May 30, 2025

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Demobilization and Disengagement: Lessons from the Philippines

AP Photo/Nickee Butlangan

The Philippines has ranked in the top 15 countries most affected by terrorism in 11 of the last 14 years, according to the Global Terrorism Index. This has come not only from a highly fragmented Islamist extremist ecosystem that was one part insurgency and two parts small terrorist groups, but also from communist elements. The leading insurgency actors were the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The prominent Islamist extremist actors were the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and Daulah Islamiyah (DI), all of which are highly fragmented and factionalized. The main communist threat comes from the New People’s Army (NPA).

However, over the past five years, the Philippines has begun to make important strides in attenuating many of these groups. In 2019, four years of negotiations bore fruit with the passage of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) and the establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), which provided greater regional autonomy to the BARMM region with its own justice system and parliament. With this move, the MILF began the process of decommissioning its armed wing, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF). According to the Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process, as of May 2023, some 26,132 fighters from the BIAF have been decommissioned. An additional 13,868 are scheduled for decommissioning in 2025.

Surrenders from the smaller extremist groups have proceeded at a steady pace since 2018. According to researcher Kenneth Yao Yoren, between 2018 and 2023, 1,866 combatants from the BIFF, ASG, and Daulah Islamiyah Maute Group (DIMG) surrendered. The governor of Sulu, Abdusakur Tan, declared the island free of the Abu Sayyaf Group, following the surrender of 966 members in September 2023. The island of Basilan was declared ASG-free in December 2024, when the last ASG members surrendered. Finally, in the first three months of 2025, 57 members of the BIFF also surrendered to the army. One can no longer speak of the Philippines as the Islamic State’s “East Asia Wilayah” in any functional capacity; even the Daulah Islamiyah factions no longer collaborate together.

The Philippines has achieved tangible results by rejecting a policy of search and destroy in favor of a holistic approach that combines kinetic and soft elements to incentivize demobilization and reintegration. The government’s response to the 2017 takeover of Marawi City by a coalition of pro-Islamic State (ISIS) groups, which resulted in the killing of some 800 ISIS-aligned fighters, prompted defections. In the aftermath of the Marawi siege, the Philippine armed forces launched a highly targeted campaign to kill the leaders of Daulah Islamiyah, including Abu Dar and Abu Zakariah, as well as Abu Sayyaf Group leaders like Hajan and Salahuddin Sawadjaan. The Philippine army also attacked Abu Sayyaf Group strongholds. These actions disrupted terrorist group standard operating procedures, forcing them on the run and into hiding. It created the conditions for the groups to think demobilization.

However, the kinetic response would have likely failed, had it not been paired with initiatives to encourage social reintegration. Here, local governments and local civil society organizations have played a key role. According to Nurhati Tangging and Kenneth Yeo, there have been several notable governmental and civil society initiatives on the island of Basilan in particular. For example, the Program Against Violent Extremism (PAVE) offered those who were willing to defect from the ASG, first on Basilan and later on Sulu, with an alternative path, including counseling, housing, vocational training, and food assistance. According to the Institute for the Policy Analysis of Conflict, more than 200 members of the Abu Sayyaf Group surrendered to the Philippine Army in the first two years of PAVE, with 139 doing so in the first batch.

Also on Basilan, the initiative Advancing and Sustaining Gains of Good Governance (AS2G CARE) adeptly provided returnees with counseling and professional development opportunities. Another such program, Balay Mindanaw,  taught literacy and elementary education to young returnees who lacked formal education and provided scholarships for them to pursue high school education. On the island of Sulu, Tumikang Sama Sama worked to resolve clan wars through shuttle diplomacy, shutting off a key feeder mechanism to extremist groups and enabling families who had joined due to clan wars to consider disengaging. The Institute for the Policy Analysis of Conflict asserts that PAVE, and subsequent reintegration programs, likely prevented a resurgence of violence by the Abu Sayyaf.

There has also been progress in demobilizing communist militants. According to the International Crisis Group, in villages where the NPA is present, there is a similar holistic approach to that of the BARMM. On the kinetic side, the Philippine army has been clearing militants from the villages. On the “soft” side, they not only provide services and skills training to encourage combatants to demobilize, but they also seek to win hearts and minds through investments in the villages. In those villages where local government actors — particularly mayors — show due dedication, these programs have borne fruit.

While much has been accomplished over the past seven years, terrorism remains a threat in the Philippines. According to the 2025 Global Terrorism Index, there were 22 attacks in the last year alone. These were small in scale but lethal, resulting in the deaths of some 31 persons. Daulah Islamiyah Maute Group(DIMG) remains arguably the most resilient of the terrorist groups in operation. It is responsible for the worst attack in Marawi since the siege in December 2023, when two DIMG members bombed a Catholic mass at Mindanao State University. Daulah Islamiyah factions continue to launch small scale attacks and are making use of social media to recruit new members.

According to Jovanie Espasor, the province of Lanao del Sur, where Marawi is located, would benefit from its own robust holistic reintegration program targeting DIMG members, perhaps modeled on the successes of the Basilan programs, but taking into account the specific traumas of the Marawi siege. To that end, they would need to identify the right local actors — from civil society organizations to trauma psychologists to clinicians to formers — to develop such a program, select the appropriate participants, conduct the appropriate needs assessments, and implement the initiative.

One cannot overstate the significance of the establishment of the BARMM for extremist group demobilization. If Moro grievances are finally being seen and heard, why continue to fight? If the October 2025 elections are free and fair, this will provide further credibility to the forces encouraging demobilization and validate the argument that Bangsamoro people, irrespective of clan, can seek redress of their grievances through formal politics, as opposed to the barrel of a gun.

Julie Chernov Hwang is a Senior Research Fellow at the Soufan Center, an Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Goucher College and a Harry Frank Guggenheim Distinguished Scholar.