INTELBRIEF
March 21, 2025
Trump’s Deportation Strategy and the Risks of Radicalization
Bottom Line Up Front
- U.S. President Donald Trump issued an executive order last weekend to invoke the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 to expel Venezuelan migrants aged 14 or older with alleged ties to the recently designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) Tren de Aragua (TdA), a violent gang with a growing presence in the United States.
- Shortly after the law had been invoked, a federal judge ordered the Trump administration to cease the deportations and return any planes transporting migrants back to the U.S.
- Hundreds of Venezuelan migrants have been sent to the notorious Salvadoran mega-prison, the Counter-Terrorism Confinement Center (CECOT), posing a national security risk as prisons are often fertile grounds for radicalization.
- Although the Trump administration’s aggressive stance toward criminal groups such as Tren de Aragua has provided new tools for countering their activities, broadening the scope of terrorism could dilute the term, while crackdowns may lead to violent backlash from cartels.
U.S. President Donald Trump issued an executive order last weekend to invoke the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 to expel Venezuelan migrants aged 14 or older with alleged ties to the recently designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) Tren de Aragua (TdA). The intention of the Alien Enemies Act has been historically reserved for wartime, only being used three times: during the War of 1812, World War I, and World War II. It allows the U.S. president to detain and deport natives of an enemy country or government. According to the Brennan Center for Justice, “the president may invoke the Alien Enemies Act in times of ‘declared war’ or when a foreign government threatens or undertakes an ‘invasion’ or ‘predatory incursion’ against U.S. territory.” In this instance, Trump declared that “TdA is perpetrating, attempting, and threatening an invasion or predatory incursion against the territory of the United States.”
Shortly after the law had been invoked, a federal judge ordered the Trump administration to cease the deportations and return any planes transporting migrants back to the U.S. Despite the judge’s ruling, some planes had already taken off to bring hundreds of migrants to El Salvador. The Trump administration denies that it has violated the court order by not ordering the planes to turn back towards the U.S., making various arguments such as lack of jurisdiction, despite the migrants still being within U.S. custody when the court order was announced.
Tren de Aragua originally began as a powerful Venezuelan prison gang, evolving into a “transnational criminal organization,” according to the U.S. State Department. The group was founded in 2014 in Tocorón prison, which the gang largely controlled – running a zoo, restaurant, nightclub, and swimming pools, among other luxuries. From prison, Tren de Aragua’s leaders ordered robberies, kidnappings, and murders. It is not uncommon for prisons throughout Latin America to be essentially controlled by the inmates inside, who have access to cell phones and other modern amenities. Corruption, bribery, and extreme violence are rampant.
In 2023, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro sent 11,000 soldiers to retake the prison, yet the gang’s influence already extended well beyond its walls, establishing criminal cells in Peru, Chile, and Colombia, eventually expanding into the U.S. The gang has developed into one of the most violent criminal organizations in the region, often preying on vulnerable Venezuelan migrants and drawing comparisons to another violent criminal gang with roots in the United States, the Salvadoran gang Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13. Further, evidence emerged earlier this year linking the notorious killing of a Venezuelan dissident in Chile, which was allegedly carried out by members of Tren de Aragua, to the Venezuelan government. A Chilean police report alleges that the order to kidnap and later execute Army Lieutenant Ronald Ojeda was issued and paid for by Venezuelan Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello. The development was viewed by some as further evidence of the link between the Maduro regime and Tren de Aragua, which has long been suspected.
The events over the weekend marked the latest move in Trump’s push to squash undocumented immigration, as Trump has promised mass deportations since the start of his campaign. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency released statistics last month citing a 94 percent decrease in Southwest border apprehensions from the same period in 2024. As such, claims from the Department of Homeland Security state that its immigration detention centers are at a capacity of about 47,600 individuals.
The hundreds of Venezuelan migrants that were sent to El Salvador have been placed in the notorious mega-prison, the Counter-Terrorism Confinement Center (CECOT), in Tecoluca. In early February, Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele posted on X, as he met with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, “We have offered the United States of America the opportunity to outsource part of its prison system. We are willing to take in only convicted criminals (including convicted U.S. citizens) into our mega-prison (CECOT) in exchange for a fee.” The Trump administration has clearly taken Bukele up on this offer as it is set to pay approximately $6 million to Bukele for the influx of prisoners it sent to CECOT over the weekend. It is yet to be seen if Trump will attempt to send U.S. citizens to El Salvador, a clear violation of U.S. law.
CECOT is known for its alleged inhumane conditions, such as overcrowding, widespread disease, and the withholding of food, clothing, medicine, and other basic necessities. As with other prisons and detention centers across the world – like the case of Islamic State prisons in Syria – such facilities are often fertile grounds for radicalization. Lacking diverse social connections and facing the confinement of prison, even migrants with no prior history of politically motivated violence are at risk of radicalization. This, in turn, poses a greater national security risk, especially as the status and future placement of the prisoners deported to El Salvador remain unknown. For example, they may be transferred elsewhere at some point, including being deported back to Venezuela.
The deportation of Venezuelan migrants underscores the dual priorities of the Trump administration: the curtailing of migration to the U.S. and a more aggressive stance toward cartels. The FTO designation of Tren de Aragua, along with seven other international cartels, most based in Mexico, does provide a new set of tools for law enforcement to counter these groups. For example, the new designation could be used to pursue various individuals in cartels’ broader network, such as those involved in drug trafficking, human smuggling, and gun running.
Yet, some experts have highlighted how the designation for such criminal groups, however brutal, may risk diluting the terrorism term and potentially losing credibility while countering it. As terrorism is generally understood as violence with political or ideological aims, a stronger case may need to demonstrate how Tren de Aragua has attempted to influence the actions of the U.S. government – evidence that thus far has not been presented. Moreover, some human rights groups have warned that the FTO designation could open a new array of individuals to charges of providing material support to a terrorist organization without necessarily having official ties to cartels or drug trafficking. Activists have raised concerns that undocumented migrants, who often turn to cartels for human smuggling networks due to diminished legal pathways, could potentially be charged under the terrorism statute despite their lack of formal connections to groups such as Tren de Aragua.
Although the recent statistics from CBP showed a significant decrease in migrant apprehensions at the U.S. southern border, crackdowns on legal migrant pathways have often led to an increase in risky behavior by migrants, with many turning to the human smuggling networks run by cartels. Further, migrant apprehensions typically peak in the summer months, and numbers could potentially rise in the coming months.
This increased demand both bolsters these criminal groups and provides a vital funding stream - human smuggling is estimated to be a multi-billion-dollar-a-year business for cartels. The severe disruption to a key income source, coupled with the seeming militarization of U.S. counternarcotics policy, could lead to backlash from cartels, potentially including attacks on American soil. Many of these groups retain the capability to engage in urban warfare tactics and maintain vast human intelligence networks, including their extensive networks stretching throughout the U.S. in the drug trade, gun running, and human smuggling. Further, as cartels have historically demonstrated their ability to restructure, regroup, and evolve in order to retain territory and corresponding lucrative trafficking networks, this new aggressive stance may prove to be challenging in both long-term sustainability and effectiveness.