March 5, 2026

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The Iranian-Russian Partnership in the Aftermath of Operation Epic Fury

(Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)

After the U.S. and Israel struck Iran on February 28, Russia, a close partner of Iran, warned that “unprovoked acts of armed aggression” would lead to global and regional instability, urging all parties to come to a diplomatic solution. On Tuesday, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov criticized the U.S.-Israeli strikes and emphasized that there was still no evidence Iran was developing nuclear weapons. Reporting indicates that so far, only ammunition and intelligence have been provided by Moscow to Tehran. Kremlin spokesperson Dimitri Peskov stated on Thursday that Russia has not received any request for assistance from Tehran. During the 12-day War, Russian President Vladimir Putin already demonstrated that he views the partnership agreement with Iran, which covers defense, counterterrorism, energy, finance, and culture, as a transaction that could be implemented or ignored according to Russia’s needs and objectives.

Now, Operation Epic Fury has reaffirmed the limited and opportunistic nature of the Tehran-Moscow partnership. For some in Tehran, the strategic partnership agreement with Russia was initially viewed as an assurance that Moscow would come to its aid in a broad array of potential scenarios — despite what Russia-Iran expert Nicole Grajewski has described as the lack of a “mutual defense commitment, integrated command structure, and obligation for automatic military intervention in the event of an attack.” The partnership agreement was widely considered a recompense for Tehran’s aid to Moscow with the lethal Shahed drones that Russian forces have used to significant effect against Ukraine. Any past Iranian calculations that its partnership with Moscow might help deter Israel or the U.S. from militarily attacking Iranian territory, beyond diplomatic outreach, were shattered last June during the 12-Day War. In the aftermath, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated that “countries we considered friends did not help us during the war.”

After the 12-Day War, defense sources reported that Iran conducted its first live test of the highly sophisticated, Russian-made S-400 Triumf air defense system. The system, purportedly trialed near the major city of Isfahan, can detect and destroy enemy aircraft and missiles from hundreds of kilometers away. According to some reports, Iran has deployed components of this system around sensitive facilities during the present conflict. However, independent analysis was never able to verify the transfer of such a system to Iran, and analysts such as those at Critical Threats assessed in September that Russia was unable to divert the S-400 or the similar Su-35 systems away from its war in Ukraine. Despite the unverified reports of these system transfers, or its more recent joint military exercises with Iran and China in the Sea of Oman, it was widely believed that Moscow had been reluctant to palpably increase its military weapon aid to Iran, even with the U.S military buildup in the Middle East prior to the February 28 strikes.

While Russia has benefited from its partnership with Iran, economically and militarily, the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz may indirectly provide Moscow with a much-needed economic boost. With about one-fifth of the global oil supply effectively stuck in the Persian Gulf as long as the Strait of Hormuz is under attack, the demand for Russian oil has already surged — especially for those heavily reliant on oil from the Middle East. Norway’s Energy Minister Terje Aasland said on Tuesday that “the events of the last three-four days have also been difficult," and that it may “revive” the debate around Russian oil and gas in the European Union.

The price increase of oil and gas caused by the ongoing conflict can provide a lifeline to Moscow to bankroll its war in Ukraine and ease its prior use of domestic taxes to help fund its efforts. Nonetheless, any economic windfall is likely overshadowed by Russia’s weakened position in the Middle East since the fall of the Assad Regime and the domino effect that the October 7 Hamas attack has had on weakening Iran and its proxies.

Since conflict in Iran reignited this month, the shared Russian-Iranian Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant has been a point of concern for Moscow, which operates the plant. On Tuesday, construction work at the civil energy plant was halted after 100 workers were evacuated on Saturday. Additionally, the future of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a rail, road, and sea network connecting India to Russia via Iran and the Caspian Sea, is heavily disrupted. While Russia has been able to maintain its naval base in Tartus and its air base in Hmeimim after the fall of Assad through its diplomatic engagement with Syria’s President Ahmed Al Sharaa, some of its main geopolitical objectives in the Middle East are now increasingly undermined with the weakening of the so called “Axis of Resistance” and the significant blows dealt to the Iranian regime over the past months.

Experts note that the Kremlin’s internal reaction to this present conflict diverges quite significantly from the 12-Day War, namely due to the assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei, and Trump’s explicit goal of Iranian regime change, which Putin likely believes sets a dangerous precedent for leaders who stand in opposition to U.S. global interests. In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Iran helped the Kremlin learn to evade and operate under a robust sanctions regime, and the two countries increasingly traded tactics and technology used to suppress domestic dissent. During the Iran protests earlier this year, Iran’s advances in internet shutdown capabilities and in spoofing Starlink indicate a potential Russian involvement in such domestic repression. Tehran and Moscow already had cooperation agreements between their police forces and interior ministries. Russia likely sees the removal of Khamenei as unacceptable on principle, and it may become more involved in this conflict than in June, to signal that Putin cannot be subject to the same sort of treatment as the late Ayatollah, especially given Russia’s nuclear status.

Russia has long held strong ties with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and other Iranian institutions. An outcome of this conflict in which the IRGC remains the core of the Iranian security state would broadly preserve the foundations of this partnership, even if the relationship has since shifted since the 12 Day War. However, if the U.S. achieves its stated aims of installing Western-friendly leadership in Tehran, Moscow may attempt to throw its weight around to complicate or prevent such a scenario — but it will likely calibrate any involvement to what is useful and sustainable, rather than committing beyond what it can plausibly afford. Even so, in the aftermath of the 12 Day War, it became clear to Tehran and the international community that, in the face of the Trump Administration’s leadership and relatively unpredictable foreign policy style, Russia is unable to sufficiently help deter conflict from its partners — either diplomatically or by shows of force.