THE NEXUS BETWEEN HUMAN SECURITY AND PREVENTING/COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM:
Case Studies from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Niger, and Tunisia

THE SOUFAN CENTER
MARCH 2020
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Community Support Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>Countering Violent Extremism</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>United States Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GIZ</td>
<td>German Corporation for Development Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>HACP</td>
<td>Higher Authority for Peace Building</td>
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<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIG</td>
<td>Office of the Inspector General</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>P/CVE</td>
<td>Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism</td>
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<td>PVE</td>
<td>Preventing Violent Extremism</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>Dollars (U.S. Currency)</td>
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<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<td>YRC</td>
<td>Youth Resource Center</td>
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KEY FINDINGS

• Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) approaches are unlikely to succeed in the long term without addressing a range of structural factors, specifically political, economic and social drivers including public perceptions of policing; the socio-economic exclusion of particular communities and ethnic, race, religion or gender groups; and the lack of economic opportunities for young people, all of which create the sense of injustice on which violent extremism feeds.

• There are poor-to-non-existent mechanisms for monitoring, assessment, and evaluation of both state and civil society initiatives in P/CVE. Metrics are often lacking or absent altogether.

• Some P/CVE funding to civil society groups go toward projects that focus on capacity-building or dialogue rather than tangible development. Much time is spent in training or discussions in a learning setting and not in tangible, on-the-ground efforts.

• Practitioners repeatedly highlighted the need to avoid short-term and impulsive reactions to security crises as well as the need for funders to commit to more long-term interventions.

• International P/CVE funders, given their priorities and financial influence, have driven local NGOs to reconsider their priorities and programs in order to attract donor funding. In some cases, this has caused NGOs to move away from their area of expertise to start programming outside their area of focus and/or irrelevant programming for their local context.

• The lack of publicly available data on P/CVE national and international funding makes it difficult to map and track funding and programmatic trends, including whether funds have been diverted from one sector to another and what quantitative and programmatic impact such diversions have on development.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Preventing Violent Extremism and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) efforts are, broadly put, those which purport to engage in non-military interventions to prevent and/or counter “extremist” and “violent extremist” behavior. There is no one accepted definition for P/CVE: it varies not just among the governments setting P/CVE agendas, but among P/CVE practitioners, researchers, funders, and beneficiaries. There is also no agreed upon definition on what “extremist” or “violent extremist” behavior is.

What is not in dispute is that the field of P/CVE gained prominence as Salafi-jihadist groups proliferated globally, including most notably al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State, as well as their affiliates and franchise groups. The judgment ascribed to the rise of the P/CVE sector – whether it has been a positive or negative development – is still a hotly contested topic of debate. The main crux of that debate is whether adopting a securitized approach to initiatives that are human rights, humanitarian, or development in nature (for example, gender equality, peace-building, or workforce programs), or community-focused in nature (for example social cohesion and resilience-building programs), is appropriate.

For those who believe yes, the argument centers on individuals’ rights to being safe from violent extremist acts. Embedded into this argument is that States have not only a right but a duty to protect their citizens from violence. Others in this camp would argue that no one wins from individuals joining violent extremist groups; therefore, it remains in the best interest of society writ large that a suite of interventions have been designed and implemented to address this problem. For those who believe no, the argument is usually centered on the notion that defining
security strictly around counter-terrorism (CT), rather than human safety and security, ends up creating the problem P/CVE is trying to solve. Put differently, those in this camp argue that tactically, P/CVE efforts have largely failed and have been counter-productive, actually creating grievances that lead to “extremist” and violent behavior.

This report attempts to utilize three case studies to elucidate that debate. We employed a country-level analysis of three states that have been targeted by the international community for CT and P/CVE efforts: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tunisia, and Niger. We chose these countries based on geographic diversity and data availability.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**
Over twenty years after a civil war, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) struggles for security and stability. Hundreds left to fight the Islamic State; an unclear number have returned. As political dynamics significantly impact Europe, the Western Balkans remains an area of deep concern to the international community, not only because of its history of conflict, but due to its outsized contribution to the foreign fighter phenomenon.

**Tunisia**
Tunisia, situated next to Libya, which is an increasingly fractured country with myriad violent groups within its borders, has one of the highest rates of recorded foreign fighters, at almost 3,000. The country also suffered from a series of high-profile terrorist attacks in 2015. This notoriety has made Tunisia the focus of the global community and forced a number of initiatives to be designed to both prevent and counter terrorism and extremism at home and to rein in the foreign fighter spectacle.

**Niger**
Niger, with its strategic position as a thoroughfare between the Lake Chad Basin region into Libya, where trade and smuggling routes have long been used by organized criminal outfits, and more recently by terror groups, has been a focal point for efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism and terrorism. The country suffers from a number of governance and development issues, and a degraded security situation is augmenting those problems.

Another intention of this paper is to successfully analyze any changes in development/human rights/good governance and other related funding from the United States government (USG) into P/CVE funding in the three case-study countries over time. While much effort was expended to determine what funding streams looked like before 2014 and after, the lack of
transparency in the ways in which the USG, including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Department of State (DoS), provide funding to foreign countries and report it publicly, made it difficult to address this issue with any fidelity and rigor. Notably, a June 2019 audit from the U.S. State Department’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) found that spending on CVE efforts between FY 2015 and FY 2017 was inaccurate and incomplete. Specifically, recorded spending on programs considered to be CVE included spending that did not align with Department’s CVE goals and objectives, while in other cases, programs and spending that did support CVE efforts and DoS goals were excluded from spending records. For example, public diplomacy-funded CVE efforts were not reported along with the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources provided to Congress because they are not considered ‘foreign assistance’ funds. This lack of accuracy and completeness on U.S foreign assistance demonstrates that assessing CVE funding from the U.S. government to other countries is difficult to confirm credibly.

We examined the 2013-2018 timeframe because governments and international organizations began ramping up efforts to support P/CVE programming as ISIS formed and its ideology and attacks spread globally. While the violent extremism threat certainly existed before the rise of ISIS, the group exacerbated this threat through its use of social media, propaganda, extreme violence against civilian populations, and its keen ability to spread its ideology quickly around the world. For the information we were able to effectively glean, please see infographics and charts throughout this document.

**Methodology**

Individual researchers in each of the three countries contextualized field and desk research within the current state of geopolitical realities looking at the following issues, among others: State responses to terrorism and extremism; State responses to non-state actors’ roles in asymmetrical warfare; State policies on armed conflict; how international agreements and international law affect responses to terrorism and extremism; and how various ideologies affect individuals’ thinking around identity and statehood.

Despite the fact that the term “violent extremism” is used throughout this document to describe the programs of national and international organizations, as stated above, there is no precise, universally accepted definition and no definition was offered or suggested to those interviewed for this research. Instead, they were invited to engage with the terms ‘CVE’ and ‘PVE’ as they see and define them. However, broadly, for the purposes of this report, P/CVE efforts are taken to be those that claim to engage in non-tactical interventions to prevent or counter “extremist” or violent extremist/terrorist behavior.
CASE STUDY: TUNISIA
This report analyzes perceptions of countering violent extremism (CVE) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) funding in Tunisia, and examines whether the rise in these categories of funding have supplanted funding for development and good governance (e.g. rule of law, anti-corruption efforts, and security sector reform) and other fields linked to broader development issues efforts. Tunisia is a very apt case study for examining the impact of P/CVE funding, given the significant increase in donor involvement in promoting P/CVE in the country in recent years.

**Methodology**

The research focuses on practitioners’ perceptions and experiences of CVE and PVE funding, an area that is often overlooked by the academic literature. Field research was conducted in Tunisia over a period of three weeks, between 20 May and 13 June 2019. Data collection methods consisted of 13 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with practitioners in government, local and international NGOs, and donor institutions, and one focus group involving governmental actors, civil society organizations, representatives of international organizations and donors, and youth activists. Although this is a small sample size, care was taken to develop a sample that contained a broad range of actors.

Despite the fact that the term “violent extremism” is frequently used in the programs of national and international organizations, there is no precise, universally accepted definition. No definition was offered or suggested to those interviewed for this research. Instead, they were invited to engage with the terms ‘CVE’ and ‘PVE’ as they see and define them. For the purposes of this report, P/CVE efforts are taken to be those that claim to engage in non-tactical interventions to prevent or counter “extremist” or violent extremist/terrorist behavior.

**Local Context**

Tunisia has faced difficult internal and external security conditions since the 2010-11 revolution. While terrorist attacks had taken place in the country before 2011, a combination of factors led to the rise in the number of attacks after 2012. The revolution in 2011 resulted in newfound freedoms and demands for change, with newfound space for public expression. In the context of personnel changes at the top of ministries and security institutions, and reduced sense of legitimacy in the face of public criticisms and rejection, state institutions experienced a weakened capacity to enforce rule of law. However, with the worsening security situation in 2013-14 and major terrorist attacks in 2015, there was a renewed focus by state institutions, under some international pressure and with international support, on re-establishing the presence and capacities of security institutions.
In the wake of terrorist attacks in 2015, domestic and international attention has focused on hard security measures. Hard security in this context means responses to security threats that rely mainly on the deployment of military or internal security forces. Domestic observers describe a “swing” between 2011 and 2018 from “an authoritarian state that controlled everything to an explosion of freedom in 2011 where there was a feeling that everything was allowed…back to the rationalization of public space, redefinition of governance, and a tightening of security after 2015.”

