June 22, 2026

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Next Steps on the U.S.-Iran Agreement

(Nathan Howard/Pool Photo via AP)

After a series of recriminations linked to the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, U.S. and Iranian officials met on Sunday in Lucerne, Switzerland. The talks marked the start of a 60-day period of negotiations that is hoped to lead to a permanent U.S.-Iran peace and a new U.S.-Iran relationship that puts aside five decades of hostility. The U.S. and Iranian delegations were led by U.S. Vice President JD Vance and Iranian Majles (parliament) Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. Also participating were Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdul Rahman al-Thani, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, and Chief of Army Staff Asim Munir — mediators who helped produce the U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding signed last week. According to U.S. officials, the Sunday talks focused on two major outstanding issues, particularly the Lebanon conflict. Still, the meetings were intended for Vance and Ghalibaf to set the tone for extended talks and turn over subsequent meetings to technical experts.

The fighting in Lebanon delayed the Lucerne meeting, initially planned for Friday, following Iran’s accusations that Israeli retaliatory attacks on Hezbollah positions in Lebanon violated the MOU. Even though Israel-Hezbollah exchanges intensified later Friday, despite Israel and Lebanon’s recommitment to a ceasefire, Iran decided to participate in the Sunday meeting, reflecting its reticence to abandon the MOU-led process. Still, the seeming intractability of the conflict in Lebanon illustrates that the MOU’s opening clause — which “declare[s] the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon” — constitutes perhaps the most potent threat to the fledgling U.S.-Iran peace process.

At the risk of its relations with Washington, Israel asserts that, strategically, it cannot allow Iran to use the MOU to constrain its ability to combat Hezbollah and Iran’s other “Axis of Resistance” partners. Israel, which seeks Hezbollah’s outright disarmament, publicly stated it would not leave the buffer zone it has established in south Lebanon. Israel asserts its ceasefire with Lebanon enables it to retaliate for Hezbollah attacks, such as a strike on Thursday that killed four Israel Defense Forces (IDF) personnel.

As of Sunday, the U.S. and Iran had largely fulfilled their MOU commitments to immediately dismantle their respective traffic blockades in the Strait of Hormuz. Global oil market observers report commercial traffic through the Strait has increased markedly since the MOU was signed, although it remains well below pre-war levels. On Saturday, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders claim to have resumed their Strait closure in response to the fighting in Lebanon, but U.S. officials say there is no evidence of Iranian military activity against shipping through the chokepoint. Still, the IRGC threat might deter some shipping lines from resuming their operations through the chokepoint. On Sunday, U.S. President Donald Trump issued new threats to attack Iran if it closed the Strait again.

The MOU leaves the ultimate status of the Strait to be decided by future negotiations between Iran and the Arab Gulf states — nearly all of which reject any Iranian attempts to influence or profit financially from commercial ship passage. Paragraph 5 of the MOU states that Iran “will make arrangements … for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge for 60 days only.” After that period, according to the paragraph, Iran “will conduct dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz, in discussion with other Persian Gulf littoral states in line with the applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz.” The MOU also requires the U.S. to remove its forces from the “proximity” of Iran within 30 days after a final accord. Defining what constitutes acceptable proximity to Iran is likely to become a point of contention.

The start of the formal talks on Sunday sets in motion the complex negotiations on the technical details of U.S. sanctions relief. Upon signing the MOU, Iran received initial sanctions easing, including the U.S. issuance of legislative waivers that will allow it to sell and export oil without restrictions. Paragraph 11 implies Iran will immediately gain access to at least some of its estimated $80-100 billion in blocked assets held abroad. But more comprehensive sanctions relief, including the release of all remaining blocked assets, is contingent on the final accord. According to Paragraph 7 of the MOU: “The [U.S.] undertakes to terminate all types of sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the United Nations Security Council resolutions, IAEA Board of Governors resolutions, and all unilateral U.S. sanctions — primary and secondary — in an agreed-upon schedule as part of the final deal.” Under Paragraph 6, a final agreement will also open Iran to a $300 billion fund for reconstruction and economic development, although it remains unclear whether the Arab Gulf monarchies or other wealthy nations will provide the funds needed to finance this provision.

Part of the sanctions relief discussions will center on the thousands of Iran-linked entities sanctioned during the past eight years under both Trump and former President Joe Biden’s “maximum pressure” Iran policies. During the negotiations to forge the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear agreement, the JCPOA, about 700 entities had been sanctioned for proliferation or terrorism-risk transactions with Iran. The process of “de-listing” sanctioned entities, many of which are based in Iran’s trading partners, including China and some of the Gulf states, will be lengthy and contentious.

The most difficult and intensive talks will no doubt center on Iran’s nuclear program. Trump has rested his justification for initiating the conflict on ensuring Iran cannot develop or otherwise acquire a nuclear weapon. Trump’s position has been based on denying Iran technical capabilities, rather than extracting pledges of its non-nuclear intent, which Iran had stated in the JCPOA and has re-stated in the MOU. Politically, Trump and his team have insisted to their Iranian counterparts that any final agreement must contain stricter limitations on Iran’s nuclear program than were stipulated in the JCPOA. However, the JCPOA’s technically complex negotiations to put verifiable constraints on Iran’s nuclear program took two years to complete. It is likely a new nuclear accord will require many more than two months of talks.

The MOU is vague, perhaps deliberately, on what nuclear commitments have been agreed informally to date. The MOU makes indirect reference to the key parameters U.S. negotiators will try to confirm in the talks: a long-term suspension of uranium enrichment (reportedly as long as 15 years) and rendering harmless Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium — a level of purity requiring little additional enrichment to reach weapons-grade uranium (90 percent purity). The MOU (Paragraph 8) states that the two sides agree to: “resolve the disposition of stockpile enriched material pursuant to a mechanism that will be mutually agreed … with the minimum methodology to be down blending on site under the supervision of the IAEA.” It adds: “The two parties also agreed to discuss the issue of enrichment and other mutually agreed matters related to the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear needs, based on a satisfactory framework being agreed upon in the final deal.” Many critics assert that Iran's final agreement, which will apparently not require Iran to dismantle its enrichment and other nuclear infrastructure, is no more likely to permanently ensure Iran is a non-nuclear state than did the JCPOA. Trump officials argue they successfully compelled Iran to agree to permanently restrict uranium enrichment to the 3.67 percent level suitable only for nuclear power — a contrast to the JCPOA’s provision sunsetting of restrictions on Iran’s enrichment program.

The MOU also nods to Iran’s demands that the final agreement be irrevocable — a response to the frequent assertions of Iranian leaders that their distrust of the U.S. is based on Trump’s abrogation of the JCPOA in 2018. Iran had advocated that any new agreement with the U.S. be structured as a formal treaty subject to Senate ratification, but apparently dropped that demand, acknowledging that a two-thirds Senate majority is beyond reach. Instead, the MOU states: “The final deal will be endorsed by a binding United Nations Security Council resolution.” The JCPOA was similarly endorsed by a Security Council Resolution (2231), but it provided for a sanctions “snapback” if Iran were deemed by any party to be in non-compliance. The snapback was invoked in September 2025, but a new resolution presumably will not contain a snapback provision. Even though none of the other permanent members of the Security Council are parties to the negotiations with Iran on a permanent deal – a clear contrast to the multilateral JCPOA — no veto of a Council resolution endorsing a new agreement is expected.