January 13, 2026

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The Future of U.S.-Colombia Relations After Maduro

(AP Photo/Santiago Saldarriaga)

Tensions have risen again between the United States and Colombia, particularly following the U.S. capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. U.S. President Donald Trump referred to Colombian President Gustavo Petro last week as a “sick man who likes making cocaine and selling it to the United States,” and that, “He’s not going to be doing it very long, let me tell you.” Trump’s statements triggered an immediate crisis in Bogotá, especially after what happened in neighboring Venezuela. Petro publicly warned that Colombia faced a “real threat” of U.S. military action and called on Colombians to take to the streets to defend their national sovereignty. Hours later, Trump requested a phone call with the Colombian leader, which seemed to calm the immediate escalating tensions, describing their discussion as a “great honor.” Still, the situation could easily escalate again, especially as the United States seems likely to remain engaged in Venezuela—and by extension the region—for the foreseeable future.

Despite the apparent de-escalation, relations between the U.S. and Colombia, as well as across Latin America, remain fragile. This incident was not the first confrontation between the U.S. and Colombian presidents. Petro had repeatedly criticized past U.S. strikes targeting alleged drug trafficking operations in the Caribbean and Pacific, arguing that they risk civilian harm and overstep the bounds of law enforcement. Petro’s criticism intensified after he accused the U.S. of killing a Colombian fisherman during an airstrike, an allegation Washington rejected. Relations worsened further when the U.S. revoked Petro’s visa after he publicly urged American soldiers to disobey Trump during a protest in New York. Petro’s criticism was not the lone voice in the region, but rather one among many, as Brazil, Mexico, and other countries spoke out against Washington after the capture of Maduro.

Petro, along with many other regional actors, certainly has a valid reason to be concerned about Trump’s policy in the Western Hemisphere, which Trump himself referred to offhand as the “Donroe Doctrine.” Following the capture of Maduro, Trump spoke openly about expanding the United States’ reach beyond Venezuela, including suggestions that Cuba could “fall” amid its loss of Venezuelan oil support, and comments indicating that he was considering further action related to drug trafficking in Mexico and, of course, Colombia. It is clear from the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy, released in December, that maintaining dominance throughout the Western Hemisphere remains a paramount objective and that Washington will exercise hard and soft power to achieve this goal.

Colombia’s situation — and by extension Mexico’s — differs significantly from Venezuela’s. Colombia remains a democratic state with functioning institutions and a long history of close security cooperation with the U.S., a military-to-military relationship that blossomed during the two decades of the Global War on Terrorism, when Colombian security forces trained closely with their American counterparts as part of Plan Colombia. Mexico, also a functioning democracy, has similarly cooperated with the U.S. for many years on drug trafficking and cartel-related issues. While Colombia is the world’s largest producer of cocaine, the drug trade is driven by non-state armed groups rather than the government itself —though corruption and complicity among some officials have long been part of the problem — and U.S.-Colombian intelligence and military cooperation has been a cornerstone of bilateral relations for decades.

While Trump’s comments regarding the Western Hemisphere and beyond — including comments rehashing his desire to acquire Greenland as a U.S. territory — should, and have been, taken seriously in light of his stated national security priorities, it remains unlikely that he would pursue regime change in Colombia in the same manner as Venezuela. Recent events, however, do signal a potentially significant shift in U.S. policy towards Latin America, harkening back to a Monroe Doctrine-style approach in which Washington asserts a dominant role in the hemisphere, backed by both a perceived and very real willingness to use force to entrench itself as a hemispheric hegemon. On Greenland, President Trump said just recently that if the United States is unable to acquire the territory from Denmark through a deal, then the U.S. would have to do it “the hard way.” He went on to say, “We are going to do something in Greenland, whether they like it or not, because if we don’t do it, Russia or China will take over Greenland, and we’re not going to have Russia or China as a neighbor.” With such frank and forceful language, all countries in the Western Hemisphere, including Colombia, have been forced to reckon with a new conception of the United States that is willing to use force to maneuver in great power competition.

Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. engagement in Latin America had often been episodic, transactional, or deprioritized, creating space for expanded Chinese economic influence, and to a lesser extent, renewed Russian diplomatic and security outreach. Trump’s recent National Security Strategy, released in December 2025, frames the Western Hemisphere as a core arena of strategic competition and explicitly prioritizes restoring U.S. preeminence in the region. For Colombia, this evolving U.S. strategy will necessitate a careful balancing act: maintaining cooperation with Washington and addressing U.S. security and counternarcotics demands, while still asserting national sovereignty and protecting domestic political priorities. This also applies to other left-leaning governments in the region, including Mexico and Brazil. The challenge will be to navigate heightened U.S. pressure without triggering punitive responses from Washington. This will also make expanding alternative partnerships, particularly with China, increasingly difficult, as its growing economic presence offers its own strategic risks and dangers in navigating relations with the U.S.

Also of increasing concern for Colombia are the security implications following Maduro’s capture in Caracas. This may be significant considering the terrorist groups and criminal organizations that operate within Venezuela and Colombia’s porous border. Armed non-state actors — such as Colombia’s National Liberation Army (ELN) and FARC dissidents and criminal drug trafficking organizations — have utilized Venezuela as a safe haven under Maduro’s regime. Though Maduro’s capture did not crumble the regime, it could create a power vacuum that these groups may rush to fill.

According to the Global Initiative on Transnational Organized Crime, although the U.S. framed its operation as targeting Maduro’s alleged role in drug trafficking, the Venezuelan illicit economy is so deeply embedded in the state structure that simply removing the purported “kingpin” is unlikely to dismantle the underlying criminal networks. Instead, Maduro’s capture could offer an opportunity for non-state actors to compete for control over trafficking routes and supply of lucrative markets such as cocaine and gold, potentially intensifying violence and instability. At the same time, the ELN has publicly rejected what it describes as “imperialist” U.S. intervention in Venezuela and called for resistance, framing Washington’s actions as a threat to regional sovereignty and urging “patriots” to confront U.S. plans — according to France24 — a position that could heighten the risk of retaliatory or escalatory attacks against U.S. interests in the region.