Since 2015, a new counter-terrorism (CT) law and huge investment in training and equipping military and security forces have resulted in significant improvements in security in recent years, and there is a widespread public perception that the terrorist threat has fallen. However, this focus on hard security has been criticized for its impact on the public budget, 20% of which is devoted to security – double what it was before 2011.

The terrorist attacks in 2015 also led to CT and P/CVE taking center stage in international funders’ priorities. The European Union (EU), for example, held a high-level dialogue on security and counter-terrorism in Tunisia in 2015 – its first ever with a Middle East or North African
In response to three major terrorist attacks that took place in 2015, the Tunisian state’s priority between 2015-19 has been to develop the security sector’s capacity to respond to and prevent terrorist attacks. The attacks in 2015 prompted a reformulation of state policies, with a renewed focus on equipping and training security forces, including the army, police, intelligence services and National Guard. The state has made considerable efforts and put significant financial resources into this area, with support from countries including the United States, Germany, UK, and France. However, experts and practitioners criticize what they see as an exclusive and shortsighted focus on hard security. They point to the lack of a clear and holistic P/CVE strategy that addresses the multiple facets of violent extremism, including ideological, cultural, social, and economic factors.

There has been an evident increase in international funding to Tunisian civil society in the areas of P/CVE. Those respondents working in civil society in a variety of sectors noted “a substantial increase in P/CVE funding between 2015 and 2019,” overtaking civil society funding for other areas.

The counter-terrorism response since 2015 has led to a huge increase in security spending. The budget of the Ministry of Interior more than doubled between 2011 and 2018, while military funding as a percentage of GDP rose by 50% between 2011 and 2015. In the state budget for 2019, funding for the Ministry of Interior rose by 7.4% to approximately $1.087 billion USD, while the Ministry of Defense received a rise of 31%, to $1.028 billion USD.

There is a widespread perception that the increased funding for security has caused a drop in funding for other sectors, particularly health, education, and development. While funding for the Ministries of Interior and Defense now takes up around 20% of the state budget, other sectors have not seen similar increases.

In 2018-19 the military (Ministry of Defence) budget saw a 31% increase. Meanwhile funding for development rose just 1.8%. The security budget (Ministry of Defence plus Ministry of the Interior) is 20 times that of the budget for the Ministry of Culture. The large increase in security...
spending has caused concerns regarding the impact on public spending in other sectors such as health, which saw an increase of just 7% in 2018-19. As one doctor noted: “There is a major diversion of public funds to security and away from health. We can see the effects.”

In addition, this hard security approach has left key ministries that have a direct impact on the shaping of young people’s mindsets severely underfunded, particularly in the educational and cultural sectors. As a member of parliament noted, “If we look at the budgets for the ministries that are key to shaping citizens and their outlooks – i.e. Ministries for Education, Culture, Women, Youth and Sports – you see that they have very little funding... In addition, the funding they do have is barely enough for them to operate. 97% of the Ministry of Education’s budget goes to paying personnel, 78% in the case of the Ministry of Youth and Sport... They have very little money left to run programs.” Thus, the approach is seen to be draining public budgets in a way that could, ironically, undermine security in the long term by diverting funds away from sectors that help ensure social cohesion and stability.

Aside from the diversion of public funds towards security, the perception among practitioners is that the funds devoted to combatting terrorism and violent extremism have been excessively focused on a hard security approach. As one CVE practitioner stated, “There are no social, educational or cultural responses to violent extremism. It’s 100% hard security-based.” Another noted, “Tangibly, there is no attention to soft security. The security, military, and judicial sectors have monopolized all state funding in this area.”

Nearly all respondents criticized this approach for failing to address the multiple facets of violent extremism, including ideological, cultural, social and economic factors.

There is a general perception that no holistic national P/CVE strategy exists that integrates all sectors, from security through to education, culture, religious institutions, and development. There is a particular weakness in P/CVE, which is largely absent from government policies. This conclusion is supported by a European Council on Foreign Relations report on Tunisia’s CT strategy, which states that Tunisia has “prioritized the prevention of attacks and the disruption of terrorist cells” but failed to develop systematic approaches to curbing radicalization and addressing conditions that facilitate it.”
Experts called for the strengthening of the capacities of national institutions, such as the National Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Parliamentary Committee on Security and Defense, in the monitoring and evaluation of progress on the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy. A number of experts also emphasized the need to provide funding for research by local universities, research centers, and NGOs, in order to provide highly contextualized knowledge and to help design P/CVE policies tailored to different localities with very different characteristics. In particular, research on links between violent extremism and educational attainment, school dropout rates, childhood experiences of violence, and other factors are needed in order to understand these complex linkages and produce policy recommendations.

**Figure 2: U.S. Government CVE Aid to Tunisia, FY 2018-2019**

![Map of U.S. Government CVE Aid to Tunisia, FY 2018-2019](image)
**Funding Trends and Implications**

Based on the fieldwork conducted, the 2015 attacks in Tunisia led funders to elevate CT and P/CVE to their number one funding priority. Practitioners speak of an “explosion of funding” for P/CVE in 2015. However, several interviewees noted the beginning of a decline in P/CVE funding in the past year, with interest shifting to other fields such as decentralization and entrepreneurship.

Due to the increased focus on security, the perception among practitioners is that international funders have focused on state-led initiatives to combat terrorism and violent extremism, while reducing their funding to civil society initiatives. One civil society activist said:

> “There was a real problem after 2015 that much of the funding that was going to Tunisian civil society got diverted to the Tunisian state, which had a major effect of weakening Tunisian civil society.”

There has been an evident increase in international funding to Tunisian civil society in the areas of P/CVE. Those respondents working in civil society in a variety of sectors noted “a substantial increase in PVE and CVE funding between 2015 and 2019”, overtaking civil society funding for other areas.

Practitioners argue that while funding for P/CVE has expanded, funding to other areas has declined precipitously. One activist remarked that there has been a marked reduction in funding for election monitoring, for example, in favor of funding for P/CVE and entrepreneurship, “In 2014, there were 30,000 election observers. Election observation needs funding so you can train observers, so they can move throughout the country to distant regions…This funding has not been provided this year, unlike in previous elections…This is a real threat to the democratic transition.” Other activists in Tunis also noted that funding for election monitoring and youth political participation had fallen.

There is a perception that the increase in international funding for P/CVE has also resulted in a fall in the amount of funding for development. Those working in interior regions, in particular, state that they have observed a decrease in funding for local development projects, in favor of P/CVE programs. One activist in Ben Guerdane, which lies on the border with Libya, said, “There is a huge flow of funding going to strengthening security in Ben Guerdane, while we see nothing for development. It’s had a major effect on development programs. This is ineffective – each one should have a separate strategy and separate funding because without development, you can’t end violent extremism.” Hundreds of foreign fighters who travelled to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS were from Ben Guerdane, a small coastal town near the Libyan border.5
An activist who works on P/CVE programs also observed that “funds for programs on rural women decreased between 2015 and 2019 as funders focused more on CVE.”

However, three of those interviewed argued that there is no relationship between an increase in P/CVE funds and a decrease in funding for development. Some stated that development funding had not been affected in recent years. The lack of publicly available data on international funding provided to the state and to civil society makes it difficult for respondents to draw adequate conclusions. But despite these perceptions regarding the impact on funding for other sectors, there is a consensus that development is central to fighting terrorism and violent extremism, and that it must not be overlooked in P/CVE strategies.

Directing P/CVE funds to designing, implementing, and assessing development projects where there is a clear, tangible economic or social output for local communities, such as improved public services or the creation of local jobs, is seen to be much more effective in countering violent extremism than hard security approaches or P/CVE programs that focus on trainings and seminars.
Several of those working in the P/CVE fields state that their work is less effective if no tangible development or economic opportunities are offered to young people as part of the P/CVE program. There were several calls to increase support for local community-driven development programs that involve dialogue with local residents, as opposed to top-down development programs that do not take into account local needs.

**Conceptual and Definitional Ambiguity**

One phenomenon repeatedly raised by practitioners is that P/CVE funding has caused P/CVE to make their way into programs as terms, but without having a clear conceptual link between P/CVE and the activities being carried out.

Civil society organizations thus use P/CVE funding to continue to run the same programs with the same content as usual, while simply adding a “sprinkling” of P/CVE to their programs. As one activist puts it, “You work on youth participation, so you write a concept note where you say that you’ll work on engaging youth and encouraging participation because this is the way to combat extremism and reduce ‘social tensions’ and you twist the language so you can get the funding. But, in the end, you’re not working on violent extremism. You’re working on citizenship and youth participation, you’re running youth debating clubs but under the cover and label of PVE. This creates ambiguity and lack of clarity in programs.”

Another expert noted, “You have organizations working on social and economic rights who apply for CVE funding, and simply stick ‘and violent extremism’ to the end of every activity title so it becomes ‘Youth unemployment and violent extremism,’ etc. There is a strong temptation for NGOs to do this, apart from those who already have significant funding secured for what they want to do.”

Part of the problem is the lack of clarity in the definition of what constitutes P/CVE. Interviewees noted that ‘P/CVE’ can potentially encompass any sort of intervention in any sector, from health to development to criminal justice. This ambiguity means that the term becomes a ‘keyword’ used by both donors and NGOs without being tied to a clear strategy or theory of change.

Experts reported that the rise in P/CVE funding has had a greater impact on NGOs in interior, marginalized regions of Tunisia. This is due to a combination of factors. The number of active NGOs in these regions is relatively low, which means that domestic and international actors seeking partners in these regions will be limited. In addition, these regions are seen as being particularly “vulnerable” to radicalization due to poor living conditions, lack of economic
opportunities and, in some, proximity to the Algerian or Libyan borders, which are areas of instability.

