October 22, 2025

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Is the United States Preparing for a War with Drug Cartels and Transnational Criminal Gangs?

Senior Airman Gabriel Jones/U.S. Air Force via AP

On the first day of his inauguration, U.S. President Donald Trump identified drug cartels as terrorist groups. Since then, the United States has been ramping up assets — both military and intelligence — to modify its force posture, assuming a more aggressive approach toward combating violent drug trafficking organizations and transnational criminal groups (reflagged as foreign terrorist organizations, or FTOs) in the Western hemisphere. In March, thousands of combat and support troops were moved to secure the U.S.-Mexico border with the express intent of preventing the flow of illegal immigration and drug trafficking. The Administration also deployed military assets to support intelligence gathering along the southern border. Also in March, President Trump argued that since the cartels were waging war on America, “it’s time for America to wage war on the cartels.” More and more visible preparations followed. Throughout the summer, Navy combat ships — including some carrying U.S. Marines — massed in the Caribbean. In early August, the New York Times reported that President Trump had signed a secret directive authorizing the Pentagon to begin using military force against the cartels. On September 5, a squadron of F-35 fighter-bombers was deployed to Puerto Rico in support of prospective military operations against the cartels.

On either September 2 or 3, the Trump administration authorized a strike against a four-engine speedboat in international waters, killing 11 alleged members of the Venezuelan gang, Tren de Aragua. President Trump stated publicly that this was a military-led operation. Administration officials were quick to set this attack as a baseline for further action. After the first boat strike, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth suggested that more kinetic actions were imminent: “We’ve got assets in the air, assets in the water, assets on ships, because this is a deadly serious mission for us, and it won’t stop with just this strike.” Indeed, American military forces attacked another suspected drug boat in mid-September, and more attacks followed. These naval actions alone could build into a sustained military campaign. In mid-October, B-52 bombers flew off the coast of Venezuela and an elite Army Special Operations aviation unit was conducting flights in the southern Caribbean Sea, also near the Venezuelan coast. More strikes followed in mid-October. The operational tempo of these increasing drone strikes against alleged drug boats, of which at the time of this writing have totaled seven this year, are already signs of potential escalation with Venezuela.

The Trump administration has even tried to make the case that the cartels are as dangerous as al-Qaeda, with Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stating, “these cartels are the Al Qaeda of the Western Hemisphere, using violence, murder and terrorism to impose their will, threaten our national security and poison our people.” Historically, military units have played an important role in Western Hemisphere counternarcotics activities. Special operations units have supported counter-cartel operations in Colombia and Mexico; American Marines have partnered with Guatemalan counterparts to combat the Zetas cartel; and military planes, ships, drones, satellites, and other intelligence assets have been used to support a wider array of partnered operations throughout Central and South America. Approaching the cartels as a military threat increases the chances of achieving battlefield effects like destroying drug labs, sinking boats, shooting down aircraft, and killing cartel members. These operations will undoubtedly hurt the cartels. But they also carry a significant risk of escalation and dangerous second- and third-order effects, particularly if the United States takes unilateral action in Mexico or violates Venezuelan air or maritime space with military assets.

It remains unclear what a broad, military-led counterterrorism campaign against the cartels might look like, how long such a campaign might last, or what geographic scope it might encompass. Trump officials frequently hint at action in Venezuela and Mexico. Operations could conceivably extend to Haiti as well, where a criminal insurgency has taken root and continues to wreak havoc. Options are limited in Venezuela and Haiti, but in Mexico, American planners could continue to partner with the state or go it alone.

