INTELBRIEF
May 5, 2025
Pressure on Trump to Ease Syria Sanctions Intensifies
Bottom Line Up Front
- U.S. officials are coming under mounting pressure from global aid organizations and partner governments to ease Assad-era sanctions on Syria.
- Global officials and experts assess that maintaining U.S. sanctions, even with temporary suspensions, will worsen societal unrest and lead to a host of other challenges to the Syrian government.
- The U.S. sanctions architecture is deterring outside investment in and transactions with key Syrian economic sectors, such as energy.
- The new government is meeting some of the stipulated U.S. conditions for the lifting of U.S. sanctions, while falling short on others.
Debate among U.S. officials over U.S. policy toward post-Assad Syria, and in particular the key issue of U.S. sanctions, is intensifying as U.S. partners warn of growing instability in the country. Damascus gets just one hour of electricity per day, and outlying provinces receive less than that. Millions of Syrians face starvation, and 12.9 million are reported to face dangerous levels of food insecurity. Conditions are deterring the millions of Syrians who fled the civil war from returning home. Many experts warn that the dire economic situation adds to a combustible mix of challenges posed by armed ethnic and sectarian groups, such as the Druze, the Alawite community, Kurds, and other groups seeking more autonomy and protection from government excesses. Government security forces, led by militias of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which led the successful anti-Assad rebellion in December, are spread thin.
Officials in U.S. partner countries, including in the Middle East and Europe, are intensifying their efforts to persuade Trump officials that the new Syrian government will falter without a more complete and permanent lifting of the U.S. sanctions architecture that was put in place to broadly pressure the Assad regime. Partners argue that stopgap measures, such as sanctions waivers contained in General License 24 (GL24), are inadequate. GL24 requires renewal every six months, leaving companies, donors, and investors hesitant to undertake commitments to Syria, uncertain whether sanctions might return to full effect. Its next expiration is in July.
Several governments have sought to build momentum for U.S. sanctions easing by suspending or terminating some of their own Syria sanctions. EU officials have suspended sanctions on some of the bloc’s sanctions targeting Syria. In March, UK officials followed the EU move by lifting a freeze on the assets of 24 Syrian bodies previously used by the Assad regime to fund the oppression of civilians, including the Central Bank of Syria, Syrian Arab Airlines and state-owned energy companies. UK Minister for the Middle East Hamish Falconer said at the time: "The Syrian people deserve the opportunity to rebuild their country and economy, and a stable Syria is in the UK's national interest." Last month, the UK also unfroze the assets of Syria’s defense and interior ministries, and lifted sanctions on Syria’s financial services and energy production sectors – actions the UK government said would help facilitate investment and rebuild Syria's economy. However, European officials say companies and humanitarian organizations remain wary of fully engaging with the Syrian banking sector or investing in long-term projects like the energy grid while U.S. sanctions remain.
Among regional states, Qatar has reportedly been hesitant to proceed with providing Syria funds to cover and expand government salaries for fear of running afoul of U.S. sanctions, even though such donations are not banned under GL24. However, in April, Doha announced a plan to provide Syria with natural gas, via Jordan, to improve the nation’s meagre electricity supply, a plan that Reuters reports has Washington’s approval. Also in April, Saudi Arabia said it plans to pay off Syria’s debts to the World Bank, paving the way for the approval of large grants for reconstruction and to support the country’s paralyzed public sector.
In response to the urging of governments and aid organizations to address the Syria sanctions issue, Trump officials have debated the conditions under which enduring sanctions relief would be appropriate. However, the requirements set by Washington appear to be extensive, reflecting the view among some U.S. officials, particularly those involved in counterterrorism policy, that HTS leaders must prove their intent to secure U.S. interests. Some U.S. officials distrust that interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa and HTS more broadly have transformed from militant Islamist rebels to legitimate political actors. Reflecting that skepticism, the counterterrorism director at the National Security Council, Sebastian Gorka, responded to journalists’ questions about al-Sharaa, asking: “Does he control all of Syria? No. He does not. He was a jihadist for a long time. Has he reformed himself? Is he a better man now? Does he believe in representative government?”
