January 17, 2025

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Moldova’s Gas Crisis: The Cost of Defying Russia

AP Photo/Aurel Obreja

On January 1, Moldova found itself the victim of an energy crisis when Russian gas exports via Soviet-era pipelines were halted after Ukraine refused to renew its transit agreement with Moscow. Kyiv declined to renew the five-year contract because the billions of dollars Russia was earning off the residual annual transit were directly financing the Kremlin’s continued assault on Ukraine. However, Moldova’s lack of preparation for this long-awaited outcome as well as the consequences of Russian hybrid aggression have caused the country to be the most affected by the stoppage.

Until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moldova relied entirely on Russian gas for its energy needs. Gazprom, a Russian state-owned energy company, provided gas to the Russian-owned Cuciurgan electricity plant in the Russian-backed separatist region of Transnistria at no cost. Subsequently, this electricity was sold to Moldova, even after it attempted to decouple from Russian gas after the invasion of Ukraine. Chisinau was able to purchase cheap electricity from Cuciurgan prior to Russia’s stoppage of gas. As a result of Russia’s stoppage of gas to Transnistria, Moldova will have to turn to other, more expensive markets in Europe. According to Moldovan economist Veaceslav Ionita, electricity prices are expected to rise 75 percent with the average electricity bill rising between $50 to $115 per month. Before 2025, 70 percent of Moldova’s power supply still came from Transnistria, which was transported there by Soviet-era pipelines running through Ukraine.

hile western Moldova retains close ties to Romania, and by extent much of western Europe. Transnistria contains mainly ethnic Russians and Ukrainians, as a result of Soviet rule, who dominate the urban areas and hold the political power, even though, according to a 2015 census, ethnic Moldovans constitute 40 percent of the population, and 60 percent of Transnistrians are citizens of Moldova. Nevertheless, the separatist region is often referred to as a miniature Soviet Union, where Russian language and culture predominate, often at the expense of the native population, who are de facto denationalized.

Thus, Moldova’s reliance on Gazprom for its energy needs and Transnistria as a supply source gave Russia undue leverage. It used annual gas deliveries as bargaining chips to extract concessions, and in the winters of 2006 and 2009, Russia followed through on threats, cutting off gas to Moldova and leaving many without heat. Since taking office in 2020, Maia Sandu's pro-Western government has also been subject to Russia’s attempted coercion, which has continued through the recent 2024 election. In October 2021, when Sandu’s party won parliamentary elections, Gazprom raised gas prices and demanded that Moldova pay its over $700 million debt; however, an audit reported by the Center for Strategic International Studies asserts that Moldova only owes a $9 million debt, as opposed to $700 million.

After the Moldovan government criticized Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Gazprom reduced its supply to Moldova by 30 percent, which resulted in widespread energy poverty in the country and caused the government to declare a state of emergency. Following this, Moldova attempted to reduce its reliance on Russian gas by connecting to the Iasi-Ungheni pipeline through Romania, eliminating Russian gas imports last winter. However, the majority of Moldova's electricity still came from Russian-operated plants in Transnistria.

When Ukraine declined to renew its transit agreement with Russia at the beginning of the new year, all gas flows to Transnistria halted. In preparation, both Moldova and the internationally unrecognized government in Transnistria declared a state of emergency in December. This January , Moldova began importing power from Europe at a much higher price, but the Transnistrian separatist government refused any assistance from Chisinau or the European Union, seemingly waiting for Russian gas to return, leaving its 450,000 citizens without access to gas. As temperatures in the region begin to drop below freezing, local energy companies urged residents to dress warmly, hang blankets or thick curtains over windows and balcony doors, and use electric heaters.

Russia often picks and chooses when it lends support to Transnistria, utilizing the region's loyalty to Moscow to undermine Moldovan authority. In March 2024, the Kremlin installed six polling stations in Transnistria and even one in Chisinau, resulting in the expulsion of a Russian diplomat from Moldova’s capital. A few weeks prior, Transnistrian authorities appealed for Russian “protection,” hinting at desires for Russian annexation and alleging that Chisinau was “destroying” its economy, a plea which Moscow blatantly ignored. Regarding the current gas crisis, Moldova claims that it still holds a valid contract with Gazprom and that an alternative transit route for gas is available, yet the company is refusing to supply gas in order to destabilize its government ahead of its upcoming July parliamentary elections. At the same time, PMR leader, Vadim Krasnoselsky, claims that Transnistria is expecting Russia to resume exports to the region soon. A Moldovan official claims, however, that Moscow would likely only supply enough gas to support Transnistria’s needs.

In an effort to create additional political challenges for Moldova's ruling party, Russia is likely planning to withhold gas from Moldova to influence its upcoming elections following Sandu’s narrow victory in October, while also aiming to empower Transnistria and encourage it to amplify its grievances against Moldova, to further complicate the political landscape. With EU integration at stake, Moldova’s upcoming parliamentary elections are more critical than ever, especially as that prospect becomes increasingly distant for Georgia, another country deeply affected by Russian hybrid operations. Sandu’s narrow victory in October, along with the closely contested EU referendum tied to her election, highlights the fragility of Moldova’s position. Russia will likely continue its efforts to influence the July elections as it views the possibility of Moldova joining the EU as unacceptable, as the country borders Ukraine, and it believes it would further isolate the Kremlin.