June 10, 2025

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Iran Holds Fast in Talks with U.S.

AP Photo/Vahid Salemi

It is perhaps too soon to conclude that the U.S. and Iran have reached an impasse after five rounds of negotiations, since April 12, on a nuclear agreement that would replace the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear accord (JCPOA) that President Donald Trump exited in 2018, during his initial term. That pact technically remains in effect among Iran and the five other parties - the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China – but Iran has since violated the JCPOA-mandated limits on its enrichment of uranium. Even as U.S.-Iran talks have proceeded and, by the accounts of the participants, made unspecified progress, a comprehensive report on Iran by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), released May 31, alleges Tehran had increased its stockpile of highly enriched, near weapons-grade uranium (60 percent purity) by 50 percent in the past three months. The report was prepared in advance of an IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna this week, which will discuss a range of non-proliferation topics including Iran’s nuclear program.

The U.S., with the backing of European countries, is reportedly considering a resolution censuring Iran for failure to cooperate with the IAEA and violating Iran’s nuclear safeguards commitments. In a phone conversation with Trump last Wednesday, which focused on the Ukraine war, Russian President Vladimir Putin "…suggested that he will participate in the discussions with Iran and that he could, perhaps, be helpful in getting this brought to a rapid conclusion," according to Trump. However, Putin, whose Ukraine war effort has employed Iranian drone and other technology, did not offer to join a censure motion or sanction Iran for its violations.

Iran’s leaders appear unbowed by the censure threats, or by the steady stream of additional U.S. sanctions on entities that do business with Iran and President Trump’s threats of military action in the event the U.S.-Iran talks collapse. Iran’s acceleration of its production of 60 percent enriched uranium seems intended to pressure the U.S. negotiating team led by U.S. Special Envoy for the Middle East Steven Witkoff. Iran is also threatening to react to any IAEA Board of Governors censure by reducing its cooperation with the agency. Iranian leaders have repeatedly warned that any U.S. or Israeli military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities will result in the country’s outright pullout from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Backed by Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s insistence on steadfastness in the face of U.S. and other threats, Iran negotiators, led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, have shown no inclination to accept U.S. insistence that Iran dismantle or cede control of its uranium enrichment program. Several weeks ago, Witkoff submitted to his Iranian counterparts a proposal that sought to craft a “face-saving” solution under which Iran might continue enriching uranium but not have control over the final product. That outcome would satisfy the U.S. by depriving Iran of any option to develop a deliverable nuclear weapon. Witkoff proposed that Iran become a founding partner of a multilateral consortium, reportedly to also include the U.S., Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and possibly Qatar and Türkiye, that would operate a uranium enrichment program for civilian nuclear power reactors region-wide. According to the offer, the consortium would begin operating after an interim period during which Iran’s facilities would be allowed to continue operating, but at a significantly reduced level.

During the interim period, Iran would be able to enrich uranium to no more than 4 percent purity – the level needed to operate a civilian nuclear power reactor. Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium (close to “weapons grade”) would be “down-blended” to the 4 percent level or shipped out of Iran and reprocessed elsewhere, most likely in Russia. Iran would be prohibited from building any new enrichment facilities and would be required to "dismantle critical infrastructure for conversion and processing of uranium." The proposal also reportedly requires Iran to halt new research and development on centrifuges, and for its underground (hardened) enrichment facilities to become "non-operational" for a period of time agreed by the parties.

Last Wednesday, Supreme Leader Khamenei, set expectations that Iran would reject Witkoff’s proposal when it delivers its formal response, expected this week. He stated: “The U.S. nuclear proposal contradicts our nation’s belief in self-reliance…” The Supreme Leader’s apparent rejection suggests the regime sees Witkoff’s proposal as an attempt, first and foremost, to take Iran’s uranium enrichment program out of its control. Iranian officials told regional journalists the concept raised immediate concerns that the U.S., its Gulf partners, or other consortium members could, at any point, expel Iran from the multilateral consortium and deprive it of a supply of enriched uranium to feed its power reactors. Prior to the Supreme Leader’s statement, press reports suggested some Iranian officials supported entertaining the offer if the planned consortium locates its enrichment facilities in Iranian territory, such as Kish Island in the Persian Gulf. Aside from the Iranian distrust of the concept, many experts asserted that establishing and running the consortium envisioned by Witkoff would face a massive challenge to overcome decades of suspicion and animosity among the potential partners of the endeavor. Iranian officials also have indicated Witkoff’s proposal does not clarify the degree of sanctions relief Trump officials are prepared to provide should Iran concur. Iran is demanding that it receive substantial sanctions relief even in an interim period that precedes implementation of a final agreement. According to regional media, after Iran delivers its formal response to Witkoff, Oman’s Foreign Minister, Badr bin Hamad al-Busaidi, will then decide when and where the next round of nuclear talks will be held.

Iran’s insistence on complete control over its uranium enrichment capability – which Iranian leaders say is the country’s “right” as a party to the NPT – threatens a collapse of the talks. At the same time, Iran’s uncompromising stance might be hardening the determination of Trump, his allies, and another regional stakeholder, Israel, to deprive Iran of the option of developing nuclear arms. On Friday, Trump reiterated the warning he has issued on at least a dozen occasions since returning to office in January, asserting: “They won’t be enriching. If they enrich, then we’re going to have to do it the other way” – a clear reference to military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Trump reiterated, however, that he prefers a diplomatic solution – a position that has apparently led Iranian leaders to calculate that Trump will not use force against Iran unless Tehran begins to construct a nuclear device. Iranian leaders assess that Trump is also facing pressure from the Arab Gulf states not to risk sparking a regional war by attacking Iranian nuclear sites. Even if Trump does not use force, an impasse in the talks will likely trigger the European parties to the JCPOA (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) to reinstate all UN sanctions on Iran by invoking a sanctions “snap-back” provision of UN Security Council Resolution 2231. That resolution enables parties to the JCPOA to reimpose sanctions on Iran if Tehran is determined to have committed violations of the JCPOA. The snap-back provision expires permanently on October 18, 2025, giving Tehran an incentive to appear flexible in talks with Witkoff, at least until the expiration date.

Even as they downplay the potential for Trump to launch military action against Iran, the leaders in Tehran, as well as Trump, are seeking to deter and dissuade Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from authorizing a significant attack on Iran. He and a broad range of Israeli leaders have consistently identified an Iranian nuclear weapon as an “existential threat.” In several meetings and conversations, Netanyahu has expressed to Trump firm opposition to any U.S.-Iran deal that enables Iran to continue enriching uranium. Netanyahu has argued that the recent setbacks his forces have delivered to Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” and to its air defense network have left Iran uniquely vulnerable to an attack now. Indirectly confirming reports U.S. intelligence had detected Israeli preparations for an attack on Iran, President Trump acknowledged in late May he had insisted Netanyahu not attack while U.S.-Iran diplomacy remains active, telling journalists: “It's not a warning [to Netanyahu]. I said I don't think [a strike is] appropriate.” Although Israel is unlikely to strike Iran as long as diplomacy is active, many experts assess that Netanyahu would launch an assault if the U.S.-Iran talks collapse. Israel’s perceived willingness to use the military option – even if doing so would set off a broader conflict – has caused regional leaders to try to facilitate a successful outcome for the U.S.-Iran talks.