INTELBRIEF

September 17, 2025

Israel and the Houthis Escalate

AP Photo/Osamah Abdulrahman

Bottom Line up Front

  • Israel and Yemen’s Houthi movement are escalating their attacks on each other –with Israel most recently launching strikes on Yemen’s Hodeidah port on Tuesday — increasing the potential to bring major powers, including the United States, back into battle against the group.
  • The Houthis have conducted numerous major attacks in recent days that represent retaliation for an Israeli strike that killed 12 out of the 16 leaders of the Houthis’ separate administration.
  • A Houthi attack last week on a tanker near the major Saudi oil export hub at Yanbu might trigger the Kingdom to question its tacit ceasefire with the Houthis.
  • The escalation might force Trump’s national security to consider a restart of an early 2025 air strike campaign on Houthi military targets — or other options — to deter the group.

Since the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel, there have been periods of calm as well as times of escalating U.S. and Israeli tensions with the Houthis, which control much of Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa. Houthi leaders, who face minimal military pressure within Yemen since an early 2022 ceasefire with Yemen government forces, steadfastly refuse to “decouple” their attacks on Israel from the ongoing war in Gaza. During the few Israel-Hamas ceasefires that have been negotiated, the Houthis have stood down from attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and on Israel. The Houthi missile, drone, and seaborne campaign against shipping in the waterway has, to date, damaged or sunk many vessels beyond those linked to Israel — the only avowed Houthi target. From November 2023 to December 2024, the Houthis attacked more than 100 ships, sinking four and killing at least eight mariners. More than half of international commercial shipping has rerouted to avoid the Red Sea.

The latest round of escalation began on Tuesday with Israel striking targets allegedly linked to the Houthis at the Hodeidah port, a key port on Yemen’s Red Sea coast. Houthi-affiliated Al Masirah TV station said Israel carried out 12 strikes yesterday afternoon in response to alleged Houthi use of the port to receive weapons from Iran. Accompanying the strikes, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said the Houthis would “continue to suffer blows” if they attacked Israel. Following these strikes, the Houthis issued a statement claiming responsibility for attempted strikes within Tel Aviv and Israel’s port city Eilat, as well as announcing that Israel had successfully intercepted a Houthi missile earlier on Tuesday.

In July, the Houthis resumed attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea after a May ceasefire with the U.S., which committed the Houthis to cease attacks on ships not affiliated with Israel or transacting any business with Israel. The Trump team interpreted the truce to apply to any Western shipping not linked to Israel. However, the Houthis apparently interpreted the agreement narrowly to apply only to ships owned or operated by U.S. firms. The Houthis resumed their strikes on ships as talks on another Gaza ceasefire broke down, and Israel’s restrictions on humanitarian aid deliveries to Gaza caused conditions to deteriorate toward famine.

In August, both Israel and the Houthis undertook attacks that crossed each other’s red lines and set the stage for a further expansion of their conflict. As Israel prepared for an offensive to capture all of Gaza City from Hamas militia forces, the Houthis expanded their attacks on Israel by arming their missiles with cluster munitions. These missiles open up with smaller explosives that are theoretically harder for Israel to intercept. However, Israel has still been able to intercept most Houthi attacks before their cluster warheads could detonate, and the cluster munition missiles have not meaningfully inflicted more damage on Israel than the group’s standard warheads, as seen on Thursday, when the Israeli military said it intercepted a missile fired from Yemen.

As experts expected, Israel responded disproportionately to the Houthis’ cluster munition attacks, intending to deter the Houthis from any further use of that or other weaponry against Israel. In addition to yesterday’s series of Israeli strikes on Hodeidah, on August 31, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu approved a major air strike on Houthi leaders convening in Sanaa to view a speech by the paramount Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi, appearing remotely. The strike killed 12 out of the 16 ministers in the Houthi administration, including Houthi “Prime Minister” Ahmed Ghaleb al-Rahawi. Israeli officials said the strike killed “a majority of the leadership,” including not only the prime minister but also the foreign minister, the minister for security affairs, and other prominent officials. The blasts from the strike sent tremors through several Sanaa neighborhoods and thick smoke over the city.

