April 1, 2026

SHARE |

After the Guns Fall Silent, a Failed State in Iran Could Breed an Insurgency

AP Photo/Vahid Salemi

After more than a month of war between the United States and Israel against Iran, the regime in Tehran has been battered mercilessly, yet many experts and the U.S. intelligence community believe that the regime will endure. According to a Washington Post report, the U.S. intelligence community assessment reinforces the view that the regime will be attenuated, yet even more hardline than its predecessor.

The generation of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leaders was shaped by the brutal nature of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and has managed to survive, and, along the way, gained control over powerful economic pillars in Iran. For whatever part of the rump regime that survives the ongoing hostilities, survival is paramount. The IRGC and the Basij, Iran’s powerful paramilitary force, have been at the forefront of putting down waves of Iranian protests. With the amount of blood on their hands, they recognize that their survival is existential; they have no place in a future, democratic Iran.

Even before the war began, Iran's economy was in a pitiful state, plagued by high inflation, suffering under the weight of international sanctions, and dealing with a devalued currency. The dire economic conditions of the country were at the forefront of the January protests, events which kick-started the Trump administration’s buildup of forces into the region. Whenever the war eventually winds down, the economy will still be a major issue for ordinary Iranians, both those who support and those who oppose whatever government is left in place. Moreover, a significant portion of Iran’s money will have to be dedicated toward rebuilding the country, including a heavily damaged infrastructure. The regime will also be hampered by a curtailed ability to provide goods and services to the population, including basic necessities. Relative deprivation and unmet expectations will further erode the political legitimacy of the regime and lead more Iranians to challenge it.

There are a number of factors that could increase the chances of an insurgency developing in Iran once the conflict comes to a halt. First, external states in the region could seek to provide both direct and indirect support to anti-regime groups operating within Iran. Training, weapons, and funding for armed ethnic groups operating in Iran — Kurds, Baluch, Azeris, Arabs, etc. — would be one approach to continuing to keep the IRGC unstable and off balance. Israel, in particular, might seek to provide external assistance to violent non-state armed groups opposed to the Iranian regime, as a means of continuing to weaken its leaders and force them to devote resources to combating a range of threats within Iran, presumably, leaving the regime with less bandwidth to meddle abroad.

Any significant gains by various armed ethnic groups would have potential ripple effects for countries like Türkiye, Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan, to name just a few. Iran’s northwestern Kurdish belt, its southeastern Baluch belt, and the Khuzestan region could be particularly vulnerable, especially if armed groups in these areas of the country believe that the rump regime in Tehran does not have the ability to project power into all parts of Iran. There are also a host of terrorist organizations, including Mujahedin-e-Kalq (MEK), Jaysh al-Adl, Ansar al-Furqan, and the Islamic State Khorasan (ISIS-K) that could take advantage of a weakened Iranian government to launch attacks within the country.

Another variable that would increase the likelihood of a lingering insurgency in Iran after the current conflict ebbs would be the introduction of U.S. ground troops in an offensive directed at the regime. A U.S. ground invasion — even if ostensibly dedicated to retaking Kharg Island or working to reopen the Strait of Hormuz — could have difficult to predict second-order effects that contribute to state failure in Iran. Any time a foreign ground force is introduced to a country, it changes the political and security dynamics on the ground. A failed state in a country of more than 90 million people would have spillover effects that directly impact the Persian Gulf, southwest Asia, Türkiye, the Levant, and the Caucasus. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees would further complicate an already challenging humanitarian situation in Iran.

A weakened regime that still feels it is under siege could continue to lash out at its neighbors even after the current round of fighting recedes. Numerous Hezbollah cells have been busted throughout the region, including in Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. The IRGC hardline regime will retain its connections to Iranian Axis of Resistance groups, including Lebanese Hezbollah, Shia militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen, although the command-and-control relationships with each of these entities could look different after the war, depending on how things continue to unfold.

The fallout from a failed state in Iran, especially one still controlled by a hardline and battle-tested IRGC core, would reverberate for decades. Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq are still dealing with the consequences of state failure. A low-level insurgency or civil war in Iran would take the form of small arms attacks, assassinations, and ambushes on regime symbols, including IRGC, Basij, police, and intelligence targets.

Insurgencies can result from a range of grievances, including economic, political, social, religious, and other issues that a population has with its government. There will be significant resentment at the regime for dragging Iran into war with the United States and Israel, two countries with far superior conventional military capabilities. Weak state capacity could make the regime more vulnerable to being attacked, but at the same time, the IRGC is likely to respond as it has to other protests and demonstrations: with overwhelming and indiscriminate force. Heavy-handed and draconian responses typically fuel further violence, perpetuating instability and further corroding the pillars upon which the regime rests.