September 16, 2026

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From “Moral Guidance” to Incorporation: Uyghur Assimilation in the Syrian Armed Forces

(AP Photo/Ghaith Alsayed)

Foreign fighters in Syria remain a concern for policymakers both in Syria and across the world. During Syria’s brutal civil war, tens of thousands of individuals from the EU, the UK, Australia, North Africa, and Russian-speaking, Uyghur, Turkic, and other ethno-linguistic communities traveled to Syria to participate in the fight, whether with rebel groups, terrorist organizations, or other armed factions. While some were killed in the fighting, imprisoned, or returned to their home countries, others have remained in Syria — largely concentrated in the country’s northwestern Idlib province.

When asked about the fate of the thousands of foreign fighters who traveled to Syria to fight in its 13-year civil war, the new leader of Syria’s government, President Ahmed al-Sharaa, less than a week after the Assad regime was toppled, told the author of this IntelBrief: “They fought and endured with us for fourteen years… they married Syrians, they gave Syrian children… we will find a solution worthy of them…” The envisioned integration mechanisms, already implemented before the fall of Assad in Idlib by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), are rarely shared in the public domain, particularly given continued opposition from Western governments like the U.S. on the issue of foreign fighters.

The most telling example is the dissolution of the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) and the incorporation of its fighters into a regular army division under the authority of the Syrian Presidency and the Ministry of Defense. The TIP, a militant organization that aims to establish Islamic rule in Xinjiang, China, is now a key part of the Syrian Armed Forces’ 84th division. This fighting force is made up mostly of Uyghurs, a Muslim minority originally from western Chinese provinces. After more than a decade of activity in Syria, TIP has been dissolved and has stopped all media production less than a month after the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.

“Moral guidance” was a key process undertaken by HTS in Idlib to consolidate and unify its ranks, but to prevent ghulu (unlawful religious extremism) and push forward a unified dogmatic vision for its fighting force and the civilian population. These “moral guidance” processes were established primarily to build a coherent military and political force capable of attracting and dissolving independent Syrian groups hostile to the current government, while also monitoring foreign fighters.

During the author’s last visit to Syria, he spoke with people familiar with “moral guidance” programs within the military establishment. The programs apply to every foreign fighter incorporated into the military ranks. According to a very well-informed source, “the assimilation process in the army is addressed at first through the understanding of the dominant Islamic mazhab [schools within Islamic jurisprudence] in Syria; therefore, familiarity and acceptance of the Shafeaai doctrine [one of the four major legal schools in Sunni Islam]. This process will facilitate and enhance the assimilation of foreign fighters and their families into Syrian society, since most popular culture and social structure are based on the teachings of the Shafeaai school... So, such teachings set the basis for coherent assimilation, a sense of belonging, and understanding of the surrounding society as a whole.”

The same source also shared that “the requirements for the muhajirin [foreign fighters] and Syrian nationals are similar, which helps the merger. Religious programs, held monthly, and specific programs for the muhajirin and their leadership are intended to address all concerns. This is part of the military’s general discipline. However, it is important to select ‘moral guidance officers’ among the muhajirin, as they understand the mindset of their own groups and are better equipped to address them with precision. Designated ‘moral guidance officers’ from the Turkestan, Uzbek, or Caucasus communities are already tackling issues and answering questions daily in the ranks. Notably, leaders of former groups that fell under the HTS umbrella in Idlib are being kept in their positions because they already complied with the policies of Syrian President al-Sharaa.”

According to one of the author’s sources, these moral guidance programs “enable the foreign fighter, and through him his family and entourage, to be confident about being part of the Syrian project, and therefore his own future. This awareness gives him a real legitimate sense of belonging and security. Therefore, he automatically comes into conflict with any foreign project or organization. Turkistan [TIP] is the most telling example. They are part of the Syrian project and severed all ties with foreign organizations, including their own in Afghanistan.”

