INTELBRIEF
June 4, 2026
Iraq’s New Government Confronts Challenges on All Fronts
Bottom Line Up Front
- The newly inaugurated Iraqi government of Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi faces the same pressures as its predecessors did, stemming from Iranian-U.S. competition for influence in Iraq.
- U.S. officials have sought to shape Zaidi’s government to its advantage by sanctioning potential cabinet nominees they consider aligned with Iran and threatening to withhold U.S. financial and political cooperation.
- Even with U.S. pressure, Zaidi will proceed cautiously in disarming militias linked to Iran, in fear of sparking civil unrest, even though the militia attacks on key Arab Gulf states are harming relations with both the Gulf and the U.S.
- The announcement last week by powerful Shia cleric Muqtada a-Sadr that his militia would fold into the national command structure will bolster Zaidi’s efforts to establish a state monopoly over Iraq’s armed forces, though a contingent of Iran-backed militias remain unintegrated.
The government of Iraq’s new Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is already facing the same pressures that frustrated his predecessors’ efforts to establish Iraq as a prosperous, moderate actor reintegrated into the region: the intense competition between Iran and the United States for influence in Iraq. Those pressures are magnified by the war between the U.S. and Iran that has reduced Iraq’s main source of revenue, oil exports, by 70 percent. Even as it seeks to build ties with as many Iraqi political actors as possible to sustain its influence in neighboring Iraq, Iran has not carved out an exception for Iraq to its blockage of non-Iranian oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait closure has halted most oil production in Basra Province, which accounts for roughly 3.3 million barrels of oil per day — about two-thirds of Iraqi exports. Approximately one-third of Iraq’s oil is produced in Kurdish-controlled, semi-autonomous northern Iraq, and some of it reaches global markets via a pipeline from Kirkuk to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. However, oil export volumes through that line are insufficient to fund the expenses of the Kurdish-dominated provinces of the north, let alone the much larger Arab-dominated areas of Iraq. In April, Iraq’s oil revenues barely topped $1 billion, down from a pre-war total of about $7 billion per month, threatening Iraq’s solvency and imposing severe hardships on the population.
On May 14, in accordance with constitutional procedures and mandates, Zaidi, nominated as Prime Minister by the Shia Arab-led Coordination Framework (CF) coalition, achieved parliamentary confirmation for 14 of 23 nominees for his Council of Ministers — the minimum number necessary for his government to take office. The key security-related ministries of defense and interior were left vacant as Iraqi factions within and outside the CF, as well as Tehran and Washington, continue to jockey for influence.
The same day, U.S. Special Envoy to Iraq Tom Barrack (officially named to that role this week), who serves concurrently as Ambassador to Türkiye and Special Envoy to Syria, congratulated Zaidi on the seating of his government. His statement noted that the Trump administration was “encouraged” by the premier’s “fresh leadership,” and was looking forward to working with him on “shared goals” like fighting terrorism and building an Iraq “at peace with its neighbors.” Tehran also congratulated Zaidi on his accession, suggesting Iran perceives his government will accommodate Iranian interests. Yet Iran has continued its periodic attacks on U.S. and Iranian Kurdish opposition targets in northern Iraq — most recently on Tuesday — as part of a broad barrage on several Gulf states, with little direct material pushback from Baghdad.
Despite its praise for Zaidi, Washington has also demonstrated its willingness to use its financial and political leverage over Iraq to shape the new government to Washington’s advantage and Tehran’s detriment. Trump’s threat earlier this year to suspend security cooperation with Baghdad compelled the CF to withdraw from nominating the pro-Iranian, Shia sectarian former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to return to that post. U.S. officials warned Zaidi, the businessman nominated by the CF as a compromise candidate, not to name any ministers associated with Iran-aligned militia groups that are part of the broader Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Officially, the PMF are integrated into Iraq’s federal government and receive governmental funding, but the Iran-aligned groups operate autonomously. Washington has refused to resume the transfer of certain dollar assets to Iraq, which it suspended in early 2026 to pressure Iraqi politicians not to form a pro-Iran government.
