April 22, 2025

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U.S. and Iran Agree to Detail a Nuclear Accord

AP Photos Stringer, Mark Schiefelbein

Trump’s Special Envoy for the Middle East Steven Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met for the second time on Saturday at the Embassy of the Sultanate of Oman in Rome, Italy. Following a format similar to the April 12 initial talks in Muscat, Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi shuttled between the two delegations, which reportedly also convened directly for a brief period. At the conclusion of the meeting, Oman’s Foreign Ministry announced that Araghchi and Witkoff “have agreed to enter into the next phase of their discussions that aim to seal a fair, enduring and binding deal which will ensure Iran completely free of nuclear weapons and sanctions, and maintaining its ability to develop peaceful nuclear energy.” Araghchi clarified after the meeting that the two sides agreed to convene an expert group in the coming “day” - on Wednesday, according to some reports - to discuss technical details of a possible accord. He explained the U.S. and Iranian technical teams would discuss setting the maximum levels to which Iran could enrich uranium, the size of nuclear stockpiles it could retain, and how compliance with any agreement could be monitored and verified. Araghchi and Witkoff also agreed to meet again on Saturday, returning to Muscat, to review the results of the technical discussions.

Prior to the Rome meeting, Witkoff met with the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, in the city, according to diplomatic sources. Reflecting the urgency of the talks, in between the two U.S.-Iran rounds, Grossi visited Iran, warning before arriving in Tehran that Iran was "not far" from possessing a nuclear bomb. Grossi told the French newspaper Le Monde: "It's like a puzzle. They have the pieces, and one day they could eventually put them together…There's still a way to go before they get there. But they're not far off, that has to be acknowledged." The IAEA assessments have formed the basis for Trump’s assertions that, although preferring a diplomatic solution, he might authorize U.S. military action against Iran to prevent Iran from acquiring an actual nuclear weapon. Last Monday, Trump reiterated the threat, telling reporters in the Oval Office: “If we have to do something very harsh (to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran), we will do it." Last Tuesday, according to Axios, Trump convened a meeting with his top national security aides in the White House Situation Room to discuss Iran’s and the U.S.’s approach to the talks.

The progress in the Rome talks reflected, at least in part, a U.S. decision to downplay disagreement within the Trump team over the ultimate goal of the talks. Trump himself has been vague, perhaps deliberately, about the strategic objectives of the negotiations. His stated “bottom line” - that Iran must never get a nuclear bomb - avoids the critical question of whether Trump could accept an Iran that is capable of quickly breaking out of any agreed restrictions to assemble a bomb on short notice. Hardliners among Trump’s team, particularly National Security Adviser Michael Waltz and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, argue the U.S. should insist that any new nuclear deal require complete and verifiable dismantlement of Iran’s uranium enrichment infrastructure. Others, including Witkoff, have cited Iran’s non-negotiable objections to that outcome to argue that, in order to obtain an agreement, U.S. officials will have to accept some level of remaining Iranian enrichment capability. However, some Trump advisers have cautioned that agreeing to limits on how much uranium Iran can acquire and stockpile - even if those limits are minuscule - exposes Trump to criticism that he is essentially returning to the 2015 Obama-era multilateral nuclear agreement (JCPOA) that he exited in 2018. Calling the JCPOA a “disaster,” Trump pulled out of the agreement primarily because of sanctions relief provisions he argued enabled Iran to earn large amounts of revenue with which to empower Tehran’s regional non-state allies, such as Lebanese Hezbollah.

Witkoff and others on the Trump team cited statements by Iranian leaders, including Araghchi, to argue the talks would quickly break down unless the U.S. team softened its demand for full dismantlement of Iran’s enrichment capability. A breakdown of negotiations would present Trump with an immediate and unwanted choice: whether to launch significant strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, and potentially set off a major regional war. As the latest talks convened in Rome, an unnamed senior Iranian official told journalists Iran would not disassemble or destroy the nuclear infrastructure in which Iran has invested billions of dollars. The official stated that the red line meant Iran would never agree to dismantle its centrifuges for enriching uranium, halt enrichment altogether, or reduce the amount of enriched uranium it stores to a level below the level (3.67 percent purity) it agreed in the JCPOA. Iranian officials have suggested they could accept returning to the JCPOA parameters because 3.67 percent purity is the level needed to produce fuel for nuclear power plants. Enriching uranium to that level would keep Iran independent of foreign sources of nuclear fuel for its civilian nuclear reactors. Iran is currently enriching and stockpiling uranium to 60 percent purity, a level not needed for civilian purposes, and which raises U.S. and global concerns about Iran’s nuclear intentions.

A New York Times report on Sunday included indications that Iran might be willing to compromise further, coming closer to Trump’s preference for full dismantlement of its enrichment infrastructure. The report stated Iranian officials had raised the possibility of forming a joint venture to run its nuclear enrichment facilities. That option, under which Iran would presumably cede full control of its enrichment infrastructure, would seem to represent a significant concession that might satisfy hardliners in both the United States and Israel. It was unclear from available reporting whether the U.S., one of the European parties to the original JCPOA (United Kingdom, France, and Germany), or one of the Arab Gulf states would become the partner of the proposed joint venture. The Iranian official source for The New York Times report added Iran might alternatively be open to transferring its stockpile of enriched uranium to Russia or another nation, much as it did to implement the JCPOA. However, that concession would not likely satisfy those in Trump’s inner circle insisting on maximal concessions from Tehran. The reported new Iranian proposals might reflect Tehran’s concerns that failure of the talks would lead to armed conflict with the U.S. and/or Israel. A New York Times story several days earlier reported Trump had “waived off” a plan by Israel’s Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to conduct air strikes and a commando raid on Iranian nuclear facilities. Trump reportedly told Netanyahu, at a hastily arranged meeting in Washington on April 7, that he had opted for diplomacy to settle U.S. and Israeli concerns about Iran’s nuclear program.

There were few, if any, details released whether the two delegations discussed in Rome Iran’s demand for comprehensive relief from U.S. sanctions. Nor was information available on whether the two sides closed gaps in their positions on Iran’s insistence that sanctions relief be made permanent – and not easily subject to reimposition by a subsequent U.S. president. Iran’s demand for permanence reflects its distrust of Trump for his pullout of the JCPOA, after which he not only re-imposed all sanctions lifted under that deal as part of his “maximum pressure” strategy, but also added further sanctions, including naming the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). After the Rome meeting, Araghchi explained Iran’s insistence on this point, saying: “We made clear how many in Iran believe that the [JCPOA] is no longer good enough for us. To them, what is left from that deal (the JCPOA) are ‘lessons learned.’ Personally, I tend to agree.” Yet, Iran’s position might be very difficult to accommodate. Even if Trump were to accede, he would only have the formal presidential power to waive, not repeal, existing U.S. sanctions laws that currently affect virtually every sector of Iran’s economy. Repealing the sanctions laws would require a vote of the U.S. Congress, which has always been broadly supportive of maximum pressure on Iran’s economy, no matter who the president is, and has historically been disinclined to offer Iran significant concessions.