An expert assessed the Israeli decapitation strike as a dramatic but far from a decisive blow to the Houthi movement. Replacements for Rahawi and others killed were named within days. Andreas Krieg, a senior lecturer at King's College London, noted the strike did not mark “a decisive turning point in the war," adding the attack did not affect the Houthis' military capability, including its missile and drone units or its smuggling networks and ties with Tehran. Yemeni analyst Fatima Abo Alasrar told journalists: "Israel removed much of the visible governance layer but not the command spine," and Elisabeth Kendall, Yemen expert at Cambridge University, said Rahawi was "largely a symbolic figurehead." She added that "real power” lies with Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi and the group’s Jihad Council decision-making body. However, other experts noted the strike indicated Israel is making progress in developing precise intelligence on high-value Houthi targets. University of Ottawa professor Thomas Juneau noted Israel has not yet achieved "the level of precision that it has demonstrated in Iran and in Lebanon," but the killing of Rahawi might demonstrate a "trend of increasingly deep Israeli intelligence penetration (of Yemen)." The Jerusalem Post reported last week that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was working side-by-side with the Israelis to develop intelligence on key Houthi leaders, representing perhaps more U.S. involvement in Israel’s retaliatory decisions than has been assumed to date.

The Israeli strike on the Houthi leaders, as experts expected, set off a new cycle of Houthi retaliatory attacks. Abdul Malik al-Houthi immediately vowed to escalate attacks against Israel and, hours after the attack, the group detained at least 11 United Nations workers, the UN reported. A Yemeni security source said dozens had been arrested for "collaboration with Israel." Still, Houthi officials provided no evidence that the UN personnel were working with Israel, and UN officials called for their immediate release. The next day, the Houthis launched a missile towards the Liberia-flagged, Israeli-owned tanker "Scarlet Ray," 40 miles from Saudi Arabia's Red Sea port city of Yanbu. The ship was not hit. Yanbu hosts a significant oil and petrochemical export hub for Saudi Aramco, the Kingdom’s largest generator of government revenue, and any Houthi attack near that facility is sure to reignite Saudi concerns about the Houthi threat.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have largely exited their battle against the Houthis, in which their air and ground forces supported forces of the Republic of Yemen Government, now based in Aden. And, the Houthis have ceased their frequent ballistic missile attacks on Saudi targets. However, any renewed Houthis strikes on the Kingdom or the UAE, or any direct Houthi threat to the two countries’ key energy export industries, would be certain to prompt U.S.-Saudi consultations about new options — potentially including a restart of ground operations — to deter or defeat the Houthi threat. At the same time, in order to be successful, a Gulf state-led restart of the ground war against the Houthis would likely require U.S. support beyond providing munitions and other indirect support.

Prior to this week’s escalation, the Houthis have still expanded their attacks throughout early September, attempting to inflict on Israel and its backers a heavy price for the Israeli decapitation strike and cause Israel to think twice about undertaking a similar operation. Last Wednesday, the Houthis launched two missiles at Israel, both of which were intercepted. One day later, the group targeted another commercial ship off the coast of the major port of Hodeidah. The private maritime security firm Ambrey issued a report that the target was "aligned with" the stated Houthi vow to attack Israel-linked shipping because the vessel was publicly Israeli-owned. Another firm, EOS Risk Group, assessed that “The current tempo (of Houthi attacks) reflects a clear escalation, shifting from sporadic launches to multiple daily attempts.”

Refusing to de-escalate, the Houthis launched an armed drone that hit and damaged the arrivals hall at Ramon Airport in southern Israel last week, the Israel Airports Authority said. Israeli officials said their systems detected the drone but failed to intercept it or sound warnings before the projectile struck, but no casualties were reported. The same day, some sources blamed the Houthis for cutting an undersea cable that disrupted Internet access in parts of Asia and the Middle East. However, it was unclear whether the cable was damaged deliberately by the Houthis or any other threat actor, or if it was severed accidentally. The Houthis have denied attacking the lines in the past.

To date, the Trump Administration has not indicated there is any consideration of resuming the Operation Rough Rider air campaign or any other U.S. military operations against the group. Nor has any Trump official cautioned Israel to try to stand down its retaliation in order to de-escalate. However, the trajectory of the Houthis-Israel escalation and the Houthis’ renewed threat to global commerce might force the Trump team to confront policy decisions and choices the team and its Arab Gulf state partners had hoped to avoid.

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