This means that while donors are particularly interested in funding work in these regions, the number of available civil society partners is low, leading to local NGOs that work in other domains being solicited to work on P/CVE. As one civil society activist noted, “In interior regions, you often find only two or three really active and strong NGOs in each area. So you end up getting NGOs who work on culture, for example, being included in CVE projects, even though they’re not even convinced by the approach or philosophy of the project.”

Some international funders not only set priorities but also impose specific conceptual frameworks and theories of change drafted and designed far from local contexts. Others go so far as to dictate the details of activities. This was raised by a number of NGOs interviewed. As one activist noted, “Especially when it comes to American funders, they give you a concept note written in the United States that they want to implement in Tunisia, with ready terms of reference. All you do as an NGO is apply it – so we’re really subcontractors with no power to develop local approaches.”

A particular challenge is the way in which international donors tend to impose their own P/CVE approaches within funding frameworks. Effective P/CVE approaches must be tailored to the particular context of their target locality. Local experts and NGOs emphasize that there are significant differences in violent extremism dynamics between neighborhoods within the same municipality, let alone between countries. Yet, several instances were cited of donors importing understandings of violent extremism based on their own contexts, including through the imposition of methodologies, frameworks or foreign experts. As one program manager in a donor institution noted, these foreign experts “do not understand the local context, don’t even speak Arabic or French, and have not even bothered to read what has been written about this country.”

Thus, the hard security approach is seen to be draining public budgets in a way that could, ironically, undermine security in the long term by diverting funds away from sectors that help ensure social cohesion and stability.

A common challenge cited by local practitioners is that international funding on P/CVE emphasizes discrete activities such as raising awareness and trainings rather than direct, ongoing support for development. A number of practitioners stated that too much money is spent on
seminars and workshops in hotels in the capital rather than on-the-ground activities at the grassroots level that have a direct impact. It was felt that while such training is important, there has been an excessive focus on them in recent years, and that civil society needs support for programs that have tangible outcomes for local communities.

**International Organizations**

It is not only civil society organizations that have been affected by the mushrooming of P/CVE funding. International organizations also appear to have been affected. Experts working with international organizations in Tunisia report a sudden shift in the organizations’ work to focus on P/CVE. One expert describes this:

> “Many international organizations that had never worked on CVE suddenly found themselves in this field. The UNFPA, for example, which had never really engaged in the CVE/PVE field, suddenly started a program on PVE. You saw real confusion among its staff, who didn’t even know what violent extremism was. Suddenly, they had to get to grips with this phenomenon and set up entire programs on youth and security, without having a clue what they were doing, just for the sake of doing them.”

Thus, international organizations that rely on donor funds themselves also appear to have been ‘squeezed’ into entering the P/CVE space and adopting P/CVE approaches, sometimes without real understanding of the concepts being used. The availability of significant amounts of international funding to civil society appears to have had the impact of reducing incentives for civil society organizations to maintain relationships with state institutions. Whereas many civil society organizations had previously relied on state funding, the arrival of vast international funds has meant that many NGOs no longer look to state funding, which is small in comparison (around 20,000 Tunisian dinars for most grants – just under 7,000 USD). This phenomenon is not particular to P/CVE funding but does mean that it is very difficult for governments to map the initiatives taking place in the P/CVE sector and take account of these within its own P/CVE strategies.

**Conclusion**

Despite the shortcomings within P/CVE funding, most practitioners interviewed were of the view that it should not be cut, as this would have a major impact on the civil society sector. It is perceived that a sudden shift out of P/CVE would be damaging and destabilizing for local civil society and would undermine effective work that is being carried out. However, there is broad
agreement that P/CVE funding should be re-evaluated, and only continued for areas of work that have had real results, with a focus particularly on poorer neighborhoods and regions and on helping NGOs in these areas to develop their capacities.

There is a broad consensus that P/CVE approaches cannot succeed in the long term without increased funding for development programs that create sustainable economic solutions, particularly for young people in marginalized neighborhoods. One solution proposed is to adopt P/CVE and resilience as transversal issues in programs on youth and marginalized regions, so that violent extremism is taken as one form of destructive behavior, alongside other phenomena such as drug abuse and delinquency. This approach would have the advantage of addressing violent extremism as one of a set of phenomena and protecting youth resilience against all forms of harm. Thus, rather than focusing on a particular phenomenon, programs and funding should focus on target groups or beneficiaries and allow local civil society to set their own approaches and tools for developing solutions with those beneficiaries.

Another recommendation made was for the Tunisian state to assume a more active role in coordinating international donor funds, so as to ensure that funding priorities reflect local needs and to reduce the impact of sudden switches in funding to a particular area in response to events, which leave funding gaps in other areas. At the same time, civil society should operate with a high level of independence.

In addition, practitioners would like to see more dialogue and coordination between state and civil society institutions on their respective roles in the C/PVE field. As one activist notes, “It’s not clear what civil society’s role is and what the government’s role is. Even the national counter-terrorism committee has never discussed this.” Funders could include a greater focus on cooperation between the state and civil society, in order to ensure that their support to civil society does not encourage it to disengage from the state, whose funding it no longer needs due to the availability of far more generous international funding.

It is clear that, while Tunisia has had significant success in cracking down on terrorist networks in recent years, it is not clear how effective this has been in addressing longer-term security threats. There is a general perception that there is a need to focus on other aspects of CT and P/CVE, including educational, social, economic, religious, and cultural factors.

The increase in domestic and international funding for CT, CVE and PVE has been seen to divert funds away from other sectors such as development, health, and education. The lack of public statistics on international funding makes it difficult to map and track trends, and whether funds have been diverted from one sector to another. However, there is a clear perception that the
new focus on P/CVE since 2015 has led to fewer funds being available for other areas such as development, youth participation, and good governance.

In addition, the shift in funds towards P/CVE priorities has led to the diversion of civil society away from its original priorities towards P/CVE, in order to make use of the available funds. This has caused both international donors and local NGOs to become “hypocrites” in the words of practitioners. Rather than providing support to civil society to respond to the local needs and priorities that they identify on the ground, P/CVE funding forces NGOs either to divert their focus to P/CVE work, neglecting their original priorities, or to try to twist the work so that it fits within the P/CVE framework. Both of these situations undermine civil society’s capacity, integrity and ability to respond to local needs. In addition, the imposition of external P/CVE approaches that are not adapted to local contexts risk undermining the effectiveness of the programs, as well as trust between funders and local NGOs, who feel that their local knowledge and insights are overlooked.

Despite the shortcomings within P/CVE approaches, there is broad recognition of the need for international support for programs to tackle violent extremism. However, local practitioners propose a number of ways in which this could be done more effectively, as set out in the recommendations above. In addition, a key recommendation is that P/CVE approaches cannot succeed in the long term without addressing political and socio-economic issues, namely public perceptions of policing, the exclusion of particular neighborhoods and regions, and the lack of economic opportunities for young Tunisians, all of which create the sense of injustice on which violent extremism feeds.
THE NEXUS BETWEEN HUMAN SECURITY AND PREVENTING/COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

CASE STUDY: NIGER
Introduction

This report analyzes funding for P/CVE programs in Niger, and whether the rise in such funding has supplanted funding for development, good governance (e.g. rule of law, anti-corruption efforts, and security sector reform) and other fields linked to human development. The report solicits the views of experts and practitioners working in local and international NGOs, government institutions, and donor institutions on whether the rise in P/CVE funding in Niger has had a negative impact on funds being available for other areas such as development, youth participation, and good governance.

Despite the fact that the term “violent extremism” is frequently used in the programs of national and international organizations, there is no precise, universally accepted definition. No definition was offered or suggested to those interviewed for this research. Instead, they were invited to engage with the terms ‘CVE’ and ‘PVE’ as they see and define them. For the purposes of this report, P/CVE efforts are taken to be those that claim to engage in non-tactical interventions to prevent or counter “extremist” or violent extremist/terrorist behavior.

Methodology

Field research was conducted in the capital of Niger, Niamey, over a period of six days, between 23 and 29 June 2019 involving experts and practitioners working in a variety of regions. Data collection methods consisted of 11 individual interviews with stakeholders and local actors, and one focus group involving local activists and non-governmental organizations, representatives of international non-governmental organizations, and a government representative.

Local Context

Located at the heart of the Sahel region, Niger’s stability has been the subject of renewed interest in recent years due the spillover of conflicts in neighboring Libya, Mali, and Nigeria. Niger has been seen as a key ally in international military efforts to combat Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram, and other terrorist groups.

In 2011, Niger underwent a political transition and held open elections, with Mahamadou Issoufou gaining power. Issoufou has been praised for making Niger an “island of stability” in a very volatile region. Since 2011, Niger has become an increasingly active partner in regional counterterrorism initiatives, including the U.S. Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership.
The country, which hosts foreign troops from several Western nations, has contributed troops in regional responses in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin. Niger has been a partner in the EU’s security strategy in the region and hosts U.S. drone bases, including the newest base in Agadez, described as the largest Air Force-led construction project in history. However, this has provoked fierce criticism from the opposition and human rights groups, which argue that the security crackdown has exacerbated conflicts and human rights violations.

The rising securitization has been blamed for growing human rights abuses. In May 2015, Nigerien authorities detained two prominent civil society activists for criticizing the government’s participation in military action against Boko Haram. In 2018, 20 civil society activists were jailed for several months, with only muted criticism by international partners. Civil society organizations have expressed concern over the declaration of a state of emergency in the Diffa region, which has disrupted mobility, trade, and humanitarian aid. Border regions have been the most negatively impacted, as challenging security conditions and attacks on aid workers have obstructed development efforts.

