July 2, 2025

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Will the Fragile Peace Deal between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda Hold?

AP Photo/Manuel Balce Ceneta

Foreign ministers from Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) signed a U.S.-brokered peace deal on June 27. Both Qatar and the African Union (AU) also served as mediators in the deal, in addition to facilitating several previous failed attempts at reaching a diplomatic resolution to the conflict that has spanned three decades and has its roots in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The agreement is both a security accord and a strategic economic pact centered on the U.S. gaining access to the DRC’s vast economic wealth, including critical minerals. The past decade of fighting has brought unspeakable death and destruction to the DRC. This year alone, thousands of people have died, and hundreds of thousands have been displaced. Following the signing of the deal on Friday, Rwanda’s Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe referred to it as a “turning point,” while Therese Kayikwamba Wagner, the DRC’s foreign minister, expressed relief, suggesting that the agreement had “been long in coming.” However, outside experts and observers are far more skeptical.

Preparations for the agreement were initiated in May 2025 by Félix Tshisekedi — the Congolese president — in response to the rapidly deteriorating security situation in the country. This comes after the Rwanda-backed March 23 Movement (M23) insurgency made substantial gains since the beginning of 2025, following a lightning advance. The insurgency, which resurged in 2021, has captured significant territory in eastern DRC over the past six months. M23 now controls large parts of the mineral-rich provinces of North and South Kivu and has established de facto governance structures, consolidating its grip over resource extraction in the region, including a strong presence in the provincial capitals of Goma and Bukavu. M23 currently controls a territory roughly eight times the size of Belgium – approximately 200,000 square kilometres according to Kivu Security Tracker – and continues to consolidate power across eastern DRC, while advancing toward the capital, Kinshasa, with the ultimate goal of seizing control of the central government. The group has sought to capture strategic locations that total around 40 percent of eastern DRC’s coltan and gold production. It most recently seized the Twangiza mining company, as part of a broader, systematic effort to gain a stranglehold over the country’s resource extraction institutions.

In exchange for mineral access, the U.S. will provide security assistance – which could include training, military equipment and possibly direct operational support – mirroring a similar U.S.-Ukraine critical minerals for security arrangement made earlier this year. The minerals-for-security agreement is valued at an estimated $3 trillion, a strategic projection made by Africa Intelligence. The DRC sits on approximately $24 trillion in untapped mineral reserves, with a significant portion of its operationalized wealth currently controlled by Chinese companies. As of 2023, Chinese investment in DRC mining exceeded $10 billion, while U.S. FDI in the extractive sector remained under $2 billion. Washington’s renewed push to secure these resources reflects intensifying strategic competition with Beijing and Moscow. Both have deepened their spheres of influence in Africa through trade and investment, and China — now the continent’s largest economic partner — extends tariff-free access to all 54 African states. Moscow has been leveraging security partnerships, through private military companies – like Africa Corps – to secure mining and energy concessions that prop up its strategic footprint across the continent. Separate negotiations are currently underway to finalize how American investors will gain access to mining operations in eastern DRC, amid deep insecurity and the presence of multiple actors competing to consolidate control over the country’s vast mineral wealth.

Washington’s rush to secure mining concessions comes just as the Trump administration cuts U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funding, including the $180 billion allocated to the DRC. The cuts eliminated humanitarian and conflict-mitigation programs that could foster long-term stability in eastern DRC. Observers worry the move will only deepen an exploitative “minerals-for-profits” paradigm. Moreover, the deal may be more likely to collapse with Washington not serving as a true impartial mediator and prioritizing commercial gain over security in the DRC.

The deal mandates a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Rwandan troops, including elite Rwandan Defense Force (RDF) units and affiliated militias — which number between 4,000 and 12,000 according to estimates — from eastern DRC within 90 days, and the disengagement, disarmament, and conditional integration of armed groups, primarily M23. Kinshasa has also committed to dismantling the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), an anti-Tutsi extremist group with ties to the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Kigali cites the FDLR as an existential threat and has labeled it a “genocidal militia.” The group has proactively sought to overthrow the Rwandan government and has been supported by Kinshasa to counter Rwandan influence.

The U.S.-brokered agreement gives Kinshasa and Kigali 30 days to establish a joint verification body — comprising representatives from the DRC, Rwanda, and the United States — to oversee its implementation. However, doubts persist over both the effectiveness of this mechanism and the broader viability of the deal itself; previous DRC-Rwanda accords with similar monitoring provisions have repeatedly collapsed. With the body staffed by the actors driving the conflict, there is an inherent conflict of interest. Moreover, the agreement outlines no clear penalties for non-compliance, relies on under-resourced Congolese forces to “neutralize” the FDLR, and assumes that Kigali will pressure M23 to cease its insurgency — despite years of official denials of any support for the group. The deal has also been criticized for its ambiguity — it remains unclear whether the agreement will require M23 to withdraw from the territory it currently occupies, whether the group will be compelled to disarm, or what entity will be responsible for disarming the FDLR. Without clear provisions addressing these issues, the deal risks having little impact on the region’s protracted conflict.

Rwanda has framed its posture toward the DRC as a reaction to Kinshasa’s support for the FDLR. Yet its covert backing of the M23 insurgency also points to broader geopolitical ambitions, consolidating economic influence in eastern Congo and countering Uganda’s presence in the region. These dynamics highlight the conflict’s multidimensional character, driven not only by security concerns but also by competition for the DRC’s vast mineral wealth. On the Congolese side, President Tshisekedi has leveraged anti-Rwandan sentiment for domestic legitimacy while propping up patriotic militias like the Wazalendo — a loose coalition of community-based self-defense groups — which compete with M23 for territory and perpetuate instability. In this context, it remains unclear how the U.S.-brokered peace agreement will address the conflict’s deeper structural drivers, including the fierce contest over eastern Congo’s multibillion-dollar mineral trade.

Moreover, the M23 was not a direct party to these negotiations. While the deal may limit violence in the short term, its long-term success may hinge on Qatari-mediated talks that directly pull in representatives from M23. Two days ago, a representative from M23 publicly stated that the terms of the peace agreement “will not apply to us,” reiterating that they are not legally bound by the accord – raising concerns that the deal may do little to stop the violence on the ground. The M23’s insurgency grew out, in part, deep-rooted ethnic tensions, as well as M23’s assertion that the Congolese government is pursuing a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Banyamulenge ethnic group. Until these issues are addressed, the group may have limited incentive to disarm. Tshisekedi appears intent on securing a side deal with the rebel group ahead of a summit in July, where U.S. President Donald Trump and Rwandan President Paul Kagame will be in attendance.