INTELBRIEF

July 6, 2026

NATO Heads to Ankara with Its Unity in Question

(AP Photo/Riza Ozel)

Bottom Line Up Front

  • As leaders descend upon Ankara for the 2026 NATO Summit, taking place tomorrow and Wednesday, several points of friction between NATO members have raised serious questions about what this year’s gathering will achieve.
  • As popular terminology in Washington shifts away from “burden-sharing” and increasingly towards “burden-shifting,” European NATO allies are acutely aware of expectations from the U.S. to not only increase their defense spending, but to work towards a truly independent defense architecture.
  • As NATO allies gird themselves for U.S. military drawdowns across Europe, Africa, and the Middle East many leaders are seeking clarity from Washington over the next two days — specifics on what the pullback will look like, where it will occur, and on what timeline, so they can plan how to fill the resulting gaps and build up the capabilities
  • Ankara is also positioned to play an important mediating role in the widening transatlantic rift, European nations recognize they must tap into Türkiye’s military capabilities as they reduce their reliance on the U.S., something they have resisted in the past.

As Western leaders descend upon Ankara for the 2026 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit, taking place tomorrow and Wednesday, several points of friction have raised serious questions about what this year’s summit will ultimately produce. Looming over the gathering is the question of the U.S. commitment to the long-standing alliance. Transatlantic tensions have only grown after U.S. President Donald Trump took office in 2024. Both the first and second Trump administrations have imposed severe pressure upon European nations for what was perceived as insufficient defense spending. This is not a new issue for U.S. presidential administrations, but the Trump administration has repeatedly signaled it would condition U.S. support for NATO allies on their defense spending levels, even reduce the U.S.’ forward posture in key NATO theaters. To some analysts, the very future of the alliance is in question, at least the extent to which the traditional role played by Washington will evolve.

The 2025 Hague summit, which saw alliance members commit to a defense spending target of 5 percent of GDP by 2035, came only months after a disastrous Munich Security Conference, where U.S. Vice President JD Vance blindsided European allies, attacking them over their policies on migration and populism and framing the defense spending debate around European principles and the perceived erosion of U.S.-European shared values. Vance stated that it was important for "Europe to step up in a big way to provide for its own defense," arguing that the most pressing threat to European security did not come from external actors like Russia or China, but a “threat from within.” Russian state media applauded the speech; Deputy Chair of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev called Vance “bold.”  Since then, transatlantic relations have only continued to sour. Trump's continued threats to annex Greenland, the U.S. tariff war with the EU in 2025, tension over the U.S. military operation that captured and removed former Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro from power, and European countries' refusals — or tepid support — for U.S. use of their military bases during the Iran war have all deepened the rift. At a NATO defense ministers’ meeting in Brussels just three weeks ago, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth brought up the tension over these bases, calling European refusals of access “shameful.” At the same meeting, he also announced a six-month review of U.S. force posture across bases in Europe. Initially, reports from the Wall Street Journal indicate that Hegseth intended to announce additional cuts to its forces, mirroring existing withdrawals from Iraq, Syria, and other theaters, but the plan was allegedly nixed by the White House

In a departure from previous NATO summits, the defense industry forum will take over the entirety of tomorrow’s meetings. Tensions over defense spending will certainly come to the forefront during these discussions. Countries like Germany, Poland, as well as many of the Baltic and Nordic states, have increased their defense spending and look to be on track to meet the 5 percent target. Countries like Spain, the UK, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Hungary have not noticeably increased their spending since 2025 and look to be in trouble for the 2035 target. This will certainly draw ire from the U.S., especially as countries like Spain have repeatedly found themselves in the crosshairs of the Trump administration.

As popular terminology in Washington shifts away from t “burden-sharing” and increasingly towards “burden-shifting,” NATO allies are acutely aware of expectations from the U.S. to not only increase their defense spending, but to build lasting infrastructure and grow high-end capabilities in order to make the continent truly responsible for its own security. Although Trump has been the most vocal about this objective, successive U.S. administrations have long hoped Europe would take greater ownership of its own defense needs, regardless of the effect this might have on the U.S. defense industry — a significant contributor to the U.S. economy.

