INTELBRIEF
July 24, 2026
Deal or No Deal? Saudi Nuclear Pact Hangs in Balance as Regional Conflict Expands
Bottom Line Up Front
- As tensions escalate between the U.S. and Iran, the Trump administration has sought to raise the stakes, announcing a new nuclear agreement with longtime Iranian rival, Saudi Arabia.
- The potential for Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium in the near future raises concerns about who follows — whether other U.S. partners will demand the same terms, whether Russia and China will match them with partners of their own, or whether it will ignite a nuclear power race in the region.
- Adding to tensions in the region, the Iranian proxy group out of Yemen, the Houthis, declared a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia and claimed attacks on two Saudi oil tankers transiting through the Red Sea.
- The Trump administration most likely chose to announce the Saudi nuclear deal now because it recognizes the critical juncture this months-long conflict with Iran has reached, and Tehran has seemingly made a similar assessment of the moment by activating the Houthis.
As tensions escalate between the U.S. and Iran, the Trump administration has sought to raise the stakes, announcing a new agreement with longtime Iranian rival, Saudi Arabia. Both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have entered into a 30-year agreement that enables Saudi Arabia to develop nuclear capabilities with the support of American technological assistance. While the Trump administration has asserted that this deal is strictly for civilian use and will feature safeguards, the deal has raised concerns about a new pathway for Saudi enrichment of uranium — which some experts estimate could take just ten years — and open up a regional arms race with Iran. The agreement marks a new chapter in U.S. foreign policy objectives in the Middle East, where its strategy has shifted from seeking the disarmament of Iran to fostering the nuclear capacities of Iran’s rivals.
This deal also marks a significant departure from U.S. nonproliferation efforts over the past decades. The U.S. has long worked to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, which only nine countries currently possess. While the deal with Saudi Arabia focuses primarily on nuclear-powered energy, experts worry that the lack of stringent guidelines around the deal will open a door that cannot be closed. When the U.S. made a nuclear cooperation deal with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2009, it insisted on a no-enrichment pledge — meaning the country had to agree to not enrich domestically. In fact, the major nuclear suppliers — the U.S. and Russia among them — have for decades preferred that other countries buy enriched fuel on the international market rather than build enrichment capacity of their own. For instance, Russia spent years pressing Tehran to enrich outside of its borders, offering a joint venture on Russian soil that Iran eventually turned down.
The UAE’s 2009 agreement, which eventually became the “gold standard” in nuclear cooperation agreements, also stipulated that the country would have to sign up for the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Additional Protocol which is designed to give the agency enough information and access to credibly certify that a country has no undeclared nuclear material or activities. Saudi Arabia refused to sign this protocol. While the U.S. stated that it had reached its own safeguard agreements with Saudi Arabia, it has not yet provided any details on the specifics of such agreements.
However, a day after the agreement with Saudi Arabia was made and signed, U.S. President Donald Trump added an additional stipulation on his Truth Social platform, posting that the deal was “totally subject” to Saudi Arabia entering the Abraham Accords with Israel. The Saudis seemed caught off guard by this announcement and some speculated that Trump attempted to add this major caveat onto the deal after being pressured by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. While the Trump administration has continued to push for Gulf rapprochement with Israel throughout its second term, in the wake of the war in Gaza, Saudi Arabia has stood firmly in their assertion that formal diplomatic engagement could only be accompanied by the establishment of Palestinian statehood — what has become a core element of the Kingdom’s foreign policy. Even with the ability to build a nuclear program and pressure from the United States, it remains uncertain that Saudi Arabia would abandon its stance on the Abraham Accords. It may also be possible that the Trump administration may again choose to move past this requirement.
Regardless of how the Abraham Accords will affect the deal between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, the potential for Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium in the future raises concerns about who follows. There is a real risk that Russia and China cite the American precedent to justify offering the technology to their own partners. Additionally, other countries in the region, including Türkiye and Egypt, have long coveted enrichment rights of their own, and the prospect of Saudi Arabia’s nuclear enrichment could certainly stoke a regional race for the technology. This agreement was signed in the middle of a war fought, in large part, to deny Tehran the very capability now offered to Riyadh, further casting doubt on the possibility of the U.S. and Iran being able to come to an updated and acceptable Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). This development will only further strengthen Iranian efforts to rebuild its nuclear capabilities.
Adding to tensions in the region, the Iranian proxy group out of Yemen, the Houthis, declared a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia — just days before the nuclear agreement with the U.S. was announced — and claimed attacks on two Saudi oil tankers transiting through the Red Sea. The Houthis justified the blockade and the subsequent attacks as an “an eye for an eye” for airstrikes on Yemen’s Sanaa International Airport last week, which the Houthis have attributed to Saudi Arabia. The strike on the airport was prompted following an Iranian commercial flight that carried a Houthi delegation from Yemen to Iran for late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s funeral. Given the favorable terrain of mountainous northwestern Yemen, the Houthis are able to position themselves on higher ground, offering a tactical advantage as they fire at passing ships. This is a group that has grown comfortable with hit-and-run, ambush-style attacks, before going back underground in a network of caves.
When the war in Iran kicked off in late February, some analysts speculated that the lack of Houthi involvement was a deliberate effort on Tehran’s part to keep this ‘ace up the sleeve’ for a future date. It appears that was correct, and the Houthis have now been ‘activated’ at a critical phase in the conflict. Houthi strikes in Bab-el-Mandeb, at the narrow bit of the entrance to the Red Sea and Suez Canal, have the ability to further complicate supply chains and global energy flows. Oil has now surged past $100/barrel and will likely climb higher. Trump threatened the Houthis in a Truth Social post, but the reality is, what this conflict with Iran has demonstrated is the limits of airpower to bend an adversary’s will. Iran’s mosaic, layered defense, has proven effective against the U.S. military, and between the price of oil and midterm elections approaching, time is on the Iranians’ side.
The U.S. has evidently been working on this deal with Saudi Arabia for some time, reportedly since before the conflict with Iran began. The Trump administration most likely chose to announce it now because it recognizes the critical juncture this months-long conflict with Iran has reached. Tehran has seemingly made a similar assessment of the moment by activating the Houthis. Each side is likely to read the other’s move as an attempt to introduce a new element into a conflict that has stalled. Trump certainly has the looming U.S. midterm elections in view, but Iran too recognizes it needs an upper hand if it is to end the fighting on favorable terms. While it believes it holds the stronger position at the negotiating table — particularly in its ability to hold the global economy hostage by opening and closing the Strait of Hormuz at will — the country is still struggling internally after months of strikes against its infrastructure and military command. While it may be able to hold out, the cost of doing so is mounting.