November 12, 2025

SHARE |

Slaughter in Sudan Enabled by External Actors

(AP Photo/Mohammed Abaker)

When the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) seized the Sudanese city of El Fasher on October 26 after years of fighting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), many observers expected reports of mass atrocities to surface. The two- and half-year year conflict between the RSF and SAF had already pushed Sudan into a humanitarian crisis, with serious abuses committed by both sides. On Sunday, Al Jazeera reported that the Sudan Doctors Network accused RSF paramilitaries of collecting “hundreds of bodies” to burn or bury them in mass graves in an attempt to conceal evidence of massacres. Over the course of the past week alone, it is believed that thousands of civilians have been massacred, with militia fighters filming themselves executing people with impunity. With approximately 400,000 people killed over the course of the past two and a half years of civil war, coupled with a spreading famine, Sudan has devolved into the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophe, even as it garners far less international media attention than Gaza or Ukraine. The RSF draws striking parallels to the Janjaweed militia, one of the main players during the genocide in Darfur two decades ago, a conflict that killed 300,000 people and displaced millions more.

Satellite imagery analyzed by the Yale School of Public Health’s Humanitarian Research Lab shows signs of large fires and recently disturbed ground near hospitals in El Fasher, appearing to confirm the claims made by Sudan’s Doctors Network. UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, said that the war was “spiraling out of control,” further stating that there were “credible reports of widespread executions since the Rapid Support Forces entered [El Fasher].” According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the RSF’s assault forced nearly 92,000 people to flee El Fasher and the surrounding areas, seeking refuge in overcrowded displacement camps across North Darfur and Kordofan.

Many humanitarian and aid workers, including Li Fung, the UN’s Human Rights Representative in Sudan, have called the conflict one of the world’s “worst humanitarian crises.” Entire neighborhoods in El Fasher and across Darfur have been razed, with survivors describing scenes of systematic slaughter. Hospitals have been attacked or occupied by paramilitaries, aid convoys looted, and doctors detained or executed. Doctors Without Borders and the International Rescue Committee report that the number of wounded civilians is overwhelming the few remaining medical facilities, many of which lack electricity or anesthesia. Famine is spreading rapidly—the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) warns that millions are facing “catastrophic” hunger, with some regions already on the brink of starvation. Women and girls have been subjected to widespread sexual violence by RSF fighters. Meanwhile, since the war began in April 2023, nearly 12 million people have been displaced.

Aside from the dire humanitarian crisis, another troubling aspect of this war has been the depth of foreign involvement. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been accused by multiple observers of providing weapons, logistics, and gold-trade support to the RSF. This “gold-trade support” refers to the financial backing of the RSF’s gains from selling gold mined in territories under its control, much of which is smuggled or exported to Dubai, one of the world’s largest gold-trading hubs. Through these transactions, the RSF converts gold into hard currency to fund its operations, purchase weapons, and sustain its forces. U.S. intelligence reportedly concluded that the UAE was also shipping arms — including Chinese-made drones, heavy machine guns, and mortars — to the RSF via neighboring Chad. However, the UAE has denied the allegations. The RSF itself, however, has acknowledged participation in arms procurement and gold-smuggling networks through the UAE.

Facing mounting international pressure, senior Emirati diplomat Anwar Gargash recently acknowledged that the international community, including the UAE, made a “critical mistake” by failing to oppose the 2021 coup that overthrew Sudan’s transitional civilian government—a move that empowered both the RSF and SAF to pursue war unchecked. However, Garash still claimed that reports about the UAE’s involvement with the RSF were “fake news.” Nevertheless, many experts believe that the UAE’s support was instrumental to the RSF’s transformation into a dominant war machine capable of sustaining its campaign across Sudan.

On the other side, the SAF is believed to receive backing from Egypt and Saudi Arabia, both motivated by regional security concerns—particularly the Nile River and Red Sea—and by broader rivalries with Islamist movements with historic roots in Sudan’s military and politics, such as the National Islamic Front and other groups inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood. The UAE’s foreign policy is often shaped by what it terms as opposition to Islamist groups, particularly those associated with the Brotherhood, although Abu Dhabi has been accused of using this threat as a smokescreen to pursue other objectives, which include commercial activities.

The fall of El Fasher is more than another territorial loss for the SAF; it marks the RSF’s control over nearly all of Darfur and symbolizes the collapse of the post-2019 power-sharing agreement established after the ousting of Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s former head of state. That agreement was designed to balance civilian and military authority and guide Sudan toward democratic governance. Instead, the RSF has retraced the violent path once taken by the Janjaweed militias from which it emerged. In its new offensive, the group has exhibited alarming patterns of ethnically targeted violence, particularly against darker-skinned communities such as the Zaghawa. Survivors have reported being hunted down and attacked solely because of their skin color.