January 28, 2025

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The Escalating Web of Conflict in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo

AP Photo/Moses Sawasawa

The Democratic Republic of Congo is grappling with a complex crisis, with ongoing confrontations between the March 23 Movement (M23) armed group and the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), as well as increasing activities of the Islamic State Central African Province (IS-CAP), locally known as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).

The conflict in eastern DRC has intensified sharply in recent days, particularly in the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu. On January 27, M23 rebels captured eastern DRC’s largest city, Goma – a key economic hub, provincial capital and located on the border with Rwanda. The M23 rebels announced their capture of the city in a statement issued minutes before the expiration of a 48-hour ultimatum demanding the Congolese army's surrender of their weapons. This is a drastic escalation of the conflict, with Kenyan president and chairman of the East African Community (EAC) William Ruto, calling an emergency EAC summit scheduled for Wednesday, to address the threat.

The advance of M23 is intensifying one of Africa’s most protracted conflicts – a UN report has noted that over one third of North Kivu’s population has been displaced. The capture of Goma comes just days after the rebels captured Sake and Minova, a key supply route to Goma, and two weeks after taking control of Masisi, a district capital in North Kivu that oversees critical supply lines. M23 has also extended its control to the mining towns of Lumbishi, Bumbi, and Shanje. This is one of the most significant advances by M23 in years, with the group now holding more territory than ever before.

The humanitarian crisis in the DRC is severe, with 23.4 million people facing food insecurity and over 237,000 displaced in 2025 alone. The crisis is compounded by abuses committed by the DRC’s armed forces and their Wazalendo militia allies – a youth defense group that has merged local armed groups and vigilantes. Abuses have included looting, extortion, kidnappings, and violence against civilians, driving even more people from their homes. Adding to the instability, the region is plagued by the presence of over 100 distinct armed groups operating in eastern DRC alone, perpetuating chronic unrest.

The March 23 Movement (M23) is a Tutsi-led rebel group, with an estimated 8 thousand fighters to date, that emerged in 2012 following the collapse of a 2009 peace agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP). After suffering military setbacks in 2013, M23 enjoyed a resurgence in 2022, launching a renewed offensive and gaining large parts of North Kivu by 2023. There are several factors driving this resurgence, stemming in part from Rwanda’s increasing support to and use of the group as a proxy to exert influence over Uganda. Kigali has felt its influence waning in the region, due to Uganda’s growing ties with the DRC in the form of joint military operations launched in 2021 to counter the ADF, and the launch of a $330 million road building initiative linking Uganda and the DRC.

M23 has faced accusations of committing severe human rights abuses, such as mass rapes, forced recruitment, and extrajudicial killings. M23 has focused on asserting control over key strategic territories in eastern DRC, particularly in mineral-rich areas that are central to the country’s coltan, gold, and tin industries. By capturing these regions, M23 has generated substantial revenues, including an estimated $800,000 monthly from taxes on coltan mining, according to the UN. This economic monopoly has played a key role in funding the group’s military efforts and prolonging the conflict. Moreover, M23 has leveraged a comprehensive strategy to weaken local governance, imposing taxes on local populations and undermining state responses in critical conflict zones. DRC’s security forces face several internal issues, including deep-rooted patronage networks and corruption hindering the provision of adequate security responses, allowing M23 to make sudden territorial gains.

Rwanda’s covert and overt support for M23 is internationally acknowledged, with the DRC recently severing diplomatic ties following M23’s capture of Goma, which claimed the lives of thirteen peacekeepers and foreign soldiers. Rwanda's involvement is rooted in economic, security, and regional interests. UN reports highlight Rwanda’s substantial military and logistical backing of M23, including deploying four thousand troops, advanced weaponry, and resupply convoys. This support aligns with Rwanda’s pursuit of access to eastern DRC’s mineral-rich regions, critical to the global tech industry and its economy, fueling accusations of resource exploitation. Moreover, the DRC has also unsettled Kigali by its partnership with the Hutu militia group, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), to counter the M23 offensive. Kigali considers this to be an existential threat, rooted in the legacy of the 1994 genocide. Despite growing international pressure, diplomatic efforts have stalled; peace talks mediated by Angola collapsed in December 2024 over disagreements about engaging with M23, leaving the region mired in ongoing violence.

Fragile relations among neighboring countries, including Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda, increase the risk of further escalation in the conflict. In 2024, Uganda faced accusations of supporting M23 rebels, which is in part, to avoid Rwanda gaining uncontested influence in DRC. Burundi's military has also been involved in supporting Congolese operations against the insurgency. These intersecting regional interests raise concerns about the conflict spreading across the broader Great Lakes region, which encompasses Burundi, Rwanda, northeastern DRC, Uganda and northwestern Kenya and Tanzania, potentially repeating the devastation of the Second Congo War of the late nineties, which claimed an estimated 5.4 million lives.

Eastern DRC is also contending with the threat posed by jihadist militants from ISCAP, locally known as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Initially a shadowy insurgent group in North Kivu with Ugandan origins, the ADF had focused on local issues in the Ruwenzori border region. However, since establishing ties with the Islamic State in 2019, it rapidly evolved into one of the Islamic State’s most active wilayats. The formal affiliation facilitated an influx of foreign fighters from neighboring countries and financial backing from the Islamic State central, which has drastically increased the groups’ capabilities in recent years. In 2023, the group was responsible for over one thousand civilian deaths, according to ACLED.

Despite setbacks following the launch of Operation Shujaa in 2021, a joint Ugandan-Congolese military campaign that successfully displaced ISCAP from several of its strongholds, the group has intensified its activities in recent weeks. On January 15, an attack in the Lubero territory resulted in the deaths of thirty civilians, while a similar attack the previous month saw fifty killed. The ADF appears to have adapted its tactics, exploiting the security vacuum left by the FARDC’s increased focus on the M23 threat. Many FARDC units within the ADF’s area of operations have been redeployed to combat M23, allowing the group to shift operations beyond Shujaa’s reach into more remote regions, where civilians are increasingly vulnerable.

The situation is further worsened by the overreliance on the limited capabilities and aggravating activities of the Wazalendo forces in areas such as northern Lubero - an established hub of ISCAP activity and a site of ongoing clashes between FARDC and M23 forces. On January 26, the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UDPF) was deployed to Lubero in response to appeals from the Congolese government. Despite the UDPF’s previous gains in containing the ADF, especially near the Ugandan border, the threat persists. As of now, it is unclear what the outcome of this renewed deployment is, especially in the context of reports that the UDPF is providing support to M23. Moreover, the ADF has launched several attacks in the past month in the "Triangle of Death" area between Beni, Mbau, Eringeti, and Kainama, which was once secured by Shujaa and had been a former epicenter of violence.

ADF’s ambitions extend beyond the region, aligned with a global jihadist agenda since its evolution into ISCAP. Its networks across South Kivu, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya, as well as its roots in Uganda could bolster operations if successfully leveraged. Moreover, if more FARDC forces are deployed to recapture Goma, it is possible that the ADF could capitalize on this strategic window to carry out regional attacks. The potential for ADF expansion amid the broader DRC crisis continues to pose a serious threat over both the short and long term.