January 29, 2026

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Türkiye Emerges as a Key Regional Anchor

(Yoan Valat, Pool photo via AP)

For much of the past decade, Türkiye was seen as an outlier in the region, largely excluded from the inner councils of regional geopolitics by not only Israel, but also Arab powerhouses Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt. Its influence in Washington was constrained by U.S. congressional criticism of its human rights abuses, particularly against the region’s Kurds. Israeli leaders, citing statements by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) allies, were able to persuade Washington that Ankara’s public support for Hamas and other regional Islamist movements rendered Türkiye an untrustworthy partner. Until late 2024, Türkiye also faced unremitting hostility from the Assad regime in Syria, and perceived a threat to its domestic security and its southern border from Kurdish organizations aligned with U.S. forces fighting the Islamic State (IS).

Over the past five years, Erdogan has de-escalated disputes with Saudi, Emirati, and Egyptian leaders by downplaying support for Islamist movements the three Arab governments perceive as threats to their rule, and by emphasizing common ground on Iran, Syria, and other issues. Ankara appealed to Arab leaders to form a common front to pressure Israel for concessions to the Palestinians on the West Bank and in Gaza, although the UAE’s decision in 2020 to normalize relations with Israel muted Erdogan’s message. Türkiye joined all the Gulf states in arguing Washington should seek to forge a new nuclear accord with Iran rather than risk Iran’s collapse by maintaining crippling Western sanctions indefinitely. Erdogan’s team also stressed shared doubts about the U.S. security commitment to the region and the seemingly unquestioning U.S. support for Israel’s regional goals and demands.

Erdogan’s diplomatic outreach resulted in a thaw in relations and the exchange of visits with Saudi Crown Prince and de facto leader Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ), and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, even if Ankara’s regional policies did not change. Türkiye continued to host Hamas leaders and other Islamist movements and to arm and defend Islamist-backed leaders in western Libya. Erdogan also resisted demands from Saudi and Emirati leaders to remove Turkish troops from several bases in Qatar. Still, the thaw in relations set the stage for Arab leaders to evaluate Türkiye as a key potential regional partner — a perception that Turkish officials quickly exploited after the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024. Turkish leaders portrayed Assad’s collapse as a significant victory for Ankara’s geostrategy, highlighting the success of their consistent support for the Hayat Tahir al-Sham (HTS) movement, which ousted Assad and brought its leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa, to the seat of power in Damascus.

Türkiye has converted its mentorship of the Assad government into major strategic benefits. Damascus’s January offensive against the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) dismantled most of the organized Kurdish units in northeastern Syria and ended Syrian Kurdish hopes they could establish a semi-autonomous enclave in Kurdish-inhabited areas of Syria. Sharaa’s offensive — which Trump officials opposed but to which they grudgingly acquiesced in order to preserve the U.S. partnership with him — delivered Ankara its long-sought buffer zone along the Kurdish-inhabited southern border.

Türkiye’s paramount position in post-Assad Syria furthered several other regional goals set by Erdogan and his team, including those that require Trump’s support. Erdogan sought an end to the Gaza conflict immediately after Israel began its military offensive against Hamas in response to the October 7, 2023, attack. He has repeatedly blamed Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory for provoking the October 7 assault. However, over several meetings with Trump in 2025, Erdogan secured Türkiye a crucial role in helping the Trump team broker the 20 Point Peace Plan for Gaza. Ankara was reportedly pivotal in persuading Hamas leaders to accede to the core elements of the plan, and Turkish diplomats are working to compel Hamas to disarm, as required. Alongside Trump and the leaders of Qatar and Egypt, Erdogan was one of the four “core signers” of the plan at the Sharm el-Sheikh summit convened by Trump in October. In mid-January, despite vocal as well as private opposition from Israel, Trump named Türkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to the “Gaza Executive Board” — a body that is to supervise the work of a Palestinian governing committee for Gaza, which is replacing Hamas as the political authority for the enclave. Israel opposed Türkiye’s inclusion on the body, citing Ankara’s consistent engagement with Hamas leaders and its perceived intent to emplace Turkish forces in southern Syria, near Israel’s borders. The U.S. is likely to back a Turkish contribution to the International Stabilization Force (ISF) for Gaza, over Israel's objections.