While increased European defense spending has near-term benefits for the U.S. defense industry, as Europe builds out its own capacity, it may increasingly attempt to meet its own defense needs domestically, which would mark a genuine paradigm shift in transatlantic defense relations. Indeed, the EU "Buy European" push, launched in 2025, has already drawn direct pushback from Washington. The initiative includes a proposed supplier preference for a 2026 Defense Procurement Directive, as well as local-content rules already in effect under the EU's €150 billion Security Action for Europe (SAFE) program. SAFE is a joint EU loan facility that funds member states' defense procurement — including a related €90 billion package supporting Ukraine's own defense needs — and requires that at least 65 percent of the equipment purchased through it be sourced in Europe. The Trump administration formally warned the EU in February 2026 that restricting U.S. businesses' access to European procurement would trigger retaliation, arguing it would undermine NATO interoperability. But that warning may be too late: many European nations are already pursuing greater independence in their defense architecture — a trend likely to outlast any single U.S. administration.

As NATO allies gird themselves for U.S. defense drawdowns across Europe, many leaders are seeking clarity from Washington over the next two days — specifics on what the pullback will look like, where it will occur, and on what timeline, so they can plan how to fill the resulting gaps and build up the capabilities the U.S. has long provided. Military experts at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) have cautioned that pulling U.S. forces out of European bases at scale could seriously undercut the alliance's ability to deter Russia — a risk that is especially salient after Hegseth’s June comments regarding the review of U.S. force posture.

Russia quite clearly poses one of the largest external threats to NATO, even though the declaration following the Hague summit only briefly addressed that threat. This year, Ukrainian defense is especially prominent on the agenda, according to CEPA. Conversations surrounding the country's defense against Russia will almost certainly center on its innovation in drone technology, which has, in the past few months, put the Kremlin on the back foot, forcing it to respond more defensively against Ukrainian drone attacks on its major cities than ever before. While Ukraine needs NATO allies' support in air defenses, NATO allies must also learn from Ukrainian drone innovation. It will be important for alliance members to incorporate what has made Ukraine so successful — just as Ukraine has been able to produce cheap drones at a lightning-fast pace, NATO allies must learn to do the same. Ukraine has offered its expertise to many countries, including those in the Gulf, during the U.S.-Israeli-led war on Iran. In a speech at an Atlantic Council event, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte stated, “As we continue to support Ukraine, we are also learning essential lessons from their experience, especially when it comes to the use of drone technology. This is a threat we all face, and no one has better experience than [Ukraine].” Spending and high-tech capabilities alone don't win wars; if they did, Russia would have defeated Ukraine long ago.

At the same time, the threat from Russia is not confined to its war in Ukraine. As has been well documented by The Soufan Center, Russia has long waged a hybrid war against the West and the NATO alliance. While Moscow tailors its tactics, tools, and procedures to each target country or population, NATO has yet to develop a coherent, alliance-wide strategy to counter the threat — or even a shared sense of the threat's true scale. Not every country is impacted or targeted in the same way by Russian hybrid tactics, but if the NATO alliance is to remain steadfast, there must be a shared sense of responsibility in countering them, tactics that, at their core, seek to undermine transatlantic relationships, social cohesion, and democratic sentiment. While the Kremlin may target Baltic states with some of its most extreme and aggressive tactics, or France with some of its most brazen efforts to erode social cohesion, countries like Spain or Italy — which may not be at the forefront of these attacks — still have a stake in the stability and governance of their fellow NATO allies.

The world will be closely watching this week's two-day summit unfold. But with so much at stake between Europe and the U.S., Türkiye, the very country hosting the gathering, has managed to avoid intense scrutiny. Türkiye has the second-largest military in the alliance, behind the U.S., and its role as a global player is only growing — especially as recent conflicts, like Iran's, have diminished the influence traditional European powers once held in the diplomatic process. With much of this week's conversation likely to center on a more independent European defense, Türkiye finds itself in a precarious position. On one hand, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's close relationship with Donald Trump has helped expand the country's role in international crises. On the other hand, human rights abuses and anti-democratic actions by the Erdogan government have drawn criticism from European leaders — even as those same leaders acknowledge Türkiye's geographic importance, sitting at the crossroads of Europe and Asia and serving as a key site of contestation between Chinese and Russian spheres of influence.

European nations recognize they must tap into Türkiye's military capabilities as they reduce their reliance on the U.S., something they have resisted in the past. Ankara is also positioned to play an important mediating role in the widening transatlantic rift. Indeed, Trump told reporters in the Oval Office: "If not for the fact that it was being held in Turkey by President Erdogan, I don't think I would have gone to [the summit]." Ultimately, it will be important to watch not only how U.S.-European conversations on defense unfold this week, but also the role Türkiye plays as host of the very summit shaping that debate.

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