The focus on curbing the flow of migrants from Africa up towards Europe has taken on growing importance in international cooperation with Niger. The northern city of Agadez, a key transit
point for West African migration, is the site of numerous internationally-funded projects to shut down migration staging centers or resettle migrants in Northern Niger. This is producing tensions between, on the one hand, international efforts to eliminate human smuggling, trafficking, and irregular migration and, on the other hand, economic survival for local communities, who have long relied on migration as a key source of livelihood. Furthermore, experts argue that while initiatives to reduce migration are being framed as tackling human trafficking, much of the migration is voluntary and cannot be treated as ‘trafficking.’

**Figure 5: U.S. Government CVE Aid to Niger, FY 2018-2019**

![Map of Niger with CVE Aid](source)

**State Responses to Terrorism**

The Nigerien government has responded to the emergence of terrorism and violent extremism primarily with hard security approaches. Between 2015 and 2017 the government imposed, and then further extended, a state of emergency in three southeastern and southwestern regions (Diffa, Tillabéri and Tahoua), closing markets and restricting access to land. This has affected access to services and the economic well-being of Nigeriens. These regions have been subsumed by fighting with Boko Haram, and the Niger government has been criticized for being slow in its response, and mainly focusing on hard security. Practitioners interviewed argue that the Niger government is acting in a reactive rather than preventive mode. As one CVE practitioner commented, “In conflict zones, the state allows the situation to get to a crisis point before intervening.”
However, the Niger state does appear to have made some efforts to broaden its security response to address deeper issues. First, it has sought to bring Touareg border communities on the side of the government by maintaining strong links with them and adopting a conciliatory, non-divisive discourse. As one CVE practitioner stated, “The state has understood, since the two rebellions that had ethnic roots, that security must no longer remain state-centered but must involve civilian populations more and aim to improve social and community cohesion, especially through campaigns targeted at youth.”

The government, through the Haute Autorité de Consolidation de la Paix (High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace, “HACP”), coordinated efforts to prevent and address conflicts and liaise with NGOs working in these fields. The government also works with local religious leaders and supports them in disseminating alternative narratives. Some practitioners praised the state’s efforts, particularly those of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Social Development, to involve civil society more closely in their work. A variety of programs supported by the HACP, such as the Security Governance Initiative, aim to improve communication between security forces and the public.

Thirdly, the new security reform plans adopted for Niger’s eight regions include a focus on socio-economic development and youth employment, with a focus on entrepreneurship. The HACP says that its approach to P/CVE involves “giving equal weight to CVE and development since… without development, we will lose in the long term.” However, the state has been criticized for being absent, particularly in border regions.

**Domestic State Funding for Security**

The renewed focus on security in recent years has involved a substantial rise in security and military spending in the country. Niger is now one of the most militarized countries in Africa, with an estimated 15-21% of the state budget going to defense; this is a huge jump from the previous level of approximately 2% of the state budget. Critics have accused the government of continuing to spend more money on what they view as a foreign war that has put Niger at greater risk of terrorist attack and resulted in a rising death toll. Sporadic protests have erupted against the presence of foreign military bases.

The increase in security spending has been criticized for diverting resources from the country’s significant social, economic, and governance challenges, including high levels of poverty, unemployment, corruption, poor education, and healthcare. Niger ranks last out of 189 countries in the United Nations Human Development Index, and over 65% of the population is aged under 25.
Critics state that the increased security spending is having a direct impact on public services and development. Education receives only 10% of the state budget, with access to water also receiving 10%. The rise in security spending, together with a fall in uranium prices, pushed the government – under international pressure – to raise taxes in 2018. Anger at the 2018 finance law led to protests and rioting, with the government responding by restricting the right to assembly.

**P/CVE Funding**

There appears to be a significant amount of P/CVE funding coming into Niger, whether to the state or to NGOs directly. As one expert put it, “CVE seems to be the new buzzword right now.” A large number of international funders are active in P/CVE in Niger, including USAID, the European Union, and the Swiss, German, and French development cooperation. Analysis of the approximately $4.44 billion EU Trust Fund for Africa approved for the period 2015-2019, for example, shows that 56% was allocated to development cooperation, 26% to migration management, and 10% (around $435 million) to security, peace, and P/CVE. The EU Trust
Fund for Africa was set up to address the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa and aims to foster stability and contribute to better migration management.\textsuperscript{10}

A widespread concern voiced by local actors is that international P/CVE funding to Niger is excessively focused on hard security, rather than addressing the grievances seen to drive violent extremism, such as lack of civil, political, and socio-economic rights, and the existence of vast inequalities.

All those interviewed concur that violent extremism cannot be reduced to a purely hard security issue. All link it more broadly to a sense of injustice or exclusion, which must be directly addressed in order to tackle the root causes of the problem. As one CVE practitioner argued, “The big gaps in society cause frustration and create conflict…cracking down on the phenomenon does not resolve these conflicts.”

Another widespread concern voiced by local actors is that international P/CVE funding to Niger is excessively focused on supporting security forces. A number of practitioners interviewed state that large amounts of funds have gone to Nigerien security institutions in recent years for the purchase of weapons and for training of security forces. This is supported by an Oxfam analysis of the EU Trust Fund for Africa released in 2017, which found that around 7\% of the fund’s budget (between $134 million and $178 million) was spent on working directly with security forces.\textsuperscript{11} The analysis also shows that in transit countries, such as Niger, half of projects relating to security, peace-building and P/CVE work to support security forces.

Nigerien NGOs interviewed expressed concerns that the state is exploiting P/CVE funding to further entrench its rule. Several NGOs interviewed criticize the government for cracking down on civil society, and for attempting to use international P/CVE funding to focus attention on security and divert it from other important issues. Practitioners reported that P/CVE funding that aims to improve governance in the security field is misappropriated by the state.

Several of those interviewed raise the need to use P/CVE funding to improve security governance. In particular, greater efforts are needed to improve relations between the police and local communities and improve police service performance. Some practitioners expressed concerns over the use of international funding for the security sector by the Nigerien government to avoid making these kinds of reforms.
Focus on Development

All practitioners interviewed argued that violent extremism cannot be successfully tackled without addressing development and socio-economic empowerment, particularly for young people and border communities. Socio-economic grievances are particularly deep in Niger, as there are regions, most notably on the borders, with virtually no services, infrastructure or economic opportunities. In particular, practitioners called for addressing corruption, promoting structural development, and reducing tensions between nomadic farming populations and sedentary communities in order to prevent conflict.

Donors appear to be moving, in recent years, to adopt a more holistic approach to P/CVE that addresses development issues. For example, USAID’s Sahel Development Partnership states that it adopts “a new, broader, holistic approach to countering-violent extremism in the Sahel that embraces development approaches alongside more traditional CVE approaches…as USAID realized the inter-connectedness and complexity of the vulnerabilities and drivers of violent extremism and resilience in the Sahel.”

However, some practitioners interviewed are concerned that most P/CVE funds going to civil society are going toward projects that focus on capacity-building or dialogue rather than tangible development.

Funding Criticisms

P/CVE funding has been criticized for being very short-term and awarded in response to crisis situations. This puts pressure on grantees to work to very short-term objectives using simplistic approaches that do not address deep-rooted issues. As one CVE practitioner stated, “Funders think that funds should be given for short-term projects and expect NGOs to work in emergency mode…whereas most NGOs do not do emergency relief. Development work is by definition, long-term.”

Another CVE practitioner also noted, “It’s a shame that we have to wait for problems to happen in order to work on peace-building. It’s better to start with prevention. The problem with CVE

Rather than providing support to civil society to respond to the local needs and priorities that they identify on the ground, P/CVE funding forces NGOs either to divert their focus to P/CVE work, neglecting their original priorities, or to try to twist the work so that it fits within P/CVE frameworks.
funds is they come once there is a big problem and you have to intervene in firefighter mode on
discrete activities once a problem is already there.” Practitioners repeatedly highlight the need to
avoid short-term and knee-jerk reactions to security crises, and for funders to commit to more
long-term interventions.

Some local actors in Northern Niger have welcomed the increased interest in their region, and
have sought to use it to attract funding for local development, such as the construction of roads,
hospitals, and schools. As with P/CVE funding, this shows how local actors devise strategies for
how to tap into international funds and direct them towards the local challenges they think are
most important, regardless of the actual funding objectives.

Examples of P/CVE Initiatives

Initiatives in Niger that are labeled as CVE or PVE range from support to security forces and
promotion of security sector reform through to “soft” P/CVE such as peace-building through
promoting dialogue and literacy, and “structural P/CVE” through development and job creation.

• Improving security governance – Nigerien and international NGOs are becoming more and
more involved in reforming governance within the security sector in Niger. Counterpart
International, for example, leads programs that seek to improve communication and
engagement between communities and security forces. This involves disseminating information
on security policy to the public and involving the public through consultations concerning
security measures. The National Democratic Institute also has a program on citizen monitoring
of security governance, and has established an observatory together with Reseau Genovico, a
local NGO.

• Women’s participation – Counterpart International leads a $2.4 million program promoting
women’s participation in security. This involves the creation of mechanisms to enable women
to take a more active role in maintaining security, cohesion, and peace at the community level,
through Citizen Monitoring Committees. These committees engage in dialogue with security
forces, religious leaders and others, and monitor and report signs of radicalization, among
other activities.

• Media – The NGO Eirene leads a program on media with the National Coordination of
Community Radios, working to train journalists to be more sensitive to conflicts and provide
support to community-based radio stations.

