October 10, 2025

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How Does Hybrid Warfare Impact the Global Supply Chain?

AP Photo/File

On September 8, the first cargo shipment of European goods departed from Warsaw, Poland, bound for the People's Republic of China (PRC) via railroad as part of the PRC’s “New Silk Road” infrastructure project. The trade route provides an essential alternative to ships traveling from Europe to Asia (and vice versa), considering the disruption to supply chains caused by ongoing Houthi attacks on cargo ships traveling through the Red Sea. However, only a few days later, rail traffic through this alternative route was suspended as Poland closed its eastern border — which it shares with Russian ally Belarus — following Russian-Belarusian wargames that sent at least 19 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) into Polish airspace, according to Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. In turn, trade routes were shut down, including a rail route that moves 90 percent of rail freight from the EU to the PRC, according to Politico. A spokesman from the Polish foreign ministry noted following a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, “It was made very clear during the talks that in this situation, the logic of trade, which is also beneficial for us, is being replaced by the logic of security.”

Even though Poland reopened its border on September 23, the incident revealed how quickly an ostensibly commercial corridor could become a geopolitical chokepoint. The result is a growing vulnerability in supply chains. This type of disruption, intentional or not, reflects a consequence of Russia’s broader playbook of hybrid warfare, demonstrating that trade routes can be weaponized without crossing a conventional military threshold. Sometimes referred to as military operations other than war (MOOTW), these asymmetric tactics can have outsized consequences and, in this case, have revealed Europe’s lack of a comprehensive strategy to deal with Russia’s approach. Moscow’s use of cyberattacks on logistics software, sabotage of energy infrastructure, and the cultivation of proxy influence in border regions can contribute to making Europe’s arteries of commerce feel conditional and insecure.

However, Europe also possesses the capacity to exert economic pressure on Russia; the closure of Poland’s eastern border and the suspension of trade signaled just this. Increasingly relevant since its invasion of Ukraine is Moscow’s sanction evasion through shadow tactics, most well-known for its shadow fleets transporting oil. However, Russia also exploits Chinese and Central Asian intermediaries to procure sanctioned goods —such as microchips, drone components, and dual-use materials — to redirect trade to Russia, helping to sustain its defense-industrial capacity. According to a classified report by the German Foreign Ministry, obtained by the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung in May, the PRC, along with Hong Kong, accounts for roughly 80 percent of global efforts to circumvent sanctions on Russia, despite Beijing’s continued denials of involvement.

The growing convergence between Russia and the PRC deepens these vulnerabilities. Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments in Central Asia, Russia, and Eastern Europe have built a vast logistics network — rail lines, ports, and energy corridors — that Moscow can leverage. Additionally, the development of the Arctic Northern Sea Route, although still limited by climate and infrastructure, signals a shared intent to create alternative supply chain routes that are less exposed to Western oversight.

Simultaneously, Russia and China have aligned their information ecosystems, where Chinese state media has amplified Russian narratives about the war in Ukraine, including regarding sanctions by the West. The China Media Project, an independent research project focused on the Chinese media landscape and political discourse of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), reported that Russian narratives are being spread through state media. For example, the group noted that the Chinese Communist Party’s official People’s Daily newspaper referred to sanctions against Russia as “financial terrorism,” along with phrases such as “economic hegemonism” and “economic weaponization.”

The implications of the Russian-Chinese relationship on European supply chains are far-reaching, exposing both structural and political vulnerabilities. Although the EU has been able to reduce its reliance on Russian supply chains, it is still heavily reliant on Chinese ones. This leaves the EU highly susceptible to disruption — whether through cyberattacks, infrastructure sabotage, or the strategic closure of key routes. Strategically, trade corridors running through Russian or Russian-influenced territories have become potential levers of coercion. For example, the PRC recently launched the first Chinese vessel, the Istanbul Bridge, to undertake the 18-day journey through the Northern Sea Route to European ports.

Politically, European leaders are not necessarily aligned on how to approach the PRC’s involvement in supporting the Russian economy and helping it evade sanctions. In response to pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump, the EU has proposed a new sanctions package targeting foreign companies, including Chinese firms, that purchase Russian oil. This move aims to intensify pressure on Russia and its allies over the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. The proposed measures include sanctions on banks, blacklisting of 118 vessels suspected of transporting Russian oil, banning transactions with major Russian oil companies Rosneft and Gazpromneft, and phasing out Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports by the end of 2026 — a year earlier than previously planned, according to the Wall Street Journal. However, the proposal still requires approval from all 27 EU member states, and some countries, such as Hungary and Germany, with significant economic ties to China, may resist such measures.

Russia’s evolving hybrid strategy — and China’s entanglement within it and indeed facilitation at times — illustrate how economic connectivity can become a weapon rather than a shield. The EU now faces a strategic landscape in which multiple points in its supply chains could be potential vulnerabilities. Hybrid warfare means Russia’s strategies are not just confined to the digital or military domain; they operate through customs queues, freight routes, and public narratives, an approach that will likely become more common over time. Unless Europe continues to further its resilience in its supply chains, its prosperity could once again become the soft underbelly of its security.