November 6, 2025

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Saudi Arabia Faces Challenges and Opportunities

AP Photo/Alex Brandon

Saudi de facto leader Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) is calibrating Saudi policy to address the dramatic geopolitical changes in the region since the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel. The post-October 7 offensives launched by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, joined at times by U.S. military action, have severely weakened Iran and its Axis of Resistance coalition. Iran’s decline, which has included Tehran’s exclusion from post-Assad Syria and the severing of Iran’s secure supply line to Lebanese Hezbollah, has eased the Kingdom’s threat matrix. But Tehran’s weakness has enabled other regional powers, such as Türkiye and Egypt, which is generally an ally of the Kingdom, to expand their influence and offer regional visions that sometimes compete with Riyadh's. Türkiye, in particular, is willing to support a role for Hamas in a postwar power structure in Gaza. To counterbalance some of its emerging regional rivals, the Kingdom signed a “strategic mutual defense agreement” with Pakistan in September.

A cornerstone of MBS’s strategy is forging closer security and economic engagement with U.S. President Donald Trump and his team, recognizing that the U.S. is uniquely positioned in the region to help him accomplish Saudi policy goals. He and Trump will try to advance their respective objectives when they meet again in Washington, a meeting officials say will take place on November 18. The MBS visit to the U.S. will be the first of Trump's second term, and a follow-on to Trump’s May visit to the Kingdom, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). That visit was dominated by Trump’s effort to encourage Saudi and broader Gulf state investment in the U.S. and U.S.-Gulf cooperation to develop Artificial Intelligence (AI) and other leading technologies. During that trip, Trump’s meeting with Syria’s interim leader Ahmad al-Sharaa in Riyadh, and the announcement of a lifting of U.S. sanctions on Syria, showcased MBS’s ability to influence Trump.

A wide range of reports indicate that MBS hopes his visit will result in the signing of a long-discussed defense pact, modeled after the recent U.S. accord with Qatar, that contains a U.S. pledge to treat any armed attack on Saudi Arabia as a threat to the United States and to respond militarily. A binding defense accord with the U.S., which would be far more comprehensive than the informal U.S.-Saudi defense cooperation agreements in place for many decades, would significantly ease most of Saudi Arabia’s security concerns. The U.S.-Saudi pact had been stalled since the October 7 attack over U.S. conditions — now dropped by Trump — that it be linked to Saudi normalization of relations with Israel. MBS will also seek U.S. agreement to sell the Kingdom up to 48 F-35 fifth-generation combat aircraft — a system approved for sale only to the closest U.S. allies. Washington and Riyadh might also finalize agreements on enhanced intelligence sharing. Separately, MBS reportedly wants to advance a longstanding Saudi request for the U.S to provide the Kingdom with civilian nuclear technology. That request has been stalled due to concerns in the executive branch and Congress about proliferation risks. Still, many Trump officials see U.S. nuclear technology sales as deterring Saudi leaders from approaching Russia or China for that equipment. However, it is unclear whether a nuclear cooperation agreement will be reached during the upcoming MBS visit.

Among the security concerns MBS hopes closer cooperation with Washington can alleviate are a potential resurgence by Iran and renewed missile and drone attacks from the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen. The Houthis are the one Axis of Resistance coalition member that, despite extensive Israeli and U.S. military strikes in 2025, retains the ability to strike preemptively in the region. On November 1, 2025, Hezam al-Asad, a member of the political bureau of the Houthis (Ansar Allah) movement, issued the latest of recent threats against the Kingdom, accusing it of violating its ceasefire commitments to the group. Asad stated the Houthis: “can also send [Saudi Arabia and the UAE] back to [the days] of living in desert tents and [riding] camels and donkeys." Saudi Arabia and the UAE led an Arab coalition that fought the Houthis unsuccessfully during 2015-2022. Any restart of war with the Houthis will, in the view of MBS and his team, derail efforts to focus their resources on implementing MBS’s Vision 2030 economic diversification program, which depends on investor confidence — faith that would be damaged if active hostilities with the Houthis were to resume.