• Education – NGOs such as Eirene, Genevico and Karkara work on programs that promote
peace education in schools and with informal youth groups. Some, such as Eirene and Cercle
d’aide, have projects in Quranic schools through their civic service program for peace, which works on rural development and literacy, with the support of the German Corporation for Development Cooperation, GIZ.

- Counter-narratives – Genovico leads a program to produce manuals that develop and disseminate Islamic-based arguments against the use of violence, for use in educational institutions. The program involved the organization of roadshows with preachers to disseminate messages in border regions with Benin and Nigeria, as well as radio programs.

**Impact of P/CVE Funding**

P/CVE funding appears to have allowed a number of organizations, both state and non-governmental, to significantly expand their work. Those interviewed who receive P/CVE funding were largely positive towards it, arguing that it had allowed them to address many urgent issues, contribute to development or enter into new fields in which they were previously not engaged. For example, some NGOs who work on dialogue have used P/CVE funding to begin engaging in the religious field, developing projects in Quranic schools, and working with religious leaders to promote moderate discourse through community radios.

NGOs working in the P/CVE sector in Niger appear to be using P/CVE as a brand to continue doing the work they want to do, whether it is peace-building, conflict prevention or development. In particular, peace-building NGOs have been able to draw on P/CVE funds to do peace-building and social cohesion work, which have traditionally been underfunded in developing countries. One CVE practitioner stated, “The arrival of P/CVE funds allowed us to work on peace-building in the Tillabéri region in an official manner and to launch programs on development and peace-building there, because it’s a region where there were previously very few funds.”

However, while embracing the opportunities that P/CVE funds offer, many NGOs remain skeptical of the P/CVE label and the added value it brings to their work. Many feel that the work they do should be valued and funded without the need to add a P/CVE label that is problematic in their eyes. Some practitioners link this to the vagueness around P/CVE terminology. Others dislike the negative perceptions associated with P/CVE. As one CVE practitioner stated, “CVE funds have been positive in that we were able to intervene in regions where there wasn’t much funding before…but the attribution of these funds produces serious consequences and remains problematic because if these funds had been dedicated to peace-building and development, we could have worked on peace, social cohesion, and more positive things than ‘fighting violent extremism’.”
Thus, while it is clear that NGOs actively seek P/CVE funds, they remain ambivalent as to the logic and assumptions associated with these funds. Some express concerns that the attribution of P/CVE funds to certain regions or beneficiary groups stigmatizes them, by labeling them as “problematic.” One CVE practitioner argued, “With CVE funds, we are pointing the finger at an enemy. We’re designating violent extremism as an enemy, and since it’s associated with religion and with youth, we’re accusing youth and religious people, and this can be counter-productive for peace-building and social cohesion. It creates divisions in society, between Muslims and Christians, between young and old. The formulation of CVE is itself problematic.”

Many argued that security challenges in the region have led to a rise in funding coming into Niger, and that these funds created opportunities to do development work (albeit with a “P/CVE” or “migration” label). However, the absence of comprehensive data on trends in development funding and P/CVE funding means that it is impossible to draw or rule out a direct correlation between the two. Although it is possible to find details of individual P/CVE projects online, there is no comprehensive overview of P/CVE funding coming into Niger, the percentage of funds that P/CVE funding represents of the country’s overseas assistance, or whether P/CVE funds are allocated from budgets that were previously used for development assistance. Furthermore, the malleability of the CVE and PVE labels means that programs that may previously have been categorized as promoting development, peace-building, or social cohesion are increasingly subsumed under the P/CVE banner.

There was certainly a consensus among those interviewed that more development funding is needed in Niger. Several of the practitioners interviewed expressed deep frustration at the shortage of development funds and criticized the trend toward funding peace-building programs focused on social dialogue rather than tangible development programs. As one civil society representative stated, “Many funds put an emphasis on management and prevention of conflicts through soft means, but there are few funds for concrete investments, which is what we really need.” Thus, while it is not clear if funds are being diverted away from development, practitioners clearly see a need to increase development funding and ensure that the trend toward PVE and peace-building does not reduce the amount available for development work.

Most of those interviewed took the view that P/CVE funding should be increased, since it allows civil society to integrate security aspects with developmental work in ways that are useful for communities. One practitioner argued, “These funds should be better rationalized and oriented in order to benefit the maximum population by providing dignified living conditions and tangible changes.” Some improvements to P/CVE funding were suggested, such as increasing the length of projects and expanding their scale to allow engagement with a larger number of beneficiaries.
Conclusion

Niger has been the recipient of significant international attention in recent years in light of the security situation in the Sahel region. This attention has brought with it increased international funding, not only in the P/CVE sector, but also in the migration field. The relationship between P/CVE, development, and migration programs is a very complex one that is difficult to deconstruct. International funding for these three priority areas is at times clearly distinct, with separate funding streams, which makes it difficult to compare and trace year-on-year trends and whether one sector is displacing another. In other cases, they are part of a single fund, as is the case with the EU Trust Fund for Africa, which allows for greater comparison.

There is a clear perception among those interviewed that increased domestic funding for security has reduced the funds available for development and public services, such as basic infrastructure and education. However, when it comes to the increase in international funding for P/CVE, more data is needed in order to allow for a conclusive analysis of trends in funding for P/CVE, development and migration, and whether an increase in one area leads to reductions in another.

However, research in Niger with those directly concerned by P/CVE funding – particularly local and international NGOs – suggests that the increase in P/CVE funding has not led to a drop in funding for development or good governance. In fact, it appears that the increase in P/CVE funding has allowed local and international NGOs to carry out development-related work that they may otherwise have been unable to do. This has been done through the strategic use of the P/CVE label to encompass the objectives and priorities that these NGOs are already working on.

**Figure 7: U.S. Department of State Aid for CVE, FY 2015-2018**

![Graph showing U.S. Department of State Aid for CVE, FY 2015-2018](source: Security Assistance Monitor)
CASE STUDY: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
The aim of this assessment is to explore the impact of an increase in funding to local communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) for preventing violent extremism and/or countering violent extremism (abbreviated collectively as P/CVE). This includes examining institutional and civil society responses to violent extremism in BiH.

Political and social problems are especially difficult to challenge in BiH due to widespread corruption. Since late 2017, concern has also grown in BiH about an increase in migrant arrivals, which the country has been inadequately prepared to accommodate. This influx of migrants, largely from the Middle East and South Asia, is a result of a wider global migration crisis due to wars in the region and exacerbated by the fact that nearby EU countries (Hungary, Slovenia, and Croatia) closed their borders to migrants. BiH has been largely unable to systematically address these migration challenges because of the country’s complex and decentralized government structures, particularly the often dysfunctional relationship between the BiH federal government structure and its localities (cantons).\(^{12}\)

**Figure 8: U.S. Government CVE Aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina FY 2018-2019**

![U.S. Government CVE Aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina, FY 2018-2019](image)

**Methodology**

This assessment was carried out by employing a qualitative methodology, including desk-research and individual, semi-structured interviews, as well as focus groups with 78 participants. Interviews were conducted with 23 individuals, while five focus groups involved 55 participants.
who were selected through purposeful and snowball sampling. The selected individuals were experts in relevant fields or work is connected to the topic of extremism. These participants represented a diversity of experience and expertise, ethnicity, age, and gender. They offered rich, yet sometimes-opposing views that significantly strengthened the validity of the assessment and enabled researchers to obtain a deeper and more contextualized understanding of P/CVE efforts in BiH.

Overall, this assessment shows that a number of efforts are currently underway, especially by CSOs in BiH, to address violent extremism and radicalization.

Recent History

The 1992–1995 war in BiH, and other post-Yugoslav wars in the Western Balkans, did not end nationalist tensions. Instead, nationalist politicians have taken advantage of those past grievances for political aims, making political discourse itself a destabilizing factor. This has especially been true in BiH with the recent intensification of talks regarding the re-drawing of state borders. Influence by neighboring Serbia and Croatia are also having a destabilizing impact in BiH, fomenting ethno-nationalism through rhetoric that is eerily reminiscent of 90s-era narratives developed at the height of violent extremist expressions in regional politics. Yet, ethno-nationalist tendencies have become so normalized over time, and so prevalent in public discourse, that their association with violent extremism is hardly recognized anymore.

This rhetoric shifts and changes based not only on regional factors, but international ones as well. After the September 11th terrorist attacks in the United States, discourse moved toward the more dominant global variety that explicitly linked violent extremism to Islam and to the terrorism of militant Islamic groups. In BiH, this has led to an acceptance of ethno-nationalism as an inevitability and the identification of radical Islam as the real security threat. This discourse has been reinforced by the growth of Salafi-Jihadism – unknown to Bosnian Muslims until it emerged two decades ago, in its most militant form, in the midst of the war. The roots of Salafi-Jihadism in BiH extend back to the summer of 1992, when foreign mujahideen began arriving to fight and not only engaged in battle but promoted Salafi-Jihadism as an ideology, eventually proselytizing among the local population. Historically, Muslims in BiH have been known for a culturally and religiously moderate form of Islam shaped by centuries of multi-ethnic community, and many observers did not believe the more conservative Salafist ideology would find traction in the country. But, decades after the end of the 1992–1995 war, the number of Bosnian Muslims drawn to Salafi-Jihadism has grown slowly but steadily, even as exact numbers of Salafists in BiH have not been established.13
Violent Extremism and Foreign Fighters in BiH

This assessment explores responses to violent extremism in BiH that is linked to both Salafi-Jihadism and ethno-nationalism, the latter of which is often intertwined with ultraconservative Christianity. Below is a brief chronology of those movements.