Gorka and other U.S. officials oppose lifting sanctions on HTS, such as removing it from the U.S. list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), arguing that HTS is a U.S. and U.N.-designated terrorist group that grew out of al-Qaeda. Its history, these officials argue, puts the group under suspicion even though HTS formally dissolved itself in early 2025 in favor of integrating formally into Syrian state institutions and structures. But, retaining HTS on the FTO list is deterring global banks from doing business in Syria, because a financial institution that conducts significant financial transactions with an FTO (or senior figure of an FTO) could be subject to exclusion from the U.S. financial system. However, attempting to shift U.S. policy toward easing sanctions, Türkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said that HTS has been providing the counter-Islamic State coalition with intelligence to help target the group and al-Qaeda. And, the Syrian government has been constraining the activities of Hamas and other Palestinian militant organizations, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine -General Command (PFLP-GC), including by closing their offices in Damascus.
Yet, counterterrorism cooperation is one of several criteria by which Trump officials will evaluate lifting the broad range of U.S. sanctions on Syria. On May 1, State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce articulated the full range of U.S. requirements for sanctions lifting. She stated: “…normalization of [U.S.-Syria] relations…or a lifting of sanctions…will depend on the interim authorities’ actions…And those are that they should fully renounce and suppress terrorism, exclude and remove foreign terrorist fighters from any official roles, prevent Iran and its proxies from exploiting Syrian territory, continue taking steps to verifiably destroy Assad’s chemical weapons, assist in the recovery of U.S. and other citizens who have been disappeared in Syria, and ensure the security and freedoms of Syria’s religious and ethnic minorities.” She acknowledged Damascus had met some of these requirements (such as preventing Iran from rebuilding its influence) but had not fulfilled others, and therefore did not yet qualify for sanctions termination. Still, some in the U.S. Congress argue U.S. sanctions should be lifted, or suspended long term, to meet acute humanitarian needs and serve U.S. strategic goals in the region. Rep. Cory Mills, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight and Intelligence, who recently visited Damascus to meet al-Sharaa and other leaders, indicated he would soon introduce legislation to suspend U.S. sanctions.
There are several major U.S. sanctions whose lifting or long-term suspension would promote Syria’s economic recovery. Several significant sanctions are triggered by the U.S. designation of Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism. Syria was placed on a “terrorism list” at the inception of the designation in 1979. Terrorism list countries are prohibited from receiving U.S. direct and indirect foreign aid, and from buying U.S. weaponry and defense services. There is also a “presumption of denial” of U.S. applications to export dual-use items (civilian goods that have military applications) to terrorism list countries. The U.S. is also required to vote against international financial institution (IFI) lending to terrorism list countries, although the U.S. can be potentially outvoted in IFI lending deliberations. Under a 1996 law, U.S. officials are required to withhold U.S. foreign aid to any country that provides foreign assistance or arms to a terrorism list country. Still, because of the presence of foreign fighters in HTS ranks and uncertainty about the HTS commitment to deny safe haven to all militant groups, Trump officials are unlikely to remove Syria from the terrorism list in the near future.
Syrian authorities have perhaps a more immediate interest in the lifting of provisions of a 2019 law, the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which provides for U.S. penalties on foreign firms or persons that conduct transactions with the Syrian government or state-controlled entities. That law designates the Syrian Central Bank as a “money laundering entity,” and bans foreign banks from conducting transactions with it. Banks that violate that provision are subject to penalties up to and including exclusion from the U.S. financial system – a powerful deterrent. The Act also authorizes U.S. officials to block the U.S.-based property of any company or person that: knowingly supports or conducts a significant transaction with the Syrian government or a state-owned entity; or knowingly sells or provides significant goods, services, technology, information, or other support for the maintenance or expansion of the government’s production of natural gas, petroleum, or petroleum products. The Act stipulates conditions under which its sanctions might be suspended – requirements essentially the same as those articulated by the State Department on May 1. In the aggregate, U.S. laws and officials have set a high bar for Damascus to clear in order to achieve durable sanctions relief. A major question is whether Trump officials might reduce their requirements if economic conditions worsen and government control unravels under the weight of serious unrest.