May 19, 2025

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Trump Highlights Iran Diplomacy in Visit to the Gulf

AP Photo/Alex Brandon

Reinforcing the focus of his trip last week to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on promoting U.S. business and economic relationships in the region, President Trump stressed his intent to forge a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran rather than use force against it. At his first stop in Saudi Arabia, Trump stated: “I want to make a deal with Iran…If I can make a deal with Iran, I’ll be very happy, if we’re going to make your region and the world a safer place.” He added that he had presented "an olive branch" to the Iranians, which might, if a deal is forged, even lead to normal economic and diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iran, essentially ending more than 45 years of mutual hostility.  While in Qatar, Trump repeated comments he has made many times before the trip that he wants a “successful” Iran – a goal that can be reached if sanctions are lifted. The message received a warm welcome from the leaders he met with during the trip, all of whom want to avoid another regional conflict that might include Iranian retaliatory attacks on U.S.-manned bases or high-value economic targets in the Gulf states themselves.

At the same time, Trump sought to reassure his hosts, who remain wary of Iran’s regional reach and intentions even as they have sought rapprochement with Tehran, by indicating he will not accept just any agreement. He put pressure on Iran to accept U.S. demands within a short time frame and reiterated his intent to use force to destroy Iran’s known nuclear facilities unless an agreement is reached. During his visit to Qatar on Thursday, Trump stated: “We’re getting close to maybe doing a deal without having to do this (attack Iranian nuclear sites)…There’s two steps. There’s a very, very nice step, and there’s a violent step.” He told journalists on Air Force One on the flight back to Washington: “[Iran has] a proposal (from the US), more importantly, they know they have to move quickly or something bad—something bad’s going to happen.” The threat of severe adverse consequences was applauded in Israel, where Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has sought — unsuccessfully to date — to enlist Trump as a partner in a strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Trump also sought to pressure Iran by highlighting the economic success and vibrancy of the three Gulf states visited, in contrast to the dire economic situation experienced by Iran, which is isolated from the global economy by U.S.-led economic sanctions. In his May 13 speech in Riyadh to an investment forum, Trump characterized Iran as a source of “collapse and suffering,” while publicly offering Iran the sanctions relief it needs to rebuild its economy. Trump threatened a continuation of his sanctions-based “maximum pressure” policy if talks fail. Iranian officials have been working to derail any potential for Trump to increase sanctions beyond those already in force, should the negotiations break down. Iran has been meeting with senior diplomats from Italy, Britain, France and Germany — known as the “E3” — to discuss the parameters of a deal to replace the 2015 multilateral nuclear accord (JCPOA) that Trump exited during his first term and which he now seeks to replace with a more comprehensive framework. In large part, Iran seeks to persuade the three European powers not to reimpose UN sanctions against Tehran - known in diplomatic circles as triggering the "snapback mechanism" (of UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA – if no U.S.-Iran agreement is reached. Diplomats from the E3 met with their Iranian counterparts in Istanbul on Friday - their first discussions since the U.S. began its separate nuclear talks with Tehran on April 12.

Although Trump’s preference for forging a Iran deal was welcomed by his Gulf hosts, it remains unclear whether the U.S. and Iran, after four rounds of talks, have narrowed the gaps in their concepts of a new nuclear agreement. Since the conclusion of the Trump trip, experts on the talks could not judge with certainty whether, as Trump asserted, the two countries were “getting closer” to an agreement. Trump claimed “Iran has sort of agreed to the terms” of a specific proposal the U.S. submitted to Iran in early May. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reportedly took the proposal, submitted by Special Envoy for the Middle East Steven Witkoff, back to Tehran for consultations with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Masoud Pezeshkian and other top officials. Publicly, Araghchi has denied receiving a written proposal from the U.S. side. At a preceding round of talks, in late April, Araghchi gave Witkoff Tehran’s concepts for a resolution of the key enrichment issue. A U.S. team of experts studied it and sent the Iranians a list of questions and requests for clarification. The Iranians replied and added questions of their own, according to press sources.

At issue is whether, and to what degree, Iran would be allowed under the agreement to enrich uranium.  Neither Trump nor any U.S. official revealed the terms of the U.S. or Iranian proposals that were exchanged, or provided any clarity on the enrichment question, complicating assessments of whether an agreement is in reach. Over the past few weeks, press reports have unveiled some of the ideas that might enable Iran to “save face” by claiming it can still enrich uranium, while at the same time giving Trump justification to assert the new deal is an advance over the 2015 JCPOA. One concept reportedly under discussion includes a long-term freeze on Iranian enrichment, under enhanced international inspection, as a confidence-building measure, leaving the long-term status of Iran’s enrichment program to be negotiated. Statements by Secretary of State Marco Rubio hinted at a version of this proposal that might be acceptable as a longer-term plan – a requirement that Iran phase out its enrichment program over time if it is assured that it can reliably get nuclear fuel on the global market. However, Iran has consistently argued it must enrich uranium (make nuclear fuel) inside Iran because outside supplies could be quickly cut off based on political and policy changes in the United States and other nuclear fuel suppliers. In recent days, Araghchi has repeated his insistence that Iran retain some enrichment capacity and blamed U.S. officials for sending confusing public signals. He stated: “What the parties to the negotiations say in the media is not the same as what they say behind closed doors.”

A few other concepts have been reported on as perhaps under discussion between Witkoff and Araghchi. Iran has lately resurrected a concept advanced in 2007 under which Iran would fold its enrichment program into one run by a consortium of Muslim states, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, in cooperation with the United States. Iran would deliver its production of low-enriched uranium (less than 4 percent purity) to Saudi Arabia and other group members in return for investment. The proposal would seem to satisfy most Trump officials’ concerns by taking Iran’s enrichment program out of Tehran’s full control. But, multilateral control of Iranian facilities might prove unwieldy and difficult to sustain if tensions and strains among the participant countries were to erupt over any number of unrelated issues.

Another concept that might be under discussion is a U.S.-Iran bilateral civilian nuclear accord, not involving any other nations in or outside the region. Under the concept (a 1-2-3 Agreement), Washington would supply Iran with civilian nuclear technology under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, which provides a framework for the U.S. to engage in nuclear cooperation with another nation. Under this program, Iran might be able to continue enriching uranium inside Iran, but the nuclear fuel would be taken out of Iran and used in reactors in the U.S or potentially elsewhere as well. A 1-2-3 Agreement with the UAE enabled the Emirates to use U.S. nuclear technology for its civilian nuclear power reactors, but with the stipulation the UAE adhere to a “gold standard” of anti-proliferation. That standard includes a UAE pledge not to enrich uranium in the UAE. The 1-2-3 Agreement concept that might be under discussion with Iran, in which Iran does enrich, might conceivably satisfy U.S. hardliners by giving Washington a high degree of control over Iran’s nuclear program, while enabling Tehran to assert it had preserved its “right” to enrich uranium in Iran. A next round of talks, still not scheduled, might provide further clarity on what proposals, if any, seem to be gaining currency in the talks.