Looking at Salafi-jihadist movements, experts estimated that between 2012 and 2016, approximately 330 people (188 men, 61 women and 81 children) travelled to Syria and Iraq from BiH, sometimes with multiple generations of their family, with some children born under the caliphate. However, with the downfall of ISIS and the end of departures by would-be foreign fighters, other violent extremist tendencies have again come to the fore in BiH. Journalists and researchers have started to re-focus on Serb ethno-nationalism. Orthodox Christian extremism has also been on the rise in BiH in recent years.

Taken together, it has become clear over the last few years that processes of radicalization and the nuances of extremism in BiH are complex and co-evolutionary; it is important that there is a greater focus on the ways radicalization is reciprocal and cumulative as well as the ways in which political discourse contributes to and supports extremism. It has also become evident that institutions beyond security agencies must be involved and invested in combating and preventing extremism.

In July 2015, the Council of Ministers of BiH adopted a five-year Strategy for Preventing and Combating Terrorism, (the Strategy) followed by an Action Plan for implementation in October 2016. A significant portion of the strategy consists of general measures directed at preventing individuals and groups from adopting violent extremist ideology. It also addresses the consequences of violent extremism, such as prosecutions and sanctions. This was reflected in changes made in 2014 to the BiH Criminal Code, which criminalized and stipulated sanctions for individuals who depart to fight in foreign wars.

The focus on fighting in foreign wars is quite evident in the Strategy, perhaps to the detriment of broader prevention efforts. A weakness of the Strategy is that it does not explicitly define
“terrorism” or “violent extremism,” referring in various ways to “terrorism and terrorism-related phenomena” or “violent extremism that can lead to terrorism,” and citing “new terrorist challenges,” including foreign fighting, but never stipulating the parameters of these terms in a practical sense. Therefore, the scope of violent extremism is unclear, as well as how prevention envisioned by the Strategy can be best directed. Still, the strategy is seen by international experts as comprehensive and essentially aligned to relevant international standards and human rights law.

Over the past few years, more research has been focused on the interactions among various drivers of violent extremism in BiH, and has shown that the interplay between general social factors – such as a weak economy, poverty, unemployment, and the fragile state, as well as personal-level vulnerabilities – can exacerbate the potential for some people to undergo a process of radicalization in the presence of extreme ideologies.

While in the last several years, other forms of extremism have also re-entered the narrative, warranting more research, in BiH, individual drivers linked to radicalization have not yet been explored beyond the confines of Salafi-Jihadism. This represents a clear gap in the literature that needs to be filled. To that end, one recently published handbook aimed at practitioners already working in systems of social protection, mental health, and education is intended to support them in contributing towards the prevention of radicalization and violent extremism and in working directly with individuals and families. The handbook broadens the conversation on violent extremism beyond Islamism by including examples of radicalization and extremism linked to nationalist and separatist groups, extreme right- and left-wing political groups, and extreme religious groups. It looks at nuances related to push and pull factors and discusses signs that someone is at risk for violent extremism.

**Examples of P/CVE in BiH**

The Youth Resource Center (YRC) from Tuzla has carried out several projects harnessing education and awareness raising to prevent violent extremism, including with the funding of governments and international organizations such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Government of Italy. The YRC was part of an OSCE project intended to establish prevention mechanisms at the community level and build cooperation between relevant stakeholders, help shape proactive interventions, and increase capacity for the reintegration of radicalized individuals and their families to those local communities. The YRC was involved in implementing the IOM-supported “Catch Me If You Can” campaign, and is a partner organization in both the “Youth Against
Violent Extremism” project, which encourages greater involvement by youth in PVE, and the “Young Activists in Combating Violent Extremism” project, which aims to build capacity among young activists to detect and report radical behavior in other young people, observed in both the digital and real worlds. Some YRC projects have also been conducted in cooperation with the PRONI Youth Development Center in Brčko District. And PRONI is involved in P/CVE efforts of its own, hosting a US Embassy-supported peace camp that empowers youth to implement small projects and thereby “build their resilience” to radicalization, and engaging with young people in the YOUTH Build project, supported by USAID, which offers a variety of life skills that empower youth to actively engage in their local communities.

**Figure 9: The Funding Sources for the Youth Resources Center in BiH**

The two CSOs mapped in this study – the PUŽ centre for community services in Tuzla and the VIZIONAR community centre in Bugojno – were partners in another USAID project, which was implemented in 2015 by IOM and funded by the Embassy of Italy, with the aim to improve the engagement of youth in vulnerable communities in BiH. The initial project was extended over three years and was implemented in 15 municipalities across BiH: Brčko, Bileća, Bugojno, Bužim, Čapljina, Cazin, East Sarajevo, Foča, Jablanica, Novi Grad Sarajevo, Prijedor, Tuzla,
Zavidović, Zenica, and Zvornik. Other CSOs working in the field of P/CVE in BiH include Hopes and Homes for Children, which has worked to build capacity among mental health professionals and social workers in this area; and Humanity in Action, which has focused on building resilience among youth to radicalization.

A careful look at these programs and projects reveals that many Bosnian NGOs have relied on international partners in order to carry out P/CVE work within BiH. Unfortunately, there is lack of empirical data about effectiveness of these initiatives and projects.

It is important to note that there are also a handful of organizations that have engaged in countrywide P/CVE projects with a religious focus. For example, the Inter-Religious Council of BiH works across all cantons to develop dialogue. ProEduca in Banja Luka has conducted national research about Salafi-Jihadists and radicalization, publishing two studies thus far, and in 2009/10, the Center for Advanced Studies, with support from the British Embassy, published “The Contemporary Muslim Dilemma,” a brief that outlined relevant topics and presented arguments and counter-arguments related to liberal and radical interpretations of Islam.

An effort to improve communication and coordination in the area of P/CVE has been undertaken by the Atlantic Initiative (AI), together with the Berghof Foundation, which has mapped the factors and actors related to vulnerability and resilience to violent extremism in select communities, specifically in the cantons of Sarajevo, Zenica-Doboj, and Bosnian-Podrinje. The Berghof Foundation has developed a policy paper based on this research, which will be published by AI and will highlight recommendations to improve P/CVE programming by emphasizing the need for all programming to be rooted in locally grounded analysis and planning. The paper will also highlight the factors and actors contributing to social resilience against violent extremism.

Prevention efforts have included trainings with teachers, and community-level engagement by youth organizations working to challenge radical narratives among young people. But critical research efforts, which have provided important insights into push and pull factors related to radicalization as well as the foreign fighter phenomenon, have not yet examined the impact of P/CVE funding directed to local communities, or whether this has supplanted funding for other projects.
**Insights from the Field**

CSOs were generally open to sharing their insights and reflections on their work. Asked about the level of funding in the area of P/CVE and whether such initiatives are overriding other important work, their responses were mostly consistent: there is still too little work in some areas of P/CVE, including projects that focus on ethno-nationalism, prison radicalization, women’s radicalization, and returning foreign fighters. In addition, interventions are largely absent in small towns and rural areas. CSOs emphasized that more funding should be directed toward local organizations working directly in the field and facilitating community outreach.

Participants in this assessment believed that an increased focus on P/CVE projects has not undermined other important initiatives and projects focusing on rule of law, gender equality, rights of children, and education. Various concurrent projects have been successfully implemented in gender equality, peace building, and education, for example, and moreover, respondents viewed all these initiatives as connected and interrelated with the issue of preventing extremism.

In terms of how much has been invested in P/CVE efforts in BiH, participants were unaware of the extent of projects or how much funding had been directed by donors toward P/CVE. Indeed, it was not possible to establish this amount, even for researchers, though it is evident that donor funding has been increasingly invested in P/CVE since 2012. Donors such as USAID, Norway, and the EU are especially focused on P/CVE and on preventing radicalization, while other large donors in BiH, including Sweden, remain focused on projects focusing on the judiciary, gender, and the environment. Respondents welcomed more P/CVE funding, and said a focus on this kind of programming was warranted:

> “Additional financing definitely led to the engagement of more experts in this field...and because of the context of the security and political situation in BiH, its history, and migrations [to Syria], even more investment in this field would be justified to prevent violent extremism in BiH.”

Several respondents argued that one of the key problems in countering violent extremism in BiH has been an over-focus on radicalization and extremism in the context of Islam, at the cost of overlooking or dismissing the normalization of neo-Chetnik (Serb) and neo-Ustasha (Croat) movements that may present a more significant domestic danger.
However, representatives from several local organizations articulated concerns that international organizations absorb most of this funding and that too many international organizations are present in BiH working on this topic. According to these respondents, resources are inadequately distributed across CSOs to successfully combat violent extremism and only a handful of local organizations are receiving approval for sizable projects in this area. Overall, participants were unsurprised by the increase in P/CVE funding generally while, at the same time, largely perceived international organizations as having an advantage in receiving this funding compared to local NGOs. Thus, international organizations are seen as gaining disproportionately from the donor focus on this area. While some of the international organizations are praised for their work, others have been criticized as non-transparent and overly donor driven.

**Critiques of P/CVE**

Several respondents argued that one of the key problems in countering violent extremism in BiH has been an over-focus on radicalization and extremism in the context of Islam, at the cost of overlooking or dismissing the normalization of neo-Chetnik (Serb) and neo-Ustasha (Croat) movements that may present a more significant domestic danger. They offered numerous examples of manifestations of ethno-nationalism and discussed efforts by local political elites to preserve a status quo of ethnic division, such as genocide denial.

