their wishes to pursue quiet diplomatic efforts or public campaigns.** Governments and other stakeholders should respect and support the decisions families ultimately choose to pursue. Families should think strategically about media campaigns and should receive greater access to media counsel and training. News media organizations also have a role to play in interrogating the claims made by abductor states and should be mindful of amplifying false narratives perpetrator states use to justify their crimes.
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About The Soufan Center

The Soufan Center (TSC) is an independent non-profit organization offering research, analysis, and strategic dialogue on foreign policy challenges with a particular focus on global security, conflict prevention and resolution, and the rule of law. Our work is underpinned by an emphasis on prevention, mitigation, and a recognition that human rights and human security perspectives are critical to credible, effective, and sustainable solutions. As a bipartisan organization, TSC fills a niche role by producing objective and innovative analyses and recommendations that shape strategic policy and dialogue and equip governments, international organizations, the private sector, and civil society to act effectively.
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