April 10, 2026

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In Islamabad, Iran Will Try to Cement Strategic Gains

(AP Photo/Anjum Naveed)

Iranian leaders interpret U.S. President Donald Trump’s agreement to a two-week ceasefire as an admission that U.S. and Israeli application of overwhelming airpower achieved military, but not strategic, gains. Iran’s remaining leaders, many of whom have been elevated to key positions following airstrikes that killed their predecessors, assert they have emerged victorious after absorbing one of the most comprehensive and precise strike campaigns in modern military history. Iran remains in essential control of the Strait of Hormuz chokepoint, through which 20 percent of seaborne traded oil flowed daily prior to the conflict. Iran also retains the ability to cause damage in Israel and at key energy infrastructure targets in the Arab Gulf states, despite more than 13,000 strikes on its ballistic missile, armed drone, and related production sites that U.S. military leaders say severely degraded Iran’s arsenal.

Iran’s de facto civilian leader, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of the Iranian Majles (parliament), will try to cement Iran’s strategic gains when he meets with U.S. negotiators, led by Vice President JD Vance, in Islamabad on Saturday morning (local time). Ghalibaf has emerged as a top figure after Israeli air strikes killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his designated chief executive, Supreme National Security Committee (SNSC) chair Ali Larijani. Strikes also apparently severely injured Khamenei’s son and successor, Mojtaba Khamenei. In negotiating a war-ending accord, Ghalibaf and his team — who Trump perhaps mistakenly characterizes as more pragmatic than the slain elder Khamenei — see Washington’s acceptance of the ceasefire and Islamabad talks as a tacit U.S. admission that the regime cannot be toppled by outside powers. Iran also views the talks as cementing its Axis of Resistance as an enduring counter to U.S. and Israeli regional hegemony. Iran’s leaders portray the regime’s ability to withstand the assault as a sign of strength against internal dissent, three months after a major uprising that at times seemed to threaten the regime’s grip on power.

Yet Iran’s posture in the negotiations might reflect an internal power struggle between the hardliners around Ghalibaf, including key surviving Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) members such as its commander, Ahmad Vahidi, and more pragmatic leaders aligned with elected President Masoud Pezeshkian. Some hardliners, such as Kayhan newspaper editor Hossein Shariatmadari, a powerful top adviser to the slain Khamenei, have criticized Ghalibaf for accepting the Islamabad talks rather than pursuing “war until victory.” If the talks proceed, amid continued strikes and mutual accusations of ceasefire violations, Iran will seek an advantage on each of the core demands stipulated in its 10-point plan publicized in the media.

President Trump had called the Iranian points a “workable basis on which to negotiate.” However, the White House later claimed that Trump was referring to a different version that was sent to the U.S. directly, with Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt referring to it as an “Iranian wishlist.” One Iranian demand is for the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces from the region, which reflects the desires of senior IRGC commanders and other regime hardliners. Although certain to be rejected by U.S. officials, many experts forecast that the vulnerability of U.S. bases in the Arab Gulf states to drone and missile strikes might yet cause the U.S. to return to a pre-Desert Storm (1991 Gulf war against Iraq) “over the horizon” Gulf security posture.

Two of Iran’s 10 points reflect a key Iranian priority — a demand for a “binding guarantee” that the U.S. and its allies will not strike Iran again, and a “permanent end to hostilities, not just a temporary ceasefire.” Underpinning the demand is a regime calculation that it cannot be overthrown by opposition groups, and that only direct U.S. intervention poses an existential threat to the regime. For weeks, Iranian leaders followed hardliner insistence by rejecting a temporary ceasefire in favor of continued attacks that would make the U.S. “regret” its decision to attack Iran. Yet Tehran’s acceptance of the ceasefire nodded to the views of pragmatists, such as former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, who argued in a widely cited Foreign Affairs article published last week that prolonging the conflict — while potentially “psychologically satisfying” for Tehran — would only result in further loss of civilian lives and destruction of infrastructure.

Iranian leaders consider their existing deterrent capability centered on missiles and drones, and support for their Axis of Resistance coalition partners as non-negotiable. In the version accepted by Washington, Iran’s 10-point plan groups Tehran’s position in two broad points: “recognition of Iran’s regional security interests” and “a broader framework for long-term negotiations without immediate surrender of core strategic capabilities.” Iranian leaders refer to the country’s missile arsenal as its “core deterrent,” because Iran is not a nuclear power, and its conventional weapons arsenal, even before Operation Epic Fury, was considered weak. It is not clear the extent to which U.S. leaders might soften longstanding Trump positions on these issues, particularly insistence on limits to the ranges and numbers of Iranian ballistic missiles.

