September 21, 2026

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Saudi Arabia Is Left to Face the Houthis Alone

AP Photo/Osamah Abdulrahman

Saudi Arabia built a complex security architecture based on a U.S. strategic umbrella, a network of regional defense alliances, and a willingness to offer generous concessions in order to avoid conflict with its main regional rival, Iran and Tehran’s regional non-state allies. Defusing tensions with the Islamic Republic was Saudi Arabia’s main goal in signing a China-brokered détente with Iran in March 2023. Riyadh calculated it could fall back on its security partnerships, particularly with the U.S., to deter Iranian attacks or defend the Kingdom, if that pact broke down.

Even as he expanded his regional alliances, Saudi de facto leader Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) never imagined the U.S. security umbrella would falter. MBS reportedly is frustrated that the Trump team has reached a strategic dead end in its conflict with Iran, failing to prevail decisively in the war or to achieve a negotiated settlement. The U.S.-Iran stalemate has presented the Kingdom with a worst-case scenario in which its main strategic partner is unable or unwilling to fulfill its long-standing commitments to defend Saudi Arabia against attacks by Iran or Iran-backed groups, particularly the Houthi movement (Ansarallah) of Yemen. Washington’s strategic failures in the war have left MBS struggling to construct a new security architecture — including greater self-reliance — to replace the U.S.-centric structure the Kingdom has long relied on. Still, a longer-term security roadmap will not necessarily help Riyadh face down the immediate crisis posed by the Houthis.

Instigated by Iran’s need to pressure U.S. President Donald Trump, but fighting its own battle against a Saudi blockade of its ports and airspace, the Houthis last week captured key ports and positions down the Red Sea coast. Coupled with renewed missile and drone attacks that have shut down the vital East-West oil pipeline temporarily, the Houthi offensive has presented Saudi leaders with an existential crisis. Some experts speculate that the Houthis might be able to expand their control deep into south Yemen, a development that could potentially consolidate a large, pro-Iranian, sovereign Yemeni state on Saudi Arabia’s border.

Claiming the Houthis have pledged not to attack U.S. interests, President Trump has so far rejected MBS’ calls for direct intervention to reverse the Houthi gains. The Trump team seeks to avoid expanding U.S. military operations in the region, but the decision has triggered alarm in Riyadh. Michael Ratney, who served as the U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia from 2023 until January 2025, told the Washington Post that Riyadh had “invested decades into its military partnership with the U.S. for just this kind of moment … Now the moment has come, and the U.S. is not stepping up.” Ratney added that the crisis facing the Kingdom is largely a product of the U.S. decision to attack Iran, although the Houthi offensive is directed primarily against Saudi efforts to contain the group.

Still, recognizing the potential threat the Houthi gains pose, the Trump team is providing some military assistance to the Saudis. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has added personnel to its intelligence and operations center in the Kingdom, staffed by a few hundred U.S. personnel, to help Saudi forces target Houthi positions. On Thursday, U.S. officials cleared the sale of up to 48 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters to Saudi Arabia, despite military and congressional concerns that China might gain access to the jets in Saudi Arabia. The announcement was intended to demonstrate support for the Saudis, even if the aircraft, after vetting by the U.S. Congress, will not be delivered for several years. Recognizing the U.S. munitions stockpile has been drawn down by the Iran war, Saudi Arabia, itself low on missile interceptors, is seeking air-defense help from France, Britain, Pakistan, and Egypt.

Saudi Arabia’s “Plan B” — establishing binding alliances with powerful Sunni Muslim actors including Türkiye and Pakistan, encapsulated in the August Mecca Agreement — has similarly failed to produce a battlefield coalition against the Houthis. The Mecca Agreement contains a binding commitment to each other’s defense, resembling Article 5 of the NATO Charter. The agreement expanded an existing defense pact between Saudi Arabia and its longtime ally, Pakistan, signed one year ago. Türkiye’s participation in the tripartite pact culminates years of diplomacy that narrowed Saudi-Turkish differences on regional Islamist movements, the Turkish military presence in Qatar, and a range of other issues.

