July 22, 2025

SHARE |

Iran Wrestles with Major Decisions Following Israeli and U.S. Strikes

Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader via AP

Iranian leaders are struggling to center on a strategy to respond to the June 12-day war with Israel and the U.S. Operation Midnight Hammer strike on Iran’s three main nuclear facilities: Natanz, Fordow, and Esfahan. Much of the U.S. discussion, to date, has centered on the effectiveness of the U.S. strike by B-2 bombers, using the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) to reach underground and hardened facilities, particularly the uranium enrichment facility at Fordow. The Washington Post reported on Saturday, quoting unnamed officials, that U.S. intelligence has assessed that only Fordow was destroyed in the strike, and that Natanz and Esfahan, although suffering severe damage, could be rebuilt.

Yet, experts and global officials assert that the damage assessment of the U.S and Israeli attacks is secondary to the questions of Iranian intent and strategic decision-making going forward. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as a wide range of experts, claim that no matter how much damage has been done to Iran’s facilities and its technical staff capabilities, Iran retains the knowledge to develop a nuclear weapon if its leaders choose to do so. Johns Hopkins professor Vali Nasr, who spoke at last week’s Aspen Security Forum, framed Iran’s national security dilemma, stating Iranian leaders “believe they’re in a long war” with Israel and that they are focused primarily on “management of the Israeli threat,” including rebuilding air defenses and plugging intelligence holes. He added that U.S. officials should focus on “not just the result of the intelligence estimate – whether Iran’s nuclear program is finished off or not – but whether it’s worth going to the table with the Iranians to negotiate something that actually would make this ceasefire have legs.”

Facing a complex set of choices, Iran’s historically fractious regime is struggling to achieve consensus on how to respond to Israeli and Western pressure in the aftermath of the U.S. and Israeli attacks. Iran’s hardliners – a camp that includes Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei – appear to see the attacks as evidence that they need a credible nuclear deterrent, even though Khamenei has not rescinded his religious ruling declaring the pursuit of nuclear weapons a “big and unforgivable sin.” More pragmatic leaders – such as reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi – appear to have accepted Iran’s vulnerability to further attacks and advocate for compromise. Iran’s pragmatists argue it will be very expensive to maintain a covert nuclear weapons program that would not be easily discovered and struck by the U.S. and/or Israel again. The pragmatists add that Iran’s nuclear program – as well as its strategy to empower a region wide network of allies, known as the Axis of Resistance – failed to accomplish its core mission to deter a U.S. or Israeli attack on Iranian territory. Furthermore, they argue that Iran’s national security strategy has damaged Iran’s relations with Gulf states. However, Iran’s hardliners have sought to use those same arguments against their more moderate opponents, asserting that the pragmatists’ strategy of compromise – and particularly their support for the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear agreement (JCPOA) – did not build trust with the U.S. and its allies. Khamenei and other hardline leaders questioned their government’s decision to enter into nuclear talks with U.S. President Donald Trump’s team in April, noting it was Trump who abrogated the JCPOA in 2018, even though the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assessed Iran was complying with the accord.

U.S. officials and their allies are encouraging diplomacy by including incentives to try to shift the debate in Tehran toward the pragmatists, but the prospects for success remain uncertain. Trump officials have said they want a negotiated nuclear settlement that would ensure that Iran does not rebuild any components of its nuclear program useful for developing nuclear weapons. Since the U.S. strike, Trump’s team has urged Iran’s leaders to return to Oman-mediated negotiations with Special Middle East Envoy Steve Witkoff, making clear that a deal with Iran would involve substantial sanctions relief that could reverse Iran’s economic decline. Iranian government leaders have said they would consider doing so but have set a condition that the U.S must first ensure there will be no more attacks on Iran, including by Israel. However, according to The Wall Street Journal, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose June air campaign gave Tel Aviv a major stake in Iranian nuclear issues, told Trump during their White House meetings two weeks ago that he might strike Iran again if they detected signs Tehran was rebuilding its nuclear program.

Even if U.S.-Iran talks were to resume, there are no indications that the basic differences between the U.S. and Iran can be bridged. U.S. officials have asserted that any new nuclear deal with Iran will require Iran to end its enrichment of uranium on Iranian territory (a policy known as “zero enrichment”). Even Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has expanded strategic relations with Iran since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, is calling for Iran to agree to zero enrichment, although the Russian stance could be intended primarily to forestall U.S. attempts to add sanctions on Moscow for its refusal to agree to a ceasefire with Ukraine. However, Supreme Leader Khamenei and his subordinates have continued to insist Iran has a “right” to enrich uranium under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and that a “zero enrichment” proposal will be rejected. Iran’s hardliners argue that the U.S. is not interested in a give-and-take negotiation but rather demands Iran “surrender.” Still, pragmatists appear to have convinced the Supreme Leader not to implement earlier threats to leave the NPT entirely if Iran’s facilities were attacked. Iranian government leaders instead announced a “suspension” of cooperation with the IAEA, following the U.S. strike in late June.

Last week, Trump’s team and U.S. allies decided to ratchet up pressure on Tehran to accept U.S. terms for a resolution. The intent of the allied action is to raise the economic and political costs to the Iran regime for refusing to return to the negotiating table. On Monday, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the foreign ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom agreed to set the end of August as a deadline for Iran to reach a nuclear agreement. The allied leaders stated that if no deal is reached by that deadline, the three European powers will trigger the "snapback" mechanism that automatically reimposes all UN Security Council sanctions that were lifted under the 2015 JCPOA. (The U.S. cannot trigger the snapback because it left the JCPOA in 2018.)

Implementing the snapback provision takes 30 days, and the European states want to conclude the process before Russia assumes the UN Security Council presidency in October. The snapback mechanism, which remains available until October 18, under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 2231, allows a JCPOA participant to unilaterally restore previously lifted UN sanctions if it believes Iran is in “significant non-performance” of its obligations. At the same time, the allies are offering Iran possible “off ramps” from the snapback if Tehran agrees to resume cooperation with the IAEA or it allows the removal of the roughly 400 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium that is believed to have survived the U.S. and Israeli attacks. The snapback represents a clear threat to Iran’s already strained economy, in large part because China, in order to comply with UN sanctions rules, would be compelled to cease purchasing Iranian oil. Beijing is by far the largest buyer of Iranian oil, taking in an estimated 1.5 million barrels of Iranian oil each day.

Still, reflecting the core thinking in Tehran against offering any concessions to the U.S. or its allies in the wake of the June airstrikes, Iran warned last week it would retaliate if the UN Security Council imposes the snapback sanctions. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei claimed during a press conference: "The threat to use the snapback mechanism lacks legal and political basis and will be met with an appropriate and proportionate response from the Islamic Republic of Iran." In a statement to the Iranian press, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi accused the European states of “playing into the hands of the United States and Israel,” and warned that triggering the snapback would effectively end Europe’s role as a credible mediator. How Tehran responds to the Western pressure might ultimately determine whether armed conflict with Iran has ended or whether it resumes.