May 23, 2025

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Implications of Xi’s PLA Tiger Hunt

AP Photo/Andy Wong

Over the past two years, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been subject to waves of purges of its senior leadership, highlighting systemic issues within the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) military and marking a renewed front in President Xi’s anti-corruption drive. Since Xi’s tenure, the PLA has periodically been subject to purges in the name of anti-corruption, but the broad scope and high level of this most recent drive illustrate a concerning trend. Specifically, historic purges of so-called “Tigers” (high-ranking and influential officials) in the PRC’s military have frequently been attributed to Xi removing officials appointed by his predecessors in order to shore up loyalists; however, many officials targeted in the past year have risen to power under Xi. Recent events have highlighted potential domestic challenges, systemic and political, that could impact the PRC’s ability to project military power and hinder its goal of military modernization.

Following the 18^th Party Congress in 2012, Xi Jinping launched a nationwide anti-corruption campaign in China. The drive aims to root out corruption and consolidate loyalty by targeting both high-ranking officials and the rank-and-file — known as hunting “Tigers” and “Flies.” For the PLA, the anti-corruption campaign intensified in 2014 and 2015, when high-ranking officials, including General Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, both former Vice Chairmen of the Central Military Commission (CMC), were purged. Both Xu and Guo, who were elevated during Xi’s predecessor's tenure, were accused of corruption, stripped of their military ranks, and expelled from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The anti-corruption drive targeting the PLA in Xi’s early days was seen mainly through two, not mutually exclusive, lenses. First, to rid the PRC’s armed forces of systemic corruption so that funds intended for military modernization and building a “world-class military” by 2049 were not siphoned off by corrupt officials. Second, to rid the PLA of Xi’s rivals and centralize authority of the armed forces, ensuring implementation of the Mao-era principle “the party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the party.”

Since 2023, however, Xi’s corruption drive in the military has targeted his own appointees. Reports suggest that around 20 high-ranking officials, or “Tigers,” have been swept up in the hunt. Those purged include high-ranking officials across different branches, including two defense ministers appointed under Xi, CMC members, and several PLA generals from the Air Force, the Ground Force, and the Navy. In 2024, Defense Minister Li Shangfu was stripped of his military rank and expelled from the party due to allegations of accepting bribes. At the same time, General Wei Fenghe, Li’s predecessor, faced a similar fate. Both Li and Wei’s corruption charges reportedly date back to their tenure in equipment procurement and development, including the PLA’s Rocket Force (PLARF), which is critical to the PRC’s nuclear deterrence strategy. Indeed, officials in the PLARF — or those with ties to it — have been particularly affected by the most recent anti-corruption drive. However, in November 2024, Admiral Miao Hua, the top ideologue of the CMC, was ousted and placed under investigation, signaling that this recent investigation extends beyond the traditional procurement and development tracks, where corruption tends to be more prevalent. And, in April 2025, rumors circulated that General He Weidong, the second highest-ranking uniformed officer in the PLA and a vice chairman of the CMC, had possibly been purged.

The most recent anti-corruption investigation, which has targeted the top brass, signals a host of domestic challenges. While the opacity of the CCP’s system complicates discerning the true motive behind these recent purges, it is likely a combination of several factors. Xi is continuing to utilize anti-corruption as a tool to consolidate his own power, remove political rivals, and shore up loyalists around him, including to the point where questions about paranoia may arise. However, the fact that many of the PLA high-ranking officials purged this time around are considered Xi loyalists indicates that Xi is inherently distrustful of his military and likely views corruption as a systemic issue. An issue that could impact the PRC’s ability to project military power, including a potential armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Xi likely observed how the Russian military overpromised and underdelivered for Putin during the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and wants to ensure that he can trust the military advice of his brass on readiness and that modernization funds are not misappropriated. This anti-corruption drive, however, has consequences. The frequent overturn of senior military leaders could impact the PLA’s operations, and some reports suggest that mid-level officers may be suffering from decision paralysis. Taken together, while Xi and the CCP continue to work toward military modernization, expand the PRC’s nuclear arsenal, and intensify military drills around Taiwan, instability and the ongoing anti-corruption hunt within the PLA may impact China’s military capabilities.