Two of Iran’s 10 demands seek to institutionalize Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz — the Iranian stratagem that has posed the foremost challenge to Trump and the U.S. military. With points demanding “the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz under Iranian conditions,” and “a transit fee (for ships passing through the Strait) around $2 million per ship, shared with Oman,” Iran seeks to compel the U.S. to recognize a new normal in the Strait. The ceasefire requires Iran to relinquish control, but Iranian officials say ships are still required to “coordinate” voyages with the Iranian military in order to avoid mines and other threats in the Strait. In addition to strategic value from controlling the Strait, Iran appears to want to use the Strait as a source of reconstruction funds. Tehran anticipates — likely correctly — that the U.S. will categorically reject one of its 10 points that insists on “compensation or reconstruction support for war damage inside Iran.”

However, experts and global leaders assert that conceding Iranian control over the Strait would represent a U.S. abandonment of the historic U.S. commitment to freedom of navigation and to ensuring its allies have unfettered access to energy supplies. Trump left the U.S. position unclear by telling journalists on Wednesday that he might consider a “joint venture” with Iran to charge tolls in the Strait of Hormuz. Trump offered no details on how such a venture would work in practice, and the 1994 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, although not ratified by either the U.S. or Iran, would preclude any party from charging fees for transit through the Strait. Some experts assert that Trump might leave the matter to European and Asian countries, including the Gulf states, which heavily depend on free passage through the Strait. But doing so would leave Trump vulnerable to assessments that the conflict represented a U.S. strategic failure.

Iran's refusal to concede to its longstanding U.S. nuclear demands is sure to prevent an agreement in Islamabad. Trump premised his decision to attack Iran on the expressed need to deny Iran any pathway to develop a nuclear weapon. On Wednesday, Trump reiterated the U.S. demand that an agreement ensure "There will be no enrichment of Uranium," and reiterated U.S. insistence that Iran allow its 440-kilogram stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium (technically close to weapons-grade purity of 90 percent) to be removed from Iran. However, the war does not appear to have moved Tehran off the long-held positions that precluded a breakthrough in nuclear talks between Tehran for the past eight years — including in talks immediately before the current war began. On Wednesday, Ghalibaf stressed Tehran is maintaining its longstanding refusal to concede its right to continue enriching uranium — a position outlined in the version of the 10-point plan circulated in Iran and in regional media. On the other hand, in Oman-brokered talks earlier this year, Tehran offered to downblend its enriched uranium stockpile to the 3.67 percent purity level associated with civilian nuclear power reactors — a proposal that Iran will likely revive in Islamabad.

Two of Iran’s 10 points insist on its ability to support its Axis of Resistance partners — a goal U.S. officials, and particularly their Israeli counterparts, have sought to thwart. One demand is for “protection for Iran’s regional proxies and allied militias,” and another refers specifically to Iran’s key ally, Lebanese Hezbollah, insisting on “an end to Israeli strikes on Hezbollah in Lebanon.” The latter demand has directly jeopardized the ceasefire and the talks in Islamabad, as Israel has escalated its attacks on Hezbollah since the Iran ceasefire began. Vice President Vance asserted Wednesday that the U.S. believes the ceasefire did not apply to the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in Lebanon, but indicated Israel would “restrain” its actions in Lebanon during the talks. Amid widespread regional doubts about the U.S. ability to constrain Israel’s policy in Lebanon, Ghalibaf disputed the U.S. interpretation and cited Israel’s actions in Lebanon as one of several ceasefire violations. On Thursday, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who will be in Iran’s delegation in Islamabad, set Washington up to blame if Iran pulls out of the Islamabad talks, posting: “The Iran–U.S. Ceasefire terms are clear and explicit: the U.S. must choose—ceasefire or continued war via Israel. It cannot have both.” On Thursday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sought to appear supportive of the U.S.-Iran negotiations by announcing direct talks between Israel and the Beirut government to disarm Hezbollah and forge peace between Israel and Lebanon.

One point on which U.S. and Iranian officials concur is on significant relief from U.S. sanctions — a consistent demand of Iranian officials through almost every successive U.S. presidency. Iran’s civilian leaders assess that in the absence of any major international pledges of reconstruction funds, sanctions relief is needed to generate the funds to rebuild. One of Tehran’s 10 points demands “full lifting of U.S. sanctions.” Trump on Wednesday affirmed that broad sanctions relief is on the table in exchange for Iranian nuclear and other concessions, posting on social media: “We are, and will be, talking Tariff and Sanctions relief with Iran.” However, experts assess that any sanctions relief will be gradual and tied to Iran’s compliance with commitments on nuclear and other issues.

Despite the wide gaps in U.S. and Iranian positions, Tehran assesses that Trump will not risk the additional economic and political damage that would accompany a collapse of the truce or of the Islamabad talks. Trump and U.S. military leaders stated on Thursday that the U.S. military will remain in the region, and additional forces are still set to arrive. Experts agree with Tehran that Trump does not want the war to resume, but assess that he will do so if Tehran refuses the core compromises Trump considers non-negotiable.