Heeding Washington’s warning, Zaidi has not named any member of Qais al-Khazali’s Sadiqoon bloc to a ministerial post, even though it constitutes the third largest Shia party in the National Assembly. The party is the political wing of the Iran-aligned Asaib Ahl al-Haq militia, which is named by the U.S. as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Should Khazali wish to secure a ministerial post for one of his allies when the final eight ministers are named, he might have to nominate a candidate considered independent rather than a member of his party. U.S. officials also ensured that Maliki did not engineer the appointment of his ally, Ali Maarij, as deputy oil minister. One week before the National Assembly vote to approve a cabinet, the U.S. imposed Iran-related sanctions on Maarij over allegations that he had allowed the blending of Iranian oil with Iraq’s oil exports. Thus far, only one of Zaidi’s cabinet members has even a tenuous association with any Iran-aligned militias. Minister of Telecommunications Mustafa Sanad reportedly has ties to linked to Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), which is considered the most powerful and pro-Iranian of the PMF groups and has conducted numerous attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and on targets in the Gulf states, particularly Kuwait. And, partly at Washington’s prodding, Zaidi retained Fuad Hussein, who hails from Masoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), as foreign minister. Hussein’s retention reflects Zaidi’s acknowledgment of Iraq’s deteriorating relations with its neighbors, and regional officials hope that Hussein, who has proven a reliable partner among his regional counterparts, will be able to mend ties.
Yet, Zaidi’s accommodation of the Trump team’s preferences will likely complicate his tenure as prime minister. More than 80 legislators in Iraq’s 329-seat National Assembly represent parties directly linked to Iran-allied armed factions and insist on a share of power commensurate with their social base of support among hardline Shia Arabs. On May 17, three days after Zaidi took office, one or more of the Iran-aligned PMF groups fired several drones at targets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) from Iraqi territory, according to the UAE defense ministry. Although most of the drones in the volleys were intercepted, one drone landed near the UAE’s Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant, setting off a fire but apparently not damaging the reactors themselves or triggering the release of any radiation. UAE Diplomatic Advisor to the President Anwar Gargash publicly blamed “Iranian militias in Iraq” for the Barakah attack.
The militia strikes immediately set Zaidi’s relations with Iraq’s Gulf neighbors off to a troubled start. Gulf leaders perceived that, under Zaidi, Iran-backed militias would continue to be able to use Iraqi territory as a force multiplier for Tehran’s war effort. In an apparent attempt to appease Washington and the Gulf states, Zaidi announced an investigation of the “criminal” drone attacks on the two Gulf states. However, similar investigations of past attacks by Iran-aligned groups did not result in any prosecutions or deter the armed groups from repeating their attacks.
Yet Washington and the Gulf states were heartened last week as Zaidi started to deliver on his promise to establish a state monopoly on its armed forces and security landscape. On Wednesday, the powerful Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr announced he was severing ties with his faction’s “Saraya al-Salam” militia and integrating the group into the Iraqi national command structure. Zaidi welcomed Sadr’s announcement, describing it as an “important” step toward reinforcing stability and consolidating the principle that weapons should remain exclusively in state hands. Although Sadr broke with Iran more than a decade ago, differentiating his nationalist movement from other Iran-aligned militias, he is so deeply embedded in Iraq’s armed Shia political establishment that his decision put immediate pressure on the other militia leaders. Many of the Iran-aligned groups, particularly KH, are offshoots of Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia that formed in 2003 to battle U.S. occupation forces in Iraq. Although the Sadrists have not competed in national elections for several of the past electoral cycles, Sadr still commands the loyalty of a large portion of the Iraqi Shia Arab community, many members of which routinely answer Sadr’s call to take to the streets in protest or agitate for political action. On Tuesday, a smaller militia, Kata’ib Imam Ali, announced that it too would hand its weapons over to government forces.
Zaidi’s effort to expand his government’s authority is also gaining public support from other Iraqi political leaders. Some elected members of the National Assembly reportedly support a proposal to place all PMF groups under the control of a new federal security ministry that would manage all of Iraq’s armed forces. Proponents of this proposal argue that the new ministry would enable Baghdad to more effectively supervise the Iran-aligned groups, including preventing them from attacking the Gulf states and other regional actors. However, experts argue that a flawed implementation of the proposal, if adopted, would enable Iran-aligned factions to assert themselves more forcefully within Iraq’s already fractured governance and security structures, rather than be brought under tighter control.