January 31, 2025

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Colombia and the U.S.: Rising Violence, Cartels, and Diplomatic Standoffs in Latin America

AP Photo/Fernando Vergara

At least 80 people have been killed and more than 32,000 have been forced from their homes in northeastern Colombia over the past few weeks as fighting has surged between rival groups the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the 33rd Front, a group made up of dissident factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). A left-wing insurgent group founded in the 1960s, FARC adopted tactics such as bombings, small arms ambushes, and hostage-taking until 2016 when the group signed a peace treaty with the Colombian government. However, a number of splinter groups, like 33rd Front, have formed since the peace treaty.

The fighting between ELN and 33rd Front has been occurring in the Catatumbo region, near the border with Venezuela, over cocoa plantations and drug trafficking routes. The violence occurred following failed peace talks between the ELN and the Colombian government, which have faltered in previous years. The series of fighting marks one of the most violent periods since the peace deal in 2016; Colombian President Gustavo Petro issued a state of emergency on January 24, deploying thousands of troops to the region. Of the over 32,000 displaced Colombians, at least 5,000 have fled to Cúcuta, a town near the border with Venezuela that is better known for hosting Venezuelan migrants fleeing the Maduro regime. Some reports have even indicated that residents are fleeing across the Colombian border and into Venezuela.

Petro, Colombia’s first left-wing president and former guerilla himself, vowed to end the internal conflicts occurring when he took office in 2022. His initiative “Total Peace,” that aims to enforce the 2016 peace accords and bring sustainable peace to Colombia, has since lost momentum––despite some achievements such as a year-long ceasefire with ELN from August 2023 to 2024––as exemplified by the most recent spasms of violence. Petro’s policy, however, has in turn allowed armed groups to expand their operations throughout Colombia and across its borders, such as in Venezuela. According to the Economist, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro allows the ELN to operate in Venezuela and his regime “profits from the drug trafficking that funds the ELN’s warmongering.”

While Colombia struggles with its internal security crisis, the challenges facing Bogota are far from unique. Across Latin America, similar patterns of cartel-driven violence plague the region’s geopolitical landscape by groups like the First Command Capital and Red Command out of Brazil, Los Lobos out of Ecuador, Tren de Aragua out of Venezuela, the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation out of Mexico, and Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13) out of El Salvador.

As organized crime networks proliferate across Latin America, their impact extends beyond violence. The illicit drug trade remains a key factor in shaping U.S. foreign policy, particularly under President Donald Trump, influencing economic and immigration policies toward many countries in Latin America. This evolving dynamic has played out in several recent developments. On Sunday, a diplomatic tête-a-tête erupted between Colombian President Gustavo Petro and U.S. President Donald Trump when Petro refused to permit two U.S. military aircraft carrying deported Colombian nationals to land. Petro, in a statement outlining his decision, claimed that he denied the aircraft landing rights due to the state in which the deported civilians arrived in Colombia––handcuffed and loaded onto a military plane as opposed to a civilian aircraft. Petro later announced that he had acted similarly in 2023 when deported civilians arrived in similar conditions under the Biden administration.

Regardless, President Trump retaliated by imposing an “emergency 25 percent tariff” on all Colombian imports, warning that the rate would double to 50 percent within a week if Colombia refused to accept the deportees. Trump also implemented travel bans and visa revocations for Colombian government officials while intensifying customs inspections for Colombian nationals and cargo. In retaliation, Petro declared a 50 percent counter-tariff on U.S. imports. However, in response to warnings that this tariff would decimate Colombia’s economy, Petro ultimately conceded, agreeing to accept the deportees, which led to the suspension of the tariff threat.

Trump’s dispute with the Colombian leader signifies a changing dynamic within Latin America. Colombia has been one of the United States’ strongest allies, not only in trade relations but also in security cooperation, where Plan Colombia helped mold the country’s special forces into a train-the-trainer model that is the envy of the region. Further, Colombia has historically served as a liberal-democratic presence in the region, particularly given its border with Venezuela, and has worked closely with U.S. security forces to combat drug traffickers and other organized crime. The rapid escalation of this dispute with a key U.S. ally has raised concerns among other regional actors. It was initially reported that Honduras had called an “emergency summit” for all Latin American countries to meet on Thursday to discuss “migration, the environment, and regional unity” in response to the recent developments in Colombia. However, the summit was called off on Wednesday after only Colombia pledged to attend.

Nevertheless, Latin American countries are proceeding cautiously in light of Trump’s dispute with Petro, as well as his inflammatory remarks during his presidential campaign and inauguration regarding the Panama Canal—a strategic trade artery that remained under U.S. control until its transfer to Panama in 1999. President Trump claims that Panama has allegedly violated the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty, accusing Panama of facilitating illicit activities and deepening ties with China. Trump and other Republican politicians have floated the idea of reclaiming U.S. control over the canal. In response, Panama has joined a coalition of Latin American leaders––including the presidents of Chile, Bolivia, and Mexico––who have pledged to resist any U.S. attempts to reclaim control over the canal.