Another issue cited by research participants was the limited knowledge among professionals to engage directly with individuals who may present a threat or may be at-risk of radicalization, in order to act early enough to intervene before problematic behaviors emerge. It is notable that despite the genocide and atrocities committed in BiH only 25 years ago, violent extremism is not addressed in the undergraduate education of teachers and social workers. The silence surrounding these issues is also reinforced by the political nature of the educational system in BiH, which divides children and their teachers by ethnic identity. In some areas of BiH, this has become especially pronounced since the war, with the creation of “two schools under one roof.”

Several teachers who participated in one of the two focus groups in Zenica as a part of this assessment mentioned this ethnic division in education as a factor that feeds radicalization and extremism. They described characteristics they observed in children educated in the “two schools under one roof” system, commenting that these children do not socialize across ethnic groups nor do they use the same buses or know about the religious holidays of other groups. According to these teachers, such children may not exhibit signs of extremism now, but the seeds of it have been sown for such extremism to manifest. Educators often feel disempowered to respond effectively, given the strength of extremist politics aimed at cementing division in BiH.
“Recently we had an invitation from Foča municipality, public authority, to deliver a workshop on violent extremism...I’m glad we are talking about this, but I’m sad that we are talking about it only now. Here, violent extremism started in the early 90s, but we only started defining it as such and talking about it when people from the Arab world started knocking at the door of Europe. When violent extremism was destroying Bosnia in the early 90s, Europe didn’t react, and only now are we talking about what has been present here for 30 years.”

Participants argued that people working on the frontlines in the field have a relatively broad understanding of issues related to violent extremism, but the general public relates the concept only to ISIS. The common wisdom is that because BiH does not experience terrorism, we have no extremism. But this ignores normalized forms of violence, such as that of football hooligans who have caused so many problems in the past and are now more radical than they were in the 1990s.

This reflects the polarization of Bosnian society, and why the topic of P/CVE does not unite people in the way donors may imagine. Moreover, activist respondents emphasized that interventions identifying or discussing only one form of extremism cannot be seen as real P/CVE work; meaning, this polarization is an obstacle to prevention.

P/CVE Practitioners

Early research efforts into “extremism” and “radicalization” helped highlight communities where Salafi-jihadist radicalization had appeared to take hold more pervasively; yet, this has not necessarily translated into funding for projects in those places. In Zenica, for example, a city near Sarajevo that has grappled with the fallout from radicalization, one would expect many P/CVE projects to be implemented, yet only 5 of 20 participants in the focus groups in Zenica were involved in projects related to extremism and radicalization. Reflecting on the data, it is possible that this is linked to the fact that some projects which include prevention elements are not necessarily referred to as P/CVE, such as activities conducted by Inter-Religious Council Boards across BiH.24
The main challenge cited by NGOs working in this field is poor information sharing, and this is linked to legitimacy. As one expert explained:

“The work of NGOs in this field has been watered down... We have a certain number of smaller organizations that work in this field but... end users see no benefit from it and they don’t even come into contact with these organizations. Somehow, the focus should be put on several organizations, because the problem is not in the number of organizations but in their expertise. It’s impossible that one day you work on issues of ecology and the next day on extremism. That is why relevance and competencies are questioned.”

Regarding who drives the P/CVE agenda, participants were clear that donors publish calls and organizations apply in response. Respondents claimed that some organizations are driven to operate outside their respective areas of expertise by donor demands. To some extent, it seems that well-established CSOs with expertise and a respected reputation are capable of preserving their intended agendas, while smaller organizations with less recognition are sometimes drawn into areas for which they have limited expertise and cannot ensure sustainability. This phenomenon was not highlighted as a key concern affecting P/CVE efforts in BiH, however.

**Conclusion**

This assessment discovered enthusiastic efforts by individuals, NGOs, and clerics to overcome ethnic divisions in BiH, but found that they have been undertaken without an honest reflection on the 1992–1995 war or an open critique of ethno-nationalist narratives. It reveals that reconciliation efforts, which could be a factor that prevents ethno-nationalist tensions and potential future violence, have been centered on the personal and not the political.

This research also revealed a number of opportunities for women in politics, civil society, and the clergy to work together to reduce social distance and create counter-narratives to radicalization. However, to do so effectively, they will require nuanced knowledge, skills, expertise, and the encouragement and support to tackle these politically unpopular and oft contested issues. Conservative, extremist, and nationalist movements share many of the aims of radical religious movements, and all are making serious attempts to reverse advances made in gender equality.

Several trends emerged from this assessment, including that stakeholders in BiH are slowly re-focusing from a view of radicalization and violent extremism that relates these phenomena to Islam alone, and are becoming aware that too much attention on Islam in this context unjustly labels and alienates certain individuals and groups while simultaneously distorting the challenge.
More efforts to address ethno-nationalism and related dangers are emerging in response. Importantly, awareness is also growing regarding the necessity to understand gender- and context-specific dynamics of radicalization, such as the role women can and do play in online spaces and the unique stressors experienced by diaspora communities.

Overall, the opinion of respondents in this assessment was that programming and funding dedicated to P/CVE has not supplanted other initiatives, and that various efforts in human rights, gender equality, and peace building have contributed, whether deliberately or unintentionally, to P/CVE. This demonstrates the extent to which projects in BiH have addressed both the root causes and the “symptoms” or consequences of extremism. However, not all such programming is defined as P/CVE and thus, activities that contribute to prevention are sometimes viewed as part of other initiatives.

Assessment participants also expressed that there is a need for more home-grown initiatives driven by local CSOs, as opposed to top-down work directed by international organizations. They noted, too, that organizations working on P/CVE must improve information exchange, for the benefit of all. Indeed, as this assessment has shown, knowledge in this field is ever evolving and violent extremism has many sides and nuances beyond those associated with “typical” acts of terrorism or engagement in foreign fighting. And as researchers have explained, this growing knowledge base does not always elucidate or validate previous assumptions, but instead introduces concepts or facts that become part of an ongoing dialogue to integrate and reconcile new findings and trends:

“There is new terminology; and an effort to make a distinction between ‘radicalisation,’ ‘extremism,’ and ‘violent extremism.’ The syntagm ‘radicalisation into violent extremism’… reflects the challenge researchers face to avoid stigmatising individuals and groups that adhere to radical religious ideologies and hold radical religious or political beliefs within the legal bounds of liberal democratic societies. But this new terminology underscores one of the main problems in both analysing the issue and developing successful prevention programmes – that the core rights of any free society include the right to radical beliefs. This freedom poses an obstacle to prevention programmes because the differences between indoctrination into radical beliefs versus into violent radical beliefs are often a matter of subtleties. And sometimes, it is also a question of personality whether those beliefs inspire violence in an individual or not.”25
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

In undertaking this multi-country study, there were some similar and some divergent trends in the feedback from the variety of P/CVE stakeholders in the three case-study countries. For example, while NGOs in Tunisia expressed concerns that P/CVE funding is encouraging them to move away from their own thematic priorities, in Niger, NGOs interviewed were far more positive about the opportunities that P/CVE funding represented. In both Niger and BiH, there were far fewer concerns about NGOs being obliged to “chase the money” and follow the priorities set by these donors. Instead, NGOs largely embraced the opportunity to use P/CVE to use the work they wanted to do. Further, whereas P/CVE funding in Tunisia appears to have led to fewer funds being available for other areas such as development, youth participation, and good governance, practitioners in Niger and BiH did not take the same view.

This may be explained by the fact that Tunisia experienced an influx of international funding after 2011 as a result of the democratic transition there and the international attention that the Arab Spring brought to the country. When the 2015 terrorist attacks took place in Tunisia, significant international funding had already been mobilized. This may have meant that P/CVE funds were diverted from existing funding commitments for the country, as those funding commitments were already high. Alternatively, it may be that the peak of international funding for pro-democracy and good governance initiatives had already been reached by 2015, so that the influx of P/CVE funds simply coincided with a natural decline in other international funding priorities. Niger and BiH had not experienced a similar influx of international funds before more recent security issues or the foreign fighter phenomenon. Therefore, security-related international
funding has been seen and experienced by local stakeholders as a significant change, and a welcome one for those NGOs who had previously found it difficult to attract funding.

However, among all three case-study countries there are a number of commonalities regarding their experiences of P/CVE funding. First, all non-governmental actors stress the need to address under-development or developmental inequalities as a central plank of any P/CVE strategy. Practitioners interviewed consistently emphasize the importance of addressing political and socio-economic grievances, and not restricting P/CVE to short-term, hard security-oriented interventions.

With respect to Niger and Tunisia, another similarity is the strategic way in which NGOs embrace and utilize P/CVE funding opportunities while simultaneously expressing skepticism, discomfort or rejection of the P/CVE label. NGOs are working on P/CVE projects, which, at times, they do not genuinely believe to constitute P/CVE. It is clear that P/CVE still lacks legitimacy among many civil society actors in Niger and Tunisia, and causes potential damage to their own legitimacy in the eyes of surrounding communities or beneficiary groups. This demonstrates the capacity of civil society to pragmatically adapt to changing funding trends, while at the same time raising questions over the degree to which civil society reflects the priorities of the local communities they serve, as set out in their missions, or donor priorities, given their need to survive. Several NGOs interviewed express concern that this need to align their priorities and approaches with those of donors undermines their ability to design and deliver programs that are suited to local needs and challenges.

