March 26, 2025

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Is the Conflict in Sudan Approaching a Tipping Point?

AP Photo

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) - along with an anti-Rapid Support Forces (RSF) coalition comprising Islamist militias, community militias, and volunteer fighters – reclaimed the presidential palace and government headquarters in Khartoum last week. The sites were occupied by the opposition paramilitary RSF, led by Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as ‘Hemedti.’ The Sudanese army gained control over several key strategic sites in central Khartoum over the weekend, including the Central Bank, National Intelligence Services headquarters, and the national museum. This followed a decisive military offensive that was launched by the SAF in January of this year, strategically advancing from three fronts to expel the RSF from central Khartoum and reassert control over the capital.

The recapture of Khartoum could strengthen the Sudanese military’s broader goal of positioning itself as the sole legitimate authority in Sudan. In February, SAF commander and de facto leader General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan outlined plans for a new centralized government system. Moreover, it positions the SAF to establish control over the Nile River's eastern bank, cutting off supply lines and communication between the RSF in Bahri, East Nile, and central Khartoum. This isolation weakens RSF capacity to coordinate and resupply in key areas. Additionally, it enables the SAF to consolidate its control over El Manshiya Bridge and Soba Bridge, both vital for movement across the Nile, restricting RSF mobility. As such, this development could lay the groundwork for future offensives to dismantle the RSF in its strongholds across western Sudan.

Since the conflict erupted in April 2023, control over Khartoum has remained a key objective. In this context, the SAF’s capture of the Republican Palace signals a significant strategic and symbolic achievement for the Sudanese military. This victory, along with the gains made by the SAF in recent months - such as taking control of the armed forces headquarters and substantial territory in Omdurman and Bahri - is now seen as a turning point in the 21-month long brutal conflict. The war has killed over 150,000 people and displaced more than 12.5 million people from their homes, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UHCR).

The conflict in Sudan has created one of the worst displacement and humanitarian crises in the world in a relatively short amount of time, exacerbating hunger and straining limited resources in the region. The nearly two-year civil war is reaching displacement levels of the devastating Syrian conflict – which saw over 14 million displaced in 14 years. With ongoing wars in both Gaza and Ukraine, Sudan has failed to generate attention in the media, and for international diplomats it has largely resided on the periphery, even as devastation reigns.

Famine has been officially declared in 10 areas, including Zamzam internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in North Darfur, according to the Famine Review Committee, which provides guidance on official declarations of famine conditions. An additional 17 areas of the country are at risk of famine, and 24.6 million people are acutely food insecure, according to the World Food Programme (WFP). This development is a crushing assessment for a country that was once considered the future breadbasket of East Africa, severely impacting food security in the broader region.

Grave human rights abuses, including alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, have also occurred since the earliest days of the conflict. There have been reports of sexual and gender-based violence against women and children, as well as ethnic cleansing. Widespread perpetration of sexual violence, including rape, against children has been documented in a new report by the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), an act that is being used as a tactic of war and could constitute a war crime. The UNICEF report provides evidence that children, including several one-year-olds, have been raped during the conflict by armed men. Millions more are at risk of rape and other forms of sexual violence as the conflict continues, particularly in places such as IDP camps or informal sites. In short, Sudan remains one of the most violent and dangerous countries in the world.

Further, the U.S. recently declared in January that the RSF and allied militias have committed genocide in Sudan, including the systematic killing of men and boys – even infants – on an ethnic basis, as well as deliberately targeting women and girls of certain ethnic groups for sexual violence and rape. The situation echoes the 2003-2005 genocide in Darfur, which left more 200,000 people dead and two million displaced.

Despite recent SAF advances, the war is far from over. The RSF still controls large parts of the country, including pockets in the capital and strongholds in the south and west. It holds four of five states in the gold-rich Darfur region, a key asset for its war efforts. While the RSF has lost the upper hand it once had, the SAF’s ability to fully reclaim Khartoum and other RSF-dominated areas remains uncertain. Given its external support, the RSF is likely to sustain a low-level insurgency for the foreseeable future.

The RSF is also working to solidify its territorial control by establishing a local political presence and attempting to build a political constituency to position itself as a legitimate entity in any post-conflict arrangement. This effort was most recently demonstrated by the February 2025 transitional charter for a secular ‘new Sudan,’ signed by the RSF and its allies in Nairobi and was enacted in response to the SAF’s recent amendment of Sudan’s 2019 constitution, which removed any reference to the RSF. This aimed to establish a parallel government to rival the Burhan-led Sovereign Council based in Port Sudan. On February 10, the Taqaddum civilian alliance fractured after some members joined civilian administrations in RSF-controlled areas. The consolidation of two rival administrations could further prolong the conflict, as civilians and armed groups seek recognition from either the RSF or SAF. These developments indicate that the prospect of partition is emerging as a serious concern, reminiscent of the 2011 secession of South Sudan.

Since September 2024, the SAF has shifted momentum by regrouping and launching a coordinated offensive, with the support of an anti-RSF coalition comprising several armed groups. Moreover, by leveraging a “long breath strategy,” it has also focused on defensive tactics to deplete the RSF and cut supply lines. A key part of this effort has been targeting northern Omdurman, pushing RSF forces southward and disrupting critical routes. Through securing strategic bridges connecting Omdurman, Bahri, and Khartoum, the SAF has restricted RSF movements, leaving the Jabal Aulia Dam Bridge as its last Nile crossing from the west - if lost, RSF resupply and reinforcements would be severely compromised.

Beyond battlefield setbacks, the RSF faces internal divisions that have further tilted the balance in the SAF’s favor. A breakdown in command and the loss of experienced officers have weakened its cohesion. In October 2024, Abu Aqla Keikel defected amid RSF infighting. As a key figure in the capture of al-Jazira, his departure contributed to the SAF’s recapture of the region in January 2025. In retaliation, the RSF launched a brutal attack against his ethnic group in al-Jazira, highlighting its internal fractures and further aiding SAF advances.

Foreign actors have leveraged the war in Sudan to expand their regional influence, backing both factions to secure economic gains from the country’s mineral-rich resources along the Red Sea. The SAF has benefited from external support, with Egypt, Turkey, Russia, and Iran providing advanced weaponry, including drones, and financial backing. Meanwhile, the RSF’s primary patron, the United Arab Emirates, has supplied weapons and fuel, though its access to these resources has been severely compromised by SAF offensives. However, Russia and Turkey are reportedly supplying both the SAF and RSF, underscoring that the conflict has become a battleground for foreign influence, with states exploiting the chaos to advance their material and geopolitical interests. Such factors may increase the likelihood of a protracted conflict.

Sudan’s civil war risks spilling into neighboring countries. In South Sudan the RSF and SAF back opposing factions - President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar - fueling Dinka-Nuer tensions and the threat of renewed civil war. Chad’s porous border with Darfur has allowed RSF recruitment from Chad’s Arab groups, straining Chad-SAF relations and heightening the risk of cross-border retaliation. Eritrea has also hosted SAF training camps, seeking greater Red Sea influence amid Ethiopian President Abiy Ahmed’s expansionist ambitions, which could inflame the burgeoning Tigray conflict. More broadly, competition for influence in the Red Sea threatens stability. As Sudan’s war drags on, the risk of a prolonged proxy conflict across the Horn of Africa, and its humanitarian toll, only grows.