For its part, the Trump team wants comprehensive Saudi involvement in advancing Trump’s peace plan for Gaza. Washington is looking to utilize the Kingdom’s unchallenged legitimacy as the birthplace of Islam, as well as the U.S.-Saudi agreement with Israel that Hamas should play no political or military role in the postwar Gaza Strip. An internal Saudi government brief, reported in Middle East Eye, asserts that officials: “aim to present the Kingdom's vision for enhancing stability in the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian territories,” that includes “marginalizing the role of Hamas in governance” and reforming the Palestinian Authority (PA) “in a manner that serves the aspirations of the Palestinian people for an independent, sovereign state on the 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as its capital.” The document adds that Saudi Arabia believes Hamas has an “impact on obstructing peace efforts and deepening divisions,” and should be sidelined. Yet, Saudi leaders face dissension from some regional powers, including Türkiye, Egypt, Qatar, and others, which argue that Hamas reflects the views of many Palestinians and should have input on Gaza’s postwar governing structure.

On other Palestine-related issues, however, Washington and Riyadh are not aligned. Saudi leaders are resisting Trump’s efforts to persuade them to join his seminal first-term achievement — the 2020 Abraham Accords normalizations with Israel. The Saudis have stated consistently that normalizing relations with Israel requires the establishment of a definitive roadmap to an independent Palestinian state. A Palestinian state is referenced in vague terms in Trump’s Gaza peace plan, but includes no U.S. commitment to bring that result about. Any U.S. push for Palestinian statehood would bring the U.S. into conflict with its close ally, Israel, which, since the October 7 Hamas attack, has categorically rejected a Palestinian state. The Kingdom has also ruled out any investment in reconstructing Gaza — an effort that Mr. Trump hopes to persuade Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries to lead — unless Gaza is free of Hamas influence and there is no possibility the war will restart.

At a meeting in Istanbul on Monday, chaired by Türkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, diplomats from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Jordan, Pakistan, and Indonesia also appeared to reject some aspects of the Trump Gaza plan. The senior officials rejected the Trump plan’s provision for an international “peace board” to oversee governance in postwar Gaza. A statement by the foreign ministers attending the Istanbul meeting said, “Gaza’s future must be Palestinian-led and avoid any new system of foreign hegemony.” Summarizing the consensus view of the officials attending, Fidan added: “Our principle is that Palestinians should govern the Palestinians and ensure their own security. The international community should support this in the best possible way — diplomatically, institutionally, and economically.” Fidan also noted the countries attending the meeting would “decide, based on the contents of this definition, whether to send soldiers or not” to the Trump plan’s International Stabilization Force, which U.S. officials are currently attempting to assemble. Like other potential force donors, Saudi Arabia has not committed to providing forces to that unit and is reluctant to send troops into an environment in which Hamas militia forces intend to resist disarming. Hoping to establish a formal UN imprimatur on the stabilization unit, several countries at the Monday Istanbul meeting called for a United Nations Security Council resolution establishing the force. The Trump team is reportedly drafting the requested resolution for consideration by the Security Council.

Left unclear is the extent to which Saudi oil production and its leading role in OPEC and the OPEC+ bloc, which includes Russia, will constitute a sticking point between Washington and Riyadh. The Kingdom has thus far tried to calibrate the need to remain closely engaged with Trump, who has consistently sought higher Saudi production to lower global oil prices, against the need to maintain the group’s alliance with Russia and other major producers. On Sunday, Russia successfully persuaded Riyadh to halt a recent trend of OPEC+ production increases, effective early 2026. Moscow argued that adding to the existing oil glut would magnify the economic damage that Trump’s sanctions on Russia’s energy industry are causing. Moscow relies on oil and gas for a quarter of its federal budget, and Trump’s sanctions have sought to cripple Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ability to continue the Ukraine war. Trump will almost certainly push against Moscow’s preferences when he meets with MBS in less than two weeks. Still, this issue is likely to be overshadowed by other bilateral, regional, and security issues.