The Uyghur fighters, who once belonged to the TIP, are the most numerous group of foreign fighters in Syria. Around 2,000 fighters — 20,000 individuals counting families — are incorporated in the 84th division, under the command of Brigadier General Abdul Aziz Dawood Khodabardi (also known as Abu Muhammad al-Turkistani). The division has around 200 Syrian soldiers; some were already with the TIP in Idlib, others, according to a senior figure the author met in Idlib, “joined after the liberation because of the reputation they enjoyed as a disciplined and trained group.”

One of the greatest challenges to assimilation and integration of foreign fighters has been addressing existing grievances about Syria’s status as a new member of the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat IS (Islamic State). One common opinion amongst sources is that the Global Coalition has mistakenly targeted some individuals. From a local perspective, one of the greatest operational mistakes committed by the Coalition was the October 2025 arrest and eventual death of Abdel Aziz Massud, who was alleged to be an IS leader but was in fact an intelligence asset monitoring IS cells in the Syrian Badia for HTS, and afterwards for Syrian intelligence.

According to the author’s source, “we explained that joining the Coalition was politically necessary to replace the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as the U.S.’ legitimate partner and regain control of the northeast. That the Coalition is directed against one party, Islamic State, which Sharia allows us to fight, and most importantly, Syria will be able to partner in the operations and therefore avoid unnecessary bloodshed and mistakes.”

After partially convincing Washington of its strategy surrounding the incorporation of foreign fighters, Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani and Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) Ibrahim Olabi made considerable efforts to convince Beijing that Uyghur foreign fighters did not pose a threat. These efforts appear somewhat successful, as China did not veto any decision concerning Syria at the UN Security Council, and Minister Shaibani visited Beijing to meet his Chinese counterpart, Minister Wang Yi. Nonetheless, foreign capitals remain clearly anxious that Syria could turn into a safe haven for international terrorist groups, including the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), and some continued opposition against the new administration.

Regarding China, according to the senior figure met by the author, “the cause of Turkistan and its people is still present and cherished, but we see our future in Syria, in the upholding of the new Syrian State and of its diplomacy on the world stage. So we will not undertake anything that conflicts with this commitment. The split is total with the Turkistan Islamic Party in Afghanistan.” According to other knowledgeable sources, organizational ties were severed as early as 2017, when the TIP leadership in Afghanistan was notified of its allegiance to HTS and acceptance of the authority of the “Salvation government” in Idlib.

The families of TIP have been present in Syria since the early days of the Syrian Civil War. After occupying Christian villages and lands in Jisr al-Shughur, Idlib, they mostly relocated to Kafraya. Local sources say they do not consider the originally Shia village that they share with other displaced Syrians as a final destination: “if we are asked to relocate in order to allow the return of original inhabitants, we will without any hesitation… as we did before." Returning property and land to Christian communities in Idlib and restoring churches started in late 2022 and early 2023 and were completed after the fall of Assad.

Uyghur fighters have exhibited no sign of intending to depart Syria; many fighters have settled with their families, and many are married to Syrian nationals. They have schools and cultural institutions, have opened businesses like restaurants, and most engage in commercial activities in the areas where they are established.

Integrating foreign fighters is complex, but the process provides a political and economic horizon for thousands of foreign fighters on Syrian soil without the challenge of forced repatriation or destabilizing competition with the new Syrian administration. Integration, incorporation, and a sense of belonging are key to stabilization. The international community should closely engage with this process, as the potential danger is posed by non-integrated foreign fighters and, mostly, by radicalized locals who are largely outside the state apparatus. Clear command structures, vetting, and international cooperation will improve the handling of the foreign fighters issue in Syria; successfully monitored integration will provide an invaluable case study and a blueprint for other conflict areas.

Wassim Nasr is a Senior Research Fellow at The Soufan Center, focusing on jihadist dynamics in the Middle East and Africa and European responses. He is a French journalist who has been monitoring jihadist groups for more than a decade for the French news outlet France24 in French, English, and Arabic. He has conducted multiple investigations and several high-level interviews on this topic. He is the author of État islamique, le fait accompli (2016). He has also served as a contributor to The Soufan Center, The Hoover Institute, the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel, and as a speaker at the Global Security Forum, organized by The Soufan Center.