INTELBRIEF
July 10, 2026
How is the War in Iran Affecting African Nations?
Bottom Line Up Front
- The costs of the war with Iran have been felt in every corner of the globe, but the impact on Africa has been underexplored, with some African nations bearing tremendous burdens, with energy shocks driving up gas and diesel prices, rising electricity costs, and widespread inflation.
- With fertilizer shipments from the Middle East to sub-Saharan Africa disrupted due to the war, the impact will be felt in terms of lower crop yields and accelerating food insecurity.
- The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden region, extending throughout the Horn of Africa to Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and Djibouti, sits at the intersection of global energy flows, maritime security, and great power competition.
- Remittances to the African continent from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initially surged at the start of the war but have since plummeted, risking significant second-order repercussions for certain African countries.
Even a cursory glance at the daily headlines related to the war in Iran reveals what a quagmire the conflict has devolved into. U.S. President Donald Trump, who just last month praised the Iranian leadership, is now labeling them “scum” and, earlier this week, suggested that the ceasefire is over. The U.S. launched strikes this week at Iran in retaliation for what U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) said were Iranian attacks against commercial shipping. Iran responded to the U.S. strikes by targeting Kuwait and Bahrain. The Gulf states have suffered tremendously as a result of the war, which began in late February and shows no signs of ending soon, despite ongoing negotiations.
The costs of the war have been felt in every corner of the globe, but the impact on Africa has been underexplored. To be sure, some African nations have borne tremendous costs, with energy shocks driving up gas and diesel prices, raising electricity costs, and fueling inflation. Governments have responded with subsidies and fuel rationing measures. South Sudan has resorted to rationing electricity, and the impact has been felt in Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Mauritius, and elsewhere. Kenya has reported widespread fuel shortages. However, African oil-exporting nations stand to benefit from the conflict, with Algeria, Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa well-positioned to take advantage of rising oil prices.
There is also the issue of agriculture. Approximately three-quarters of the fertilizer used in sub-Saharan Africa originates from the Middle East. And while ships are once again moving through the Strait of Hormuz, traffic has fallen substantially after the recent tit-for-tat attacks. According to the maritime intelligence firm Kpler, as reported by the BBC, only 23 tankers and cargo ships transited the Strait on Wednesday, down from 47 just one week prior. According to the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC), before the conflict began, an average of 138 ships crossed through the Strait daily. With little confidence that Gulf shipping lanes will remain safe for transit — as Iran seems determined to control traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and is prepared to respond kinetically to even minor provocations — African nations will continue to struggle with fertilizer shipments, which in turn will affect crop yields and food security.
While the Trump administration is focused on preventing Iran from developing a nuclear bomb, Tehran's newfound control over the Strait of Hormuz is an even more practical weapon. At a moment's notice, Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) can decide to launch attacks against commercial shipping in the waterway, effectively weaponizing this maritime chokepoint for strategic effect. It is difficult to envision a deterrent to this process playing out in the future, since months of bombing have done little to change Tehran’s behavior. Indeed, as many analysts have already observed, the current iteration of Iran’s regime is dominated by IRGC hardliners who seem to be less risk-averse than Iran’s late Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. This unpredictability is highly concerning for the governments of many African nations, which have already been negatively impacted by the reverberations from this conflict.
Although the war in Iran has not spilled directly onto the African continent, the conflict has raised concerns about other potential security implications for the future. These include attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, maritime piracy and security in general, the activities of Iranian-linked networks throughout East Africa, and possible changes to the operational environment, which bring Iranian-backed proxy groups like the Houthis closer together to Sunni jihadist groups in Yemen (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP) and the Horn of Africa (al-Shabaab). Iran also remains a threat, either through the IRGC or its broader proxy network, to resort to its comparative advantage of transnational terrorism, targeting U.S., Western, Jewish, or Israeli interests throughout Africa. As al-Qaeda did in the late 1990s, terrorists could work to identify perceived shortcomings in security at embassies or diplomatic compounds. Soft targets, including hotels, also remain attractive targets for terrorists.
The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden region, extending throughout the Horn of Africa to Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and Djibouti, sits squarely at the intersection of global energy flows, maritime security, and great power competition. Gulf nations, including the United Arab Emirates, as well as Egypt, Türkiye, Israel, and others, have crafted aggressive foreign policies that could further destabilize the region. Iran has also extended its influence throughout East Africa, with warming relations and increased interactions with Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Uganda.
Another underreported consequence of the Iran War has been the extensive second-order and globally felt effects of disrupted economic life in the Gulf countries, including for the millions of guest workers from South Asia and Africa whose sources of income often support family members in their country of origin. Guest immigrant workers make up more than half of the total population across the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. According to data from 2017, around 12 percent of the GCC’s guest immigrant workers are from the African continent. Many of these migrant workers in the Gulf regularly send back remittances to their family members in their countries of origin, an estimated $124 billion in 2024. When war disrupted travel to and through the Gulf region, various sectors, including many that employ migrant workers, were heavily hit. In the initial turbulence of the war, multiple payment services reported significant upticks in remittance outflows. Onafriq, for example, saw remittance transfers to Kenya surge in March, then plummet in May, likely reflecting migrants initially using savings to keep remittances flowing and later suffering from disrupted incomes as the war continued. Remittances to the African continent are mostly used by recipients to cover basic needs, including education, food, and housing. Continued disruptions in the labor markets of the Gulf countries due to the hostilities would have far-reaching consequences across remittance-receiving countries too.