A common theme across all three case studies is an emphasis on the need to focus on the root causes and drivers of violent extremism, not just the symptoms and resulting consequences. These drivers, while not clearly defined by governments or international institutions, are directly related to deeply-rooted challenges associated with the rule of law and economic distress, particularly the need to improve governance, address corruption and increase opportunity. These drivers are indeed structural and systemic; solutions should be similarly structural and systemic in nature. However, as this paper details, a significant amount of funding to NGOs has been securitized through the growth of P/CVE aid and grants, sometimes to the detriment of programs focused primarily on addressing structural governance and economic challenges.
Among the most important elements to consider when designing a P/CVE assessment is that it specifies the way in which the results will (or will not) enable causal inference regarding the outputs, outcomes, or impacts of the effort. Overall, the most effective designs will be valid, generalizable, practical, and above all else, useful for policymakers at multiple levels. Yet, tensions and tradeoffs always exist when prioritizing objectives.

Rigor and resources are the two conflicting forces in designing assessment. These two forces must be balanced with utility, but assessment design should be tailored to the needs of stakeholders and endusers in order to add value. As this report goes to print, there are myriad organizations attempting to conduct P/CVE interventions in conflict environments. To the extent possible, P/CVE efforts should view these interventions as a longer-term relationship that involves the transfer of “teachable skills” rather than an operation to be deployed one time to solve a problem.26
Annex A: Institutions Interviewed (Niger)

Conseil National du Dialogue Politique. Established in 2004 by ministerial decree, this council is a permanent body that brings together all of Niger’s legally-recognized political parties, for the purposes of creating consensus and resolving conflicts.

Counterpart International. Counterpart is a non-profit organization headquartered in Virginia, USA. The organization’s mission is to build inclusive, sustainable communities in which their people thrive. Their work in Niger includes the Participatory Responsive Governance Program – Principal Activity (PRG-PA), to improve education, health and security through increased dialogue and cooperation between government and civil society leaders.

Eirene. International NGO based in Germany, created in 1957. It has been working on humanitarian assistance in the Sahel since 1974, starting with Niger then expanding to Mali and Burkina Faso. Their main source of funding is the German Corporation for Development Cooperation.

Haute Instance de la Consolidation de la Paix. State institution for conflict prevention and management, and peace building, which carries out research, promotes dialogue between the state and the public, and finances projects. It has regional representatives throughout Niger, some of whom are former fighters. Its annual budget is eight billion CFA Francs (approximately 13.5 million US dollars).
International Crisis Group. Transnational think tank carrying out field research on violent conflict.

Jeunesse Paix et Developpement. Local NGO working on youth participation and development.

Mercy Corps. Mercy Corps has been working in Niger since July 2005. Their work in Niger addresses food security, girls’ education, climate change and economic wellbeing. In 2017, Mercy Corps Niger received funds from USAID to implement the Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment Initiative to Counter Violent Extremism, aimed to design and test assessment tools to enable national, regional and local level state and civil society practitioners to identify communities most vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremist groups.

Oxfam. Oxfam is an international development NGO. Oxfam works in Niger to secure livelihoods, basic social services, humanitarian emergency response, governance and gender justice.

Réseau Genovico. Nigerien network for the peaceful management of conflict, composed of experts in non-violent communication, mediation, and conflict resolution. The network has representatives throughout Niger and has a large number of national and international partnerships.

Réseau Panafricain Pour la Paix, la Démocratie et le Développement (REPPADD). REPPADD is a pan-African human rights and pro-democracy NGO created in 2011 by Nigerien youth. Its work includes a focus on countering and preventing violent extremism as well as community conflicts in Niger, the Sahel and the Lake Chad basin.

SOS Civisme. SOS Civisme is a Nigerien NGO that works on citizenship education, local development, women and youth participation and multi-stakeholder dialogue. In partnership with CARE International, they support the Security and Resilience in the Region of Diffa and Migration Risk Prevention programme ("SECURISER").

**Focus group: institutions represented**

- ACM Niger (local NGO)
- ACTED (international NGO)
- Centre Afrika Obota-Niger (local NGO)
- COPAVE (local NGO)
• HACP (state institution)
• International Organization for Migration
• Islamic University of Niger
• Lutheran World Relief
• ONG Coeur Citoyen (local NGO)
Annex B: Institutions Interviewed (Tunisia)

Assembly of People’s Representatives, member of the Committee on Youth, Culture, Education and Scientific Research.

Assembly of People’s Representatives, member of the Committee on Women, Families and Children.

Beder Association for Citizenship and Inclusive Development. Beder began their work in 2011, with a focus on economic initiatives. In 2014, the NGO broadened their focus to include youth and resilience projects. The association sees every citizen as having a potential contribution to development societal resistance. Their work seeks to create an ecosystem that supports citizens and especially youth to develop their potential as active citizens and to develop their resilience.

British Council. The British Council in Tunisia has partnerships with several Tunisian ministries including Ministry for Employment and Vocational Training, Ministry for Higher Education, Ministry for Education. It worked on the development of counter-narratives through a 2015-16 program funded by the EU.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Carnegie’s fellows carry out studies relating to Tunisia’s democratic transition, including security-related issues.

Center for Economic and Social Research (CERES).

Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID). CSID work on training imams through a partnership with the Ministry for Religious Affairs and with support of international funders. Their aim is to address violent extremism by challenging religious extremism discourse and developing moderate religious discourse.

Ministry of Interior.

Ministry of Youth and Sport.

Namaa Association. Namaa worked on a project on countering violent extremism with the Danish Center for Monitoring and Analysing Conflicts, with a focus on grassroots approaches to countering violent extremism, between 2016 and 2018.
Search for Common Ground (SFCG). SFCG ran a project called Ma’an on mapping of social vulnerability in 17 Tunisian regions and 15 local communities.

University of Tunis. Researchers at the University of Tunis have worked on a number of international research programs on violent extremism.

Yes We Can. Yes We Can is a local NGO that has worked on conflict prevention in Bizerte, Greater Tunis and Kairouan.

**Focus Group: institutions represented**

- Arab Institute for Human Rights (regional NGO)
- British Council
- EntrePrendre (local NGO)
- Institut Tunisien des Etudes Strategiques (state research center)
- International Republican Institute
- IWaatch (local NGO)
- Ministry of Constitutional Relations, Human Rights and Civil Society
- Ministry of Religious Affairs
- Ministry of Youth and Sport
- Nisaa Tounssiet (local NGO)
- Tunisian Scout Movement (local NGO)
- UNDP
- UNICEF
- University of Mannouba
- University of Tunis
- Youth Centre, Mannouba
- Youth Centre, Medenine
Annex C: Institutions Interviewed (BiH)

Atlantic Initiative

Hope and Homes for Children

OSCE

Prosecutor’s Office of BiH

Criminal Justice, Criminology, and Security Studies, University of Sarajevo and Manager/New Security Initiative and the Center for Security Studies

SOC

Focus Group Participants:

• Students
• Journalists
• Teachers
• Municipality representatives
• Inter-religious forum: Imam, representative from local synagogue,
• Police representative, Una-Sana Canton
• Pedagogical council
• Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport
• Center for Social Work
Annex D: Sources Reviewed for CVE and Human Development for Tunisia, Niger and BiH


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Patrick Wilson is a former senior British diplomat who specialized predominantly in the politics of the Arab world. In later years of his career he specialized in conflict resolution, in the Balkans, Sudan and Palestine/Israel, with the triple role of senior Government adviser, personal envoy and confidential senior level negotiator/mediator. Following his Crown Service Patrick was appointed as a Special Adviser to Tony Blair when the latter took on the role of Quartet Representative for the Middle East peace process.

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ABOUT THE SOUFAN CENTER

Based in New York, The Soufan Center is a non-partisan strategy center dedicated to serving as a resource and forum for research, analysis and strategic dialogue related to global security issues and emergent threats. TSC fills a niche-role by producing independent, quality research and hosting proactive events in order to effectively equip thought leaders, policy makers, governments, bi- and multilateral institutions, the media, funders, and those in the non-profit and academic communities to engage in strategic security-related practices. Our work focuses on a broad range of complex security issues—from international and domestic terrorism, to humanitarian crisis analysis, to refugee and immigrant issues, and more.

TSC’s dynamic team of research and policy analysts, with diverse professional, educational and cultural backgrounds—including experience in human rights; international development; federal, state and local government; law enforcement; and military—leverage subject matter expertise against real-world experience to offer world-class investigative methodologies, innovative analytical tools, and contextualized, actionable solutions.
ABOUT THE ROCKEFELLER BROTHERS FUND

The Rockefeller Brothers Fund (RBF) is a private family foundation established in 1940 by the grandsons of John D. Rockefeller. The RBF advances social change that contributes to a more just, sustainable, and peaceful world. Its grantmaking is organized around three themes: Democratic Practice, Peacebuilding, and Sustainable Development. Although the RBF pursues its three program interests in a variety of geographic contexts, it has also identified “pivotal places” on which to concentrate cross-programmatic attention: China and the Western Balkans. The RBF’s Charles E. Culpeper Arts & Culture program nurtures a vibrant and inclusive arts community in its home city of New York, with special interests in supporting the creative process, building capacity small and mid-size cultural organizations, and creating opportunities for artists of color and other underrepresented artists.
ENDNOTES


9 Oxfam, Raty Tuuli, Shilhav Raphael, EU Trust Fund for Africa: Trapped between aid policy and migration politics, January 29, 2020


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22 Tuzla, Youth Resources Centre focus group participant.


24 The Interreligious Council in BiH is a non-governmental organization that aims to contribute toward peacebuilding and reconciliation. Interreligious boards made up of representatives of different religions operate in towns across BiH. See the website of the Interreligious Council at: https://www.mrv.ba/lat

