August 21, 2025

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The Prisons and Detention Camps in Syria Deserve a Greater Sense of Urgency

AP Photo/Bernat Armangue

On 15 August, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that Iraq had successfully repatriated over 25,000 – around 80 percent – of its nationals from the al-Hol and al-Roj detention camps in northeast Syria. This uptick in the repatriation of Iraqi nationals from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled camps, which accommodate thousands of family members of Islamic State (ISIS) fighters, reflects the commitments previously articulated by the Iraqi government. In a statement on X, US CENTCOM praised this accomplishment as “demonstrating its commitment to the sustained defeat of ISIS.” This move by the Iraqi government could provide much-needed momentum to a policy problem that seems to have been stuck in limbo for years, even as national security officials have repeatedly pointed to the vulnerabilities these camps face to a jihadist-engineered prison break.

The “Breaking the Walls” campaign was a series of coordinated prison assaults carried out by the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI, the precursor to ISIS) between July 2012 and July 2013. Announced by the group’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the campaign’s goal was to free large numbers of imprisoned militants, replenish the group’s manpower, and demonstrate its ability to operate with strength despite years of U.S. and Iraqi counterterrorism pressure. The campaign targeted multiple detention centers across Iraq — including the infamous Abu Ghraib and Taji prisons — resulting in the escape of hundreds of battle-hardened fighters and experienced commanders. These raids not only replenished its ranks but also boosted morale and propaganda value, directly contributing to the group’s resurgence and eventual transformation into the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). By emphasizing spectacular operations, tactical complexity, and mass prisoner releases, “Breaking the Walls” became a pivotal moment in ISIS’s evolution from a growing, but still low-level, insurgency into a revitalized jihadist movement with regional ambitions and sophisticated capabilities.

The legacy of the Breaking the Walls campaign was on display in January 2022, when the Islamic State launched its largest operation since the collapse of its territorial caliphate in early 2019: a massive assault on the Ghwayran (al-Sina’a) prison in Hasakah, northeast Syria, which housed roughly 3,500 suspected ISIS fighters, many of them minors from the so-called “Cubs of the Caliphate.” The attack began with a coordinated car bomb and synchronized ambush, followed by an uprising inside the facility. Fighting raged for nearly 10 days as ISIS gunmen held parts of the prison and nearby neighborhoods, using detainees as human shields. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), backed by U.S.-led coalition airstrikes and ground advisers, eventually regained control, but only after intense urban combat. The violence killed at least 500 people, including ISIS militants, prison staff, SDF fighters, and civilians. While most detainees were recaptured, several hundred managed to escape, demonstrating ISIS’s enduring organizational capacity and the lackluster security situation at detention sites in northeastern Syria. The Hasakah prison break should serve as a constant reminder of the risks posed by holding thousands of ISIS fighters in overstretched, poorly resourced facilities.

This acceleration comes amid worsening conditions at al-Hol and Roj camps, which were initially established to provide temporary shelter for civilians — and foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) — displaced after the 2019 collapse of the Islamic State’s (IS) so-called “caliphate.” Conditions in the open-air camps are dire; a 2023 United Nations report highlighted routine violence, sexual violence, widespread disease, and a lack of basic necessities, describing them as “life-threatening.” Moreover, the presence of active IS cells within the camps has been well documented, and the ongoing arbitrary detention of inhabitants is widely regarded as a tinderbox that could spark the resurgence of an “ISIS 2.0.” Just this week, in a report for the Secretary-General of the United Nations, an assessment concluded that detention camps and prisons in northeastern Syria “risk becoming incubators of radicalisation,” with the UN calling for member states to “facilitate the safe, voluntary, and dignified repatriation of their nationals, treating children primarily as victims.”

As of March 2022, the camps still held an estimated 64,000 people — 90 percent of them women and children from more than 50 countries — though the vast majority are Iraqi and Syrian nationals. Iraqi repatriations have been ongoing since 2023. Given the clear security implications, international bodies, including the UN, have repeatedly urged member states to repatriate women and children in compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL), but progress has been limited.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres lauded Iraqi efforts as “a model initiative,” offering UN assistance for repatriation programs, particularly those targeting children under 18. With support from the Global Community Engagement and Resistance Fund (GCERF), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), Iraq has developed the infrastructure to repatriate its citizens in significant numbers. The UNOCT has provided essential equipment to register and track adult returnees, as well as training in trauma-informed interviewing practices. With GCERF’s support, Iraq has also developed a multi-stage, holistic repatriation initiative that may serve as a model for its neighbors. However, broader state responses remain sporadic.

One of the most significant obstacles to repatriating foreign nationals from detention camps in Syria is security risk assessment — governments fear that returning citizens, many of whom have some semblance of links to ISIS, could pose ongoing terrorist threats if not adequately monitored or prosecuted. Compounding this is the legal challenge: many countries lack sufficient admissible evidence to prosecute detainees under domestic law, especially for crimes committed abroad, leaving them with limited options beyond surveillance or deradicalization programs. While battlefield evidence is sometimes available, the concept itself is nascent, and many prosecutors remain wary of attempting to integrate it into courtroom proceedings.

A lack of political will, or explicit political resistance, also plays a role, as public opinion in many states is highly divided over bringing back suspected jihadists and even their families, creating domestic backlash for policymakers. Additionally, resource constraints — including the costs of transportation, vetting, prosecution, and long-term rehabilitation — deter states from large-scale repatriations. Finally, the fragile security environment in northeast Syria and the reliance on the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces for camp management complicate transfers, as there is no stable central authority to coordinate with, and risks of prison breaks or camp riots remain high. Together, these legal, political, security, and logistical hurdles explain why repatriations have been piecemeal and uneven across countries.