Ankara has also aligned with key Arab allies of the U.S. to try to persuade the Trump team that a weak but intact Iranian regime is preferable to the uncertain outcome that might result from a political collapse. Two weeks ago, along with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt, Türkiye reportedly played a key role in prompting Trump to reconsider using force to punish Iranian leaders for using massive violence to suppress the January uprising. A collapse in Iran, which carries the potential for long-term state failure, poses a key threat to Türkiye, which shares a long and porous border with Iran. In Ankara’s view, a collapse in Iran would turn its Kurdish regions into a corridor for militants and could fuel Kurdish separatist aspirations. Reports on Monday indicated that Türkiye, judging that Trump might yet strike Iran, has begun reinforcing its border to prevent a flow of refugees into Türkiye. Some experts add that Türkiye's assessment of the Islamic Republic helps Ankara shape Washington’s perceptions of Türkiye as an indispensable NATO ally and a partner in containing Iranian power. These critics note that a collapse of the regime in Tehran would refocus Western criticism on Turkish human rights abuses and Ankara’s efforts to extend its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean, and the Horn of Africa.

Türkiye’s rising profile has increased its attractiveness as a regional security partner, including to Arab and other regional leaders once critical of Erdogan’s policies. MBS reportedly is set to expand the Kingdom’s September strategic pact with Pakistan by forging similar accords with both Pakistan and Türkiye. The proposed trilateral pact would incorporate the Saudi-Pakistan agreement’s binding commitment to come to each other’s defense if attacked — language that mimics NATO’s Article 5 pledge. Some experts term the emerging Saudi-Türkiye-Pakistan defense alliance as a step toward developing an “Islamic NATO” — a concept that gained traction following Israel’s strike on a Hamas compound in Doha in September. That attack further fueled longstanding Gulf state doubts about the U.S. commitment to Gulf security, and prompted assessments that the Gulf states should join with Egypt and other Arab states to form their own security coalition akin to NATO.

Indicating that the pact’s concept predates the Doha attack, Pakistan’s Defense Production Minister Raza Hayat Harraj confirmed last Wednesday that Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye have completed drafting their defense agreement after nearly a year of talks. Harraj clarified to Reuters that the potential deal between the three countries was separate from, but similar to, the September bilateral Saudi-Pakistani accord. He added a final consensus between the three states is needed to complete the deal, stating: “The Pakistan-Saudi Arabia-Türkiye trilateral agreement is something that is already in pipeline…The draft agreement is already available with us. The draft agreement is already with Saudi Arabia. The draft agreement is already available with Türkiye. And all three countries are deliberating. And this agreement has been there for the last 10 months.”

Türkiye’s rationale for wanting the three-part alliance is clear. A Bloomberg report quoted sources familiar with the matter, saying Türkiye had sought to join the earlier Pakistan-Saudi defense agreement, viewing it “as a way of strengthening security and deterrence when there are questions over the reliability of the U.S., which has strong military ties with all three countries, and President Donald Trump’s commitment to [NATO].” Bloomberg also quoted Nihat Ali Ozcan, a strategist with Ankara-based think tank TEPAV, as explaining: “Saudi Arabia brings financial clout, Pakistan has nuclear capability, ballistic missiles and manpower, while Türkiye has the military experience and has developed a defense industry.” Yet lingering distrust between Erdogan and MBS could derail the agreement. Last week, Fidan explained that talks had been held on a Saudi-Pakistan-Türkiye accord but that no agreement had been signed yet. Fidan pointed to a need for broader regional cooperation and for “trust to overcome distrust.” He added, “At the moment, there are meetings, talks, but we have not signed any agreement. Our President’s vision is for an inclusive platform that creates wider, bigger cooperation and stability.”