February 19, 2025

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Like Vultures Circling: External Actors Eager to Intervene in Post-Assad Syria

AP Photo/Baderkhan Ahmad

The Syrian people, as well as Western and regional leaders, hoped that the fall of the regime of President Bashar al-Assad to Islamist rebels professing moderation and tolerance would quickly produce domestic stability. Regional and European countries anticipated an end to civil conflict might encourage the more than 6 million Syrian refugees and 7 million internally displaced persons to return to their homes. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), of those who took refuge in neighboring countries, approximately 5.5 million live in Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt. Germany, the largest non-neighboring host country, houses more than 850,000 Syrian refugees. The international community also anticipates that the establishment of a moderate and inclusive new government in Damascus would pave the way for economic reform, the lifting of global sanctions on Syria, and a reduction in regional trafficking of the narcotic Captagon.

Yet, more than two months after Assad fled, stability remains elusive, particularly in areas of Syria where external actors continue to intervene to promote their strategic objectives. Türkiye, even though it has consistently sought a stable and moderate Syria, is taking advantage of its close relationship with the new Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leaders in Damascus to step up its offensive against Kurdish factions in northern Syria. The objective of Türkiye’s effort is to expand a secure corridor along the border and ensure that Syrian Kurds cannot materially support Kurdish militant groups inside Türkiye. Syrian-Kurdish leaders deny any association with anti-Türkiye Kurdish militants, particularly those of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Ankara’s position on the Syrian Kurds, who constitute 10 percent of the population, has long strained relations with Washington. The 2,000 U.S. forces in Syria support the Kurd-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in an effort to prevent a resurgence of the Islamic State (IS). Despite this, Türkiye’s membership in NATO has facilitated efforts by Ankara and Washington to prevent this disagreement from damaging the broader U.S.-Türkiye relationship.

Ankara is implementing its policy by supporting the Syrian National Army (SNA), an armed umbrella group comprised of 41 anti-Assad factions. With the help of Turkish air and drone strikes, the SNA’s post-Assad offensive against the SDF in the northeast has sought, and in some cases succeeded, in capturing several cities, including the major hub of Manbij. The UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights war monitor estimates that, from mid-December until late January, at least 423 people have been killed in the SNA-SDF conflict, of which 41 were civilians, 308 were SNA fighters, and the remaining 74 were SDF fighters. An estimated 100,000 persons have fled their homes to avoid the fighting. Since Manbij fell in early December, the fighting has moved further east toward the key Tishreen Dam, which regulates water from the Euphrates River and supplies electricity for many in the region. Significant damage to it could prove catastrophic, physically and economically, for Syria and the broader region.

U.S. officials are increasingly concerned that the SDF’s pivot from combatting IS to defending its positions against the SNA is jeopardizing the ongoing U.S.-led mission to prevent an IS resurgence. Syrian, U.S., and regional leaders warn that IS might use post-Assad instability, the collapse of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), and the departure of many Russian forces from Syria to reconstitute its control over territory in both Syria and parts of Iraq. The SDF’s anti-IS mission includes guarding prisons and camps holding IS fighters and their families. U.S. leaders see ending the conflict between the SNA and SDF as a prerequisite for the SDF to resume its focus on its anti-IS roles.

Going forward, U.S. officials hope to forge operational cooperation between the SDF and Syrian government forces against IS. A Syrian-led front against IS would, in the view of U.S. officials, permit Trump to implement the course of action he preferred during his first term – a U.S. departure from Syria. The withdrawal was shelved at that time over concerns that IS could reconstitute its strength and that Iran and its militias in Syria would benefit. But, Iran-backed militia forces have left Syria following Assad’s fall, removing Iran as a strategic hindrance to a U.S. decision to withdraw from Syria. Many experts see a U.S. withdrawal from Syria as a requirement if the new government in Damascus is to achieve economic and political reform and integrate fully into the region after Assad’s estrangement.

The SDF-Damascus cooperation the Trump administration envisions will likely depend on the outcome of negotiations to fold the SDF into the national command structure. HTS leader and transitional Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa, who led the offensive that ousted Assad, has demanded integration in order for the state to exercise a monopoly of armed force on all Syrian territory. SDF leader Mazloum Abdi has expressed readiness to meld the SDF into the Syrian military, but negotiations to do so are expected to be difficult. Syria’s Kurdish leaders argue they do not seek to replicate in Syria the autonomous government and parliament that has existed in Kurdish-inhabited northern Iraq since the ouster of Saddam Hussein. Rather, they seek decentralization and the leeway to run their day-to-day affairs. HTS leaders, including Sharaa, have acknowledged that the Kurds were unjustly treated under Assad, but it is unclear whether they will permit the Kurdish community the degree of political autonomy it seeks.

The Syrian government is also fighting to stabilize another front – the border with Lebanon. Apparently seeking to compensate for Iran’s loss of a secure land route through Syria to resupply the group, Hezbollah’s militia has sought to encroach on border areas of Syria to facilitate the trafficking of drugs, weaponry, and other commodities. The smuggling generates the revenue needed to recover from the effects of Israel’s air and ground campaign throughout much of last year. In late January, Syrian forces intercepted several large-scale Hezbollah smuggling operations, reflecting an effort to assert control over its territory and curb criminal activity. The border security operations accompanied HTS-led dismantlement of factories and warehouses the Assad regime’s allies used to traffic in the narcotic Captagon. In early February, Syrian government forces clashed with Hezbollah fighters attempting to advance near the Syrian town of Al Qusayr, a stronghold of the Iran-backed group during Assad’s rule.  As the clashes escalated, Syrian forces crossed into Hawik, a Lebanese town in the Hermel region, where intense combat forced Hezbollah elements to retreat.

By confronting Hezbollah on the border, Syrian forces also seek to deny Hezbollah, and by extension, Iran, access to pro-Assad groups inside Syria. Officials in the new government have blamed Iran, as well as Hezbollah, for stoking violent attacks on government authorities by members of the Shia Muslim Alawite community. The Alawites, predominantly in the cities along the Mediterranean Sea, in Latakia Province, were the backbone of Assad family rule. Syrian officials have attributed the Alawite unrest to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s encouragement – he has stated on several occasions he expects pro-Iranian and pro-Assad elements to return to power in Syria eventually. Clashes between Syrian forces and supporters of the ousted Assad regime killed six HTS militia members on December 23 and wounded others, according to a UK-based monitoring group. However, members of the Alawite community deny any linkage to Iranian or Hezbollah plotting, arguing instead their protests in December were sparked by videos showing the burning of an Alawite shrine by HTS members.

The HTS leadership has largely ignored one other front experiencing outside intervention – the Golan Heights border with Israel. Israeli forces were ordered by its leadership to take over evacuated SAA positions on the Golan Heights after Assad fell, and have since fortified their new forward lines. Israel also conducted major air strikes to destroy Syria’s remaining heavy weaponry and suspected chemical weapons and missile sites. Sharaa and other Syrian leaders have thus far done little other than denounce Israel’s actions. Damascus might calculate its forces would be weakened by any clash with the Israelis, and that combatting Israel would dissuade its ally, Washington, from lifting economic sanctions on the new government.