November 20, 2025

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COP30 and the Climate-Security Paradox: Strategic Competition, Fragile States, and the Erosion of Collective Security

AP Photo/Fernando Llano

The 30^th United Nations climate conference (COP30) concludes tomorrow in Belém, Brazil, against a backdrop of increased global competition surrounding critical minerals, mounting climate-linked instability, and an erosion of collective security frameworks. While the conference is aimed at accelerating decarbonization, many have grown skeptical of global institutions, like the United Nations (UN), and have questioned whether these institutions are capable of solving these issues. COP30 has become an international referendum on the international system’s capacity to respond at a moment when great power competition, resource insecurity, and global instability are shaping geopolitics. The paradox is that global decarbonization — intended to mitigate long-term security risks — is simultaneously generating new sources of instability like illicit mining, particularly within fragile states, and exposing the limits of cooperative governance structures. The absence of an official delegation from the United States — coupled with President Donald Trump’s decision to once again withdraw from the Paris Agreement — has further deepened the departure of multilateralism.

Acquiring critical minerals has become central to global power competition — which are also essential for the clean energy transition — and have increasingly been viewed as strategic assets underpinning geopolitical strength. China’s entrenched dominance in processing and refining critical minerals continues to shape global supply chains, prompting the U.S., European Union, and like-minded partners to pursue diversification through bilateral deals with states in Africa, Latin America, and the Indo-Pacific. However, many of the states hosting these minerals — like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Brazil, and Myanmar — are afflicted by conflict, corruption, and/or weak governance, undermining the ability to establish transparent and sustainable supply chains. For the first time, delegates in Belém recognized the environmental and social effects of mining for critical minerals in these countries as Latin American indigenous groups have protested the consequences of extracting and processing critical minerals on their communities.

Additionally, the geography of many critical minerals intersects with some of the world’s most unstable regions, making illicit networks and conflict central to the critical mineral supply chain. The DRC, for example, which produces more than 70 percent of the world’s cobalt, has become a hub of exploitation in which armed groups — such as the rebel group M23 — and corrupt military and political officials have profited from. Many of these mines are operated by Chinese mining companies and are considered illegal because they do not operate under Congolese mining standards. According to Harvard University's Carr-Ryan Center for Human Rights, “In territories with mining operations, the rate of severe malnutrition among children under five years old is high, many children are out of school, there is an unbearable degradation of water ecosystems, and the rainforest is being washed out.” While operations have been temporarily suspended at a number of Chinese-owned mines, it is unclear whether there will be any change in practice once the mines are able to be used again.

Myanmar represents another country involved in the illicit economy of critical minerals. Rare earth mining in Kachin and Shan States — regions controlled by ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and junta-aligned militia groups — operates with minimal oversight. These minerals cross the border into China to be brought into the formal supply chain. According to the Stimson Center, EAOs that operate mines in Myanmar — such as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) — have utilized their role in the supply chain to formalize their autonomy in the region, even going as far as imposing a 20 percent levy on exported critical mineral concentrates to China in December 2024. These mines have also created environmental harm from harsh chemicals polluting the water, soil, and air, as well as forced migration to make room for more mines.

In Latin America, illicit copper and lithium networks have expanded in countries such as Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, and Peru, as well as gold in Colombia and other minerals such as cassiterite and manganese in Brazil. Criminal organizations and corrupt officials have allowed for the illicit trade of critical minerals in Latin America to flourish and contribute to environmental degradation which has disproportionally affected its indigenous community. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, Colombia’s criminal groups earn over half their revenue from illegal gold, with insurgent organizations such as the National Liberation Army (ELN) and ex-FARC fighters extending operations to Venezuela and Ecuador, according to think tank InsightCrime. In Peru, SMPE, the country’s main energy and mining association has warned that the most significant threat to its mining sector is the increase in informal and illegal mining activity. Together, these trends highlight the widening security vacuum surrounding the critical mineral industry within Latin America that is being integrated into the global supply chain.

However, the climate-security implications extend beyond critical mineral supply chains. In the Sahel, climate shocks and resource extortion have contributed to the collapse of governance structures, fueling conflicts, and making recruitment into jihadist groups more effective. Al-Qaeda's Sahelian branch, Jama'at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) has created a fuel-blockade in Mali’s capital city of Bamako as a tactic to potentially exert control and undermine public confidence in the country’s junta ruler. In the Horn of Africa, successive droughts followed by catastrophic floods have driven migration, leaving millions of people with food insecurity. Groups like al-Shabaab in Somalia have leveraged these vulnerabilities, particularly during a severe drought between 2020-2023. In Sudan, the picture is even more acute. Rising temperatures, erratic rainfall, and prolonged droughts have degraded pastoral and agricultural livelihoods, while deforestation and land degradation have compounded the damage. This climate stress is deeply intertwined with the ongoing civil war where the conflict has disrupted access to water, food, and shelter. These issues have in turn led to the spread of diseases such a cholera, which the International Red Cross stated in September that Sudan is witnessing the largest outbreak of the disease in years.

Compounding these pressures is the weakening state of collective security institutions — a trend that is palpable at COP30 itself. The UN Security Council remains gridlocked on climate-security resolutions, while peacekeeping operations continue to shrink due to budget limitations and political divisions. This loss of confidence is particularly evident in the U.S.’ total official absence from COP30. With President Trump withdrawing from the Paris Agreement for a second time, the world’s largest historical emitter has not only stepped back from global climate leadership but also has removed itself from the core architecture of climate cooperation. U.S. disengagement sends a power signal: without American participation, financial commitments may dwindle, mitigation trajectories lose coherence, and the political space for coordinated global action narrows. This has also given China the opportunity to step up during COP30 and continue its dominance in the renewable energy sector. However, the absence of U.S. leadership may also create openings for middle powers and developing countries such as COP30’s host country, Brazil, which claims to be a climate leader, as well as Nigeria and Indonesia which have some of the highest numbers of delegates attending the conference.