Despite the provisions of the Mecca Agreement, Türkiye and Pakistan, as well as another Saudi ally, Egypt, have refused to intervene militarily in Yemen to help the Kingdom and its Yemeni partner, the Aden-based President Leadership Council (PLC). Regional leaders appear to have decided, as has the Trump team, that intervening would invite retaliation by Iran and Iran-aligned non-state actors. Pakistani officials have justified their decision by arguing the fighting in Yemen represents a “pre-existing” conflict that predates the Mecca Agreement and therefore does not commit Pakistan to come to the Saudis’ defense. However, Saudi Arabia’s claim that the Houthis last week launched a drone attack on Mecca — the holiest city in Islam — prompted Islamabad to publicly reconsider its position. The spokesperson for Pakistan’s politically powerful Army said Thursday: “We are present in Saudi Arabia; and we are ready to go to any extent required by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.” The Houthis denied conducting any attack on Mecca and, on Saturday, senior Houthi official Mohammed al-Bukhaiti warned Pakistan and Türkiye that: “We will strike them with an iron fist” if they were to intervene in Yemen.

Saudi leaders had no expectation their erstwhile anti-Houthi partner, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), would rally to Riyadh’s defense, even though the Houthi advance constitutes a severe setback to the UAE and the other Arab Gulf states. During the 2015-2022 Saudi-UAE-led war against the Houthis, the UAE sponsored southern Yemeni groups committed to secession, whereas Riyadh supported the PLC and its Islamist militia allies. Last December, Saudi forces intervened to reverse territorial gains by UAE-aligned secessionists in oil-rich Hadhramaut province, representing a clear and likely permanent break between Saudi and Emirati interests in Yemen. The two Gulf powers have tussled in recent years not only on Yemen and Iran policy but on a broad range of issues, including the civil war in Sudan. However, some UAE-aligned militias, including the effective Giants Brigade, have since been incorporated into a new Saudi-run force structure that is now battling the Houthis.

Unwilling to risk internal unrest, Riyadh has refused direct help from the one regional state willing to intervene on its behalf — Israel. Recognizing that the Houthi gains embolden Iran, a majority of Israelis support helping the Kingdom, according to polls. Some reports indicate Saudi officials have quietly consulted with Israeli military officers, tapping their previous experience bombing Houthi targets, including decapitation strikes on Houthi leaders. But Riyadh is concerned that working openly with Israel against the Houthis would not only inflame public opinion but also trigger U.S. pressure on MBS to normalize relations with Israel. A Saudi source told Israel’s Kan radio last week that the crisis won’t change its position on Israel, saying: “The assumption that … Riyadh will be flexible on the matter of normalization with Jerusalem is mistaken.” The source added that Saudi Arabia continues to demand an “irreversible pathway” to Palestinian statehood before normalization.

Bereft of outside help, MBS faces key decisions on whether to marshal the Kingdom’s resources for major all-out ground combat against the group, or to assume his usual default position and seek a compromise. For now, faced with not only the Houthi move to the Bab el-Mandeb but also continuing strikes on its energy infrastructure, Saudi leaders have responded militarily. The Saudi Air Force has been conducting strikes on Houthi command centers and positions, including the capital Sana’a, and it has deployed elite units such as the Giants Brigade to counter Houthi ground forces. Key objectives include preventing further Houthi advances on the PLC capital in Aden, the oil-rich province of Marib, and the city of Taiz. Although Saudi-backed Yemeni forces have stopped further Houthi progress, there is no indication they will be able to win back the lost territory along the Red Sea coast. On Saturday, Saudi officials claimed the Houthis tried to attack its capital with a ballistic missile, the first targeting of Riyadh since the escalation in fighting, but the assault was intercepted.

If the Saudi-led counterattack fails, as expected, experts expect MBS to fall back to his usual default position: de-escalate, even if doing so requires painful concessions. The Houthis are demanding an end to the Saudi blockade, increased funding for government workers in Houthi-controlled territory, and a guaranteed share of the country’s oil revenues. Houthi leaders might also insist that Saudi Arabia abandon its support for the PLC and recognize the Houthi movement as the leader of the Yemeni state. Riyadh will likely try to enlist Pakistan, Oman, and China to pressure the Houthis to reach an agreement. But the Houthis’ utility to Iran’s war effort against the U.S., coupled with the Houthis’ deep ideological commitment, is certain to complicate settlement negotiations.