September 14, 2026

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Houthi Advance on Red Sea Coast Empowers Tehran

(AP Photo/Osamah Abdulrahman)

As the most potent member of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” the Houthi movement of Yemen delivered Tehran a key strategic gain by advancing down the Red Sea coast last week. Iran’s other non-state allies, particularly Iran-aligned militia groups in Iraq, have pressured U.S. forces and allies by using ballistic missiles, drones, and other weaponry to augment Iran’s efforts to damage energy infrastructure in the Arab Gulf states and raise world energy prices. The Axis members’ contribution to Iran’s strategic counterattack has been significant, but not decisive — insufficient in scope and scale to compel President Trump to end the war on terms Tehran demands. But the Houthis, by capturing key terrain near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait chokepoint last week, might position Tehran to exercise potentially decisive leverage over Washington.

In a lightning offensive launched in response to a ground attack by Saudi-backed Yemeni forces further north, by Friday the Houthi forces had captured the port of Mocha and several islands out in the Red Sea, including Perim. The ground combat between the Houthis and the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC, also referred to as the U.N.-recognized Republic of Yemen Government) represented a culmination of tensions that have escalated since June, when Saudi Arabia sought to enforce its blockade of Houthi-controlled entry points. The Kingdom bombarded the airport in Sanaa to prevent the landing of a flight by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-run Mahan Air, which allegedly was carrying Iranian weaponry for the Houthis. Prior to the Saudi strike, the Houthis and Saudi-backed forces had largely abided by a 2022 ceasefire, although a breakdown of that truce was likely inevitable in the context of the U.S.-Iran war.

Experts cautioned against underestimating the potential impact of the Houthi advance. The Red Sea commercial shipping lane at Perim Island is only about 2 miles wide, meaning that ships will now pass within visual range of Houthi positions. The Houthis no longer need advanced detection and guidance equipment to threaten the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. They can use direct fire, such as anti-tank missiles, to attack ships trying to cross through the chokepoint. The new positioning gives the Houthis "enormous power," according to one regional expert, expanding their ability to threaten the global economy and amplifying Iran’s capability to attack the Strait of Hormuz.

The Houthi capture of the coastal positions immediately benefited Iran strategically by causing a further spike in global energy prices, pushing crude oil well over the $100 per barrel mark. The price pressure emboldened leaders in Tehran to reassess whether they might yet accomplish their goals of raising world prices to the point where President Trump will be compelled to end the war on Iran’s terms. Iranian hardliners, including key senior IRGC commanders and former commanders, insist the U.S. recognize Iranian management of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz as a condition of returning to a broader June Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). However, the hardline position has been called into question by more moderate leaders by U.S. Navy successes in protecting and guiding increasingly large daily volumes of oil and other hydrocarbon exports safely through the Strait. Iranian leaders might assess that the Houthi advance to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait restores the leverage Iran seemed to be losing.

U.S. officials publicly sought to downplay the Houthi advance. They noted the Red Sea is primarily a route for consumer goods — not energy — going from China to Europe, adding that ships can use an alternative route through the Suez Canal and then around Africa. Regional experts asserted the large Houthi force concentration that seized the new territory had left its protected positions in the mountains further inland for exposed positions on the coast, making Houthi fighters an easy target for air strikes, or what is militarily known as a "kill box."

Saudi officials immediately assessed the Houthi advance as a breakout from a decade-long effort by the Kingdom to contain the Houthis through diplomacy and economic incentives. Compounding the alarm in Riyadh, the Houthi offensive coincided with a strike, reportedly by Iran-aligned Iraqi militias, on the Kingdom’s crucial East-West oil pipeline. The strike caused the line to shut down for repairs, interrupting the crucial artery the Saudis have been using to compensate for Iran’s disruption of the Strait of Hormuz. The line can carry up to 7 million barrels of crude from Saudi Arabia’s oil-producing heartland on the Persian Gulf to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea.

To address the crisis, Saudi leaders began mobilizing militarily to help its beleaguered PLC allies and enlist the assistance of its key strategic partners, particularly the United States. Reports indicate Saudi Arabia deployed armored personnel carriers, tanks, Apache attack helicopters, and up to 200 fighter jets near the Yemen border in preparation to try to push the Houthis back to their previous positions. ABC News, citing a U.S. official, reported the Kingdom will launch a major military operation against Houthis even if no outside assistance is offered. The Houthis claimed the Saudis launched 129 air strikes on Saturday, but the strikes did not materially affect the balance of power on the battlefield. Reports on Sunday indicated Houthi forces continue to advance, moving on the city of Taiz and Marib, the last PLC stronghold in north Yemen.

There is little sign that any of the Kingdom’s regional partners are willing to intervene to try to reverse the Houthi offensive. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), the architect of the Saudi-Emirati war effort against the Houthis during 2015-2022, has not mobilized to help Saudi-backed forces in Yemen. The UAE's inaction is, in large part, a consequence of Abu Dhabi’s favoritism toward southern Yemen secessionist groups that are rivals of the PLC. By stating it would not send troops into Yemen to address a crisis that existed prior to the Mecca pact, Pakistan pre-empted Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) from invoking the newly forged “Mecca Joint Defense Agreement” between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan. The accord, signed by the leaders of the three powers in early August, commits them to come to each other’s defense. Türkiye's position is similar to Pakistan's, raising questions about the validity and durability of the Mecca accord.

MBS perhaps had reason to expect a more supportive response from President Trump, given the threat posed by Houthi gains to U.S. efforts against Iran and to global energy markets. As the Houthis advanced toward Mocha, MBS called Trump twice on Thursday, asking him to order U.S. airstrikes to slow the Houthi advance, according to an Axios report citing two unnamed US officials. However, Trump turned down the appeal, telling reporters on Saturday he had spoken with his 'good friend' MBS, and that everything in Yemen would “work out fine and dandy” without U.S. intervention. The U.S. reticence to react forcefully might reflect assurances from Houthi spokesperson Mohammed Abdul Salam that U.S. (and Israeli) ships in the Bab al-Mandeb would not be attacked if the U.S. refrained from military intervention. In Dublin on Saturday, Trump confirmed the verbal exchange with Houthi officials. U.S. officials are also reluctant to expand the Iran war to Yemen, further stretching munitions and other resources. Some experts speculate Trump is withholding support to MBS in retribution for the earlier Saudi denial of the use of its territory for some U.S. operations against Iran, and possibly to pressure MBS to join the Abraham Accords normalizations with Israel.

More broadly, U.S. officials appear to believe that Saudi Arabia, recipient of hundreds of billions of dollars of advanced U.S. weaponry, should be capable of reversing the Houthi gains without direct U.S. involvement. A senior administration official explained to regional outlet Al-Monitor on Friday: “The United States is focused on protecting our core national security interests — such as ensuring freedom of navigation in the Red Sea — while empowering our regional partners to take the lead in managing and resolving regional security challenges.” For now, the Trump team has opted to provide non-lethal support, including tactical intelligence, presumably through an established U.S.-Saudi fusion cell. As the Houthis advanced on Mocha, U.S. leaders dispatched CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper to Riyadh on Thursday to consult on potential responses. Yet experts doubt the Saudis and their PLC allies will be capable of restoring the previous front line — or preventing a further advance on PLC-held territory — without significant and direct U.S. military involvement.