October 16, 2025

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Fighting Continues to Rage in Myanmar as the Death Toll Mounts

AP Photo/Aung Shine Oo

At least 32 people were killed and over 50 were injured in an attack in Myanmar last week when junta paragliders dropped bombs on a crowd at a candlelight vigil protesting against the regime that doubled as an observation of the important Buddhist holiday, the festival of light, or Thadingyut. The attack utilized a motorized paraglider, also known as a paramotor, dropped two bombs on the crowd, then circled back moments later to drop another two bombs, according to local recounts of the attack. This airstrike is one of many carried out by the junta regime against opposition forces this year, with the low-tech and inexpensive paragliders increasingly being used to conduct attacks.

Until recently, the junta military, also known as the Tatmadaw, had steadily lost territory, hemorrhaged economic assets, and suffered from attenuated popular support, as a loosely aligned opposition coalition gained ground. The opposition includes ethnic armed organizations (EOAs), such as the Three Brotherhood Alliance. One of the members of the alliance, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), recently lost control over the country’s second-largest city — Kyaukme — to the regime. Control of Kyaukme provides a critical transport route into the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which has greatly increased its support of the Tatmadaw over the past year.

Historically, the PRC has supported both the military and EOAs, even after the military coup in 2021, but has recently decided to place its bets wholly on the Tatmadaw. Potentially fearing a Syria-like regime collapse, Beijing has realized the need to stabilize the region. According to analysis by the Stimson Center, though it has little confidence in junta chief Min Aung Hlaing, Beijing now views the Tatmadaw as the sole political actor capable of preserving Myanmar’s territorial integrity and securing Beijing’s economic interests. As a result, Beijing has increased military transfers — including aircraft, unmanned systems, spare parts, and training support — and pledged billions in targeted aid, including line items for census and electoral infrastructure to help the junta “normalize” its domestic standing. This surge in assistance has strengthened the Tatmadaw’s aerial campaign, especially its use of drones and loitering munitions, and provided a morale boost to a military battered by desertions and manpower shortages. This assistance arrives at a time when a long-standing partner of the Tatmadaw, Russia, likely needs its weapons and technology for its war in Ukraine. Experts at War on the Rocks assess that the Tatmadaw’s utilization of these drones places Myanmar as the second most active drone theater behind Ukraine.

Yet this new aid package may not be enough to turn the tide of the conflict. The junta’s poor leadership, corruption, and a weak command structure limit its ability to convert external assistance into more durable gains. Even as Chinese weapons and funding arrive, anti-regime forces continue to hold or contest large swaths of territory, particularly in border regions like Shan and Kachin. The result is a war of attrition in which Beijing’s support can slow the junta’s decline but unlikely reverse it. For China, however, even stalemate is acceptable if it preserves border stability and secures its strategic footholds.

Economic interests underpin Beijing’s engagement. The PRC’s Belt and Road-linked infrastructure projects — including pipelines, trade zones, and the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port — provide it with important leverage across Myanmar’s vast and complex geography. Beyond transport corridors, competition is unfolding globally over critical minerals. The PRC already dominates global processing, and controlling upstream supply from Myanmar would help to further consolidate that advantage. According to a report by the Institute for Strategy and Policy-Myanmar — an independent, non-partisan think tank out of Thailand — over the past eight years (2017-2024), Myanmar has become China’s primary exporter of rare earths exceeding a value of $4 billion. The report also mentions that since the coup in 2021, exports of rare earths to the PRC soared with the post-coup surge accounting for 84 percent of the exports to China during the eight-year period of 2017-2024.

Myanmar’s vast critical mineral reserves have caught the attention of U.S. President Donald Trump in his quest to secure critical minerals globally. Washington is increasingly aware of the role of critical minerals in the supply chain and that the PRC’s dominance in this space grants Beijing significant geopolitical leverage. Reportedly, Vice President JD Vance had discussed over the summer the possibility of working with an EAO, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), to transport critical minerals via India. Additionally, reports from the summer also state that the Trump administration is considering engaging in direct peace talks with the junta, perhaps as another avenue to acquiring critical minerals.

This U.S. interest is fragile and constrained; the junta remains much more trusting of key U.S. adversaries like Russia and China. Moreover, engaging diplomatically with the junta would represent a significant retreat from America’s core commitment to democratic principles. In addition to this, many of the richest mineral deposits lie in territory outside effective junta control, in areas held by EOAs or opposition groups like the KIA. Thus, any U.S. push to tap those resources would either require negotiating with the KIA for a better deal than it currently has with Beijing or backing military offensives to capture them — moves that risk legitimizing military rule or entangling the U.S. in a new conflict. These tactics could also negatively impact relations with other allies in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), with which the U.S. has a strong partnership. India, which shares a border with Myanmar, is also exploring Naypyidaw’s rare earth reserves, adding more competition to the mix.

With elections being held in December of this year, the stakes are high. The elections will be the first held in the country since the military coup in 2021. However, the junta is likely to frame the elections as part of a transition to normalcy — one buttressed by promises of resource-driven development and international engagement — but in practice the vote is expected to be tightly controlled and narrowly legitimizing rather than genuinely democratic. Many countries have already written the election as a power grab by the general. However, the PRC is fully backing the election, with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi pledging $3 billion in assistance, with funds dedicated to a census and elections, according to the Stimson Center. India has also announced its intention to dispatch election observers to the December polls, signaling support for the vote. It is unlikely that the elections will significantly alter the balance of power in Myanmar; rather, they are poised to serve as a tool for the junta to entrench its rule and project legitimacy.