March 24, 2026

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Competing Narratives: Understanding All Sides’ Approach to the War in Iran

(U.S. Navy via AP)

After his 48-hour deadline before striking Iranian power plants expired, U.S. President Donald Trump extended the window until Friday. According to Axios, Trump claimed that U.S. envoys have been negotiating with a senior Iranian official, yet Iranian sources denied that they had any direct talks with Washington. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf, who was later identified as that senior Iranian official, suggested that Trump’s claim of “very good and productive” discussions was to calm the markets, stating on X that “no negotiations have been held with the U.S., and fake news is used to manipulate the financial and oil markets and escape the quagmire in which the U.S. and Israel are trapped.”

While President Trump would like to frame the current situation in terms of more formal negotiations, the reality is likely far more complicated. According to Axios, Trump’s claims may have been referencing reported back-channeling from Turkish, Omani, Egyptian, and Pakistani mediators, who allegedly passed messages from Washington to Tehran. The Iranians are unlikely to outright acknowledge any type of bilateral negotiations when active hostilities continue, yet it is clear that several parties are hoping to de-escalate the conflict and provide a channel of communication between the U.S. and Iran. Sources claim that the U.S. has refused key demands from Iran, including compensation for the damage inflicted by the U.S. and Israel, and recognition of its aggression against Iran.

In that vein, several ambassadors from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states met in Ankara with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. According to Al-Monitor, Turkish sources claim that the United States has asked Türkiye to mediate talks between Vice President JD Vance and Ghalibaf, though Iran has not yet responded. If these reports are indeed true, they would be a departure from Washington’s usual approach, which has been to rely on Trump’s trusted adviser and U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, and Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law. Witkoff and Kushner were integral to the most recent nuclear negotiations between the United States and Iran immediately before the onset of the war. The U.S. may be putting forward Vance for talks in Ankara in an effort to build trust with Iran. However, according to a statement by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, he and Trump agreed to continue striking Iran and Lebanon until a deal is reached, which would not be interpreted by Iran as a confidence-building measure. In the same statement, Netanyahu said that Israel “will safeguard our vital interests in any agreement,” suggesting that he would reject any deal that does not, in his view, sufficiently guarantee Israel’s security, which could have wide interpretations.

For Washington, the conflict with Iran has been marked by mixed messaging to both domestic and international audiences. The U.S. government’s underlying goals and objectives have remained vague, if they have been defined at all, and no clear off-ramp is yet in sight. That is unlikely to change until the Trump administration articulates a clear objective it can realistically achieve and present as a victory. If President Trump can credibly claim that he prevented Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons — a hard case to make considering some U.S. intelligence figures have since claimed Iran posed no nuclear threat, especially after the 12-day war — or that his actions fundamentally weakened the Iranian regime, he may seek to de-escalate the conflict. Even then, however, those “victories” would likely need to be embedded in any settlement or ceasefire with Tehran. The Iranian regime’s ability to fight back, remain intact, and seemingly move toward negotiations after Washington appeared to pursue regime collapse as a broader objective signals a victory for Iran. Until Washington can re-frame this, it remains to be seen whether the U.S. would seriously engage in formal negotiations.

For Iran, portraying the conflict as a victory to its domestic audience will be far easier. The initial strikes under Operation Epic Fury can be easily framed by the regime as unprovoked. As the underdog, the regime does not need to achieve outright military success; it need only demonstrate that it can continue functioning despite repeated leadership assassinations and impose meaningful costs on the United States. On that front, it has already achieved a measure of success, having wreaked havoc on the global economy through the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and attacks on energy infrastructure across the Gulf. However, whoever controls Iran after the conflict ends will need to reckon with stabilizing the country across political, social, and economic spheres, particularly as Iran’s infrastructure has been devastated and the government’s ability to provide basic services to its people will have been substantially lessened.

After pulling back from his 48-hour deadline and extending it throughout the week, some speculated that Trump is merely using this interregnum to buy time before a U.S. Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) lands in the region, which is expected by Friday. As Trump has in the past, he could be moving military assets into place, in this case to prepare for an invasion and seizure of Kharg Island, while using negotiations as a cover until those assets are fully combat-ready. On the contrary, given the immense economic pain caused by this war, due in large part to Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz and Tehran targeting critical energy infrastructure throughout the region, Trump could be actively seeking an offramp. Whether Iran reciprocates is yet to be seen.