It is important to acknowledge the real threats posed by the cartels, but also understand the risks associated with a military-led campaign. If the United States moves forward with military action against Venezuela, cartels operating on Mexican soil, or other growing threats in the Caribbean or elsewhere, Washington should carefully consider strategic options and begin preparing for likely undesirable second- and third-order consequences. Partnering in a prospective counter-cartel war in Mexico would be the ideal approach. History strongly suggests that counterterror, counternarcotics, and perhaps even counterinsurgency operations in complex urban and mountainous terrain require across-the-board teamwork. Temporary success achieved against narco-terrorist groups like the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in Colombia was only achieved through carefully balanced and mutually supportive partnering operations, robust budgets, and extended time horizons. Americans did not lead a unilateral strike campaign to defeat the FARC; the Colombians led and won that fight with U.S. support. Despite close collaboration, that decades-long conflict has remained ongoing, and progress is reversible.

This dynamic — strength through partnership — has proven true in every 21st-century war. It has been true to varying extents throughout recorded history. Moreover, in wars like the one against the Islamic State, military actions were only one component of what were necessarily far broader and more nuanced campaigns. Other parallel and mutually reinforcing lines of effort have been essential. Counterterror, counterinsurgency, and counternarcotics operations and wars achieve success through carefully balanced military, diplomatic, financial, and political inputs. American interagency partners support each other, partnered forces, and allies as part of a complex strategy. And even with all cylinders firing, chances of long-term success in any irregular war are mixed at best, and the outcome is subject to a range of unpredictable factors — what some might term “the fog of war.” While the Venezuelan military could not put up a serious fight against the U.S. military, its likely conventional response could force an intended American counterterror operation towards a full-scale military invasion. Assuming it is able to defeat the organized units of the Venezuelan military quickly, the U.S. military would then have to conduct strikes against the cartels from afar or, as in Mexico, press on to land.

Research on best practices and lessons learned for both counterterror and counterinsurgency operations shows that qualified success is achieved only with high levels of commitment and motivation on the part of the host-nation government. This research also shows that purely kinetic strategies are often counterproductive. Long-term focus, adaptability, and strong will to continue the fight over an extended timeframe — more often measured in decades rather than years — are required by all partners. It remains unclear if any of the factors would be present in a U.S. military operation in either Mexico or Venezuela. Venezuelan citizens are concerned about what will be left in the wake of U.S. military action, and warned that even if Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is overthrown, there would be a panoply of armed actors vying for control of the spoils — remnants of Venezuela’s military, Colombian guerrillas, paramilitary gangs, and other violent non-state actors.

There is little indication that the American public is collectively prepared for an escalating, long-term war in Mexico, Venezuela, or even Haiti. While most Americans might agree that the cartels represent a real threat and need to be dealt with, most will have little understanding of the costs and time required to fight the cartels. Nor are they likely to expect the possible horizontal escalation the cartels can undertake inside the United States. If the Trump administration is determined to act against the cartels, American policymakers, military, and law-enforcement leaders should act thoughtfully, legally, ethically, and morally, with reasonable expectations for success. Those considerations rule out even the most brilliant and carefully thought-through unilateral military campaign; however, do not preclude amplifying robust partnered, law-enforcement-led operations. This includes acting in concert with Mexico in an enhanced partnership that involves a ramped-up multinational law enforcement operation and perhaps increased support for any covert action underway. Cooperation would extend across the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Coast Guard, and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). U.S. assistance also extends to military intelligence, logistics, and equipment support to Mexican partners in accordance with longstanding practice. As aforementioned, the United States has a long history of using its military to support operations related to countering the drug trade, including border security, building partner capacity, enabling partner operations against criminal organizations, and interdicting drug shipments. Working by, with, and through an established partner significantly reduces risk, exposure to horizontal escalation, and a range of second- and third-order effects.

Venezuela presents a different challenge. President Maduro’s illegal regime will not cooperate with the United States in any effort to reduce gang or cartel activity on Venezuelan soil. He has proven resilient in the face of long-standing American sanctions. When it comes to financial and physical isolation, the situation may have reached a place where the law of diminishing returns is in play. Therefore, the best course of action against Tren de Aragua and other Venezuelan gangs and cartels is increased multinational air, land, and sea law-enforcement action. That will be a dissatisfying approach to some, but it remains the most logical, practical, legal, ethical, and moral way to address this problem.