April 21, 2025

SHARE |

Saudi Arabia Tries to Stay Out of the Crossfire

Iranian Presidency Office via AP

On Thursday, Saudi Arabia’s Defense Minister, Prince Khalid bin Mohammad, brother of de-facto leader Mohammad bin Salman (MBS), conducted the first high-level Saudi visit to Iran in decades, cementing a rapprochement formalized under China’s auspices in March 2023. The visit reflects the Saudi leadership’s assessment of both risks and opportunities resulting from the geostrategic changes that have swept the region since the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel. The Kingdom’s key potential adversary, Iran, is far weaker than it was at the time of the Hamas attack. Israel, with which Saudi leaders have quiet but strategic ties, has been strengthened by its successful military action against Iran’s non-state allies, as well as the collapse of the pro-Iranian Assad regime in Syria. The return to power of Donald Trump in the U.S., who favors the Kingdom, plans to visit it again as early as next month. He sees Saudi Arabia as a major source of new investment and a key to fulfilling his vision of a more peaceful Middle East, giving MBS and his associates pivotal leverage. The start of formal talks between the U.S. and Iran on a revised nuclear agreement paved the way for Prince Khalid to visit Tehran without risk of offending Washington, which itself is now engaging Tehran on a revised nuclear accord.

The sweep of Prince Khalid’s meetings in Tehran demonstrated the evolution of the Saudi-Iran relationship since the 2023 restoration of relations. On social media, Prince Khalid noted meeting the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, saying: “I delivered a letter from the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques (his ailing father, King Salman) and conveyed the leadership’s greetings. We discussed our bilateral relations and topics of mutual interest.” Prince Khalid also met not only with Iran’s relatively moderate President Masoud Pezeshkian, but also with the Chief of Staff of Iran's Armed Forces Major General Mohammad Bagheri, to “review the bilateral relations between our countries and explore prospects for defense cooperation,” as well as discuss “regional developments and related efforts.” Bagheri is a stalwart in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), but heads the joint command military leadership headquarters for the IRGC as well as Iran’s regular military force (Artesh). Prince Khalid engaged with Bagheri not only as a formal counterpart, but also as a harbinger of expanding defense cooperation between the two Gulf powers. In October, Saudi Arabia and Iran conducted their first ever joint naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman, according to Iranian media, and in November, the Chief of Staff of Saudi Arabia’s armed forces, Fayyad al-Ruwaili, visited Tehran to meet with his Iranian counterpart, state media reported.

Khalid’s visit reflects MBS’ strategy to avoid embroiling the Kingdom in the region’s current or potential conflicts. Last year, in the context of two exchanges of air strikes and ballistic missile attacks between Israel and Iran, Arab Gulf leaders reportedly expressed concern to the U.S. that an expansive Israeli attack on Iranian oil facilities could spark regional war and adversely affect the Gulf states’ economies and environment. In part as a consequence of the Gulf's concerns, U.S. officials cautioned Israel to avoid civilian targets, and Israel largely obliged, confining its strikes to air defense and missile program infrastructure. Iran did not follow through on threats to retaliate against any parties aiding Israel, even though Saudi Arabia quietly cooperated with the U.S. military to intercept the brunt of Iran’s missile barrages against Israel.

Seeking to avoid a broader war sparked by Iran’s nuclear program advances, Prince Khalid expressed to the Supreme Leader a hope that the U.S.-Iran talks would achieve a positive outcome. MBS and his aides want to avoid becoming the subject of an Iranian backlash should the talks fail and the Trump administration – or Israel – attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. To deter a U.S. attack, Iran has threatened to attack the Gulf states if U.S. forces strike Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Saudi Arabia, as well as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar, have reportedly told Trump officials they would not permit the use of their bases to strike Iran. Nor will they permit Israel to use their airspace for strikes on Iranian nuclear sites.

Kingdom leaders have also sought to shield the country from any retaliation for Trump’s escalating attacks on the Houthi movement in Yemen, which began in mid-March. Seeking to avoid a Houthi resumption of missile and drone strikes on Saudi targets, the Saudi leadership has stated repeatedly that it is not involved in or supporting the U.S. strikes. Prince Khalid discussed the U.S. campaign against the Houthis and the potential for settling the broader Yemen conflict in his meetings in Tehran, which is the leading supplier of weaponry and advice to the Houthis. The U.S. strikes have weakened the Houthis and degraded their arsenal, but the movement has been able to continue missile launches against Israel and U.S. ships in the Red Sea, although with decreasing frequency.

Although it is willing to engage Iran, in part to focus on the Kingdom’s expansive “Vision 2030” economic diversification program, Saudi leaders also want to ensure their longer-term security in the event Tehran reverts to an aggressive posture towards the Gulf. For more than a decade, Saudi, Emirati, and other Gulf leaders have questioned the U.S. commitment to remain the ultimate guarantor of Gulf security and have, as a result, expanded security relations with Russia and China. Through the Biden administration and now in the second Trump term, Washington has sought to keep Saudi leaders closely aligned with the U.S. by discussing a bilateral defense pact committing the U.S. to the Kingdom’s defense. The U.S. has made that pact contingent on a Saudi normalization of relations with Israel, as part of Washington’s effort to build a Gulf-Israel-U.S. coalition against Iran and expand the 2020 “Abraham Accords” Arab state normalizations with Israel. However, Israel’s tactics in the Gaza war and its rejection of an independent Palestinian state preclude Saudi leaders from entertaining formal relations with Israel, at least for now.

Although a “grand bargain” with Saudi Arabia might be out of reach at least until the Gaza war ends, Trump is emphasizing shorter-term alternatives to engage more closely with the Kingdom and serve mutual geostrategic interests. His agenda in Saudi Arabia when he visits, probably in May – making the Kingdom his first foreign stop, as he did in his first term – will likely focus on energy relations and investment. In the days after Trump’s second inauguration, Saudi media reported: “The Crown Prince (MBS) affirmed the Kingdom’s intention to broaden its investments and trade with the United States over the next four years, in the amount of $600 billion, and potentially beyond that.” When he visits Riyadh, Trump is also certain to urge cooperation with U.S. officials to preserve stability in the global oil market, presumably by rejecting pressure from “OPEC+” price hawks such as Iran and Russia to cut production targets.

Saudi officials are also taking advantage of Trump’s apparent willingness to pursue a bilateral civilian nuclear accord with the Kingdom. Saudi leaders have made U.S. technical assistance to the nascent Saudi nuclear program a condition of the broader bilateral defense pact/Israel normalization grand bargain framework. MBS has said that the Kingdom would acquire a nuclear weapon if Iran did, and developing the Saudi program is essential to reinforcing that threat. Appearing to represent Trump’s willingness to accede to Saudi demands, last week U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright visited Riyadh. He announced the two countries agreed to sign, at a later date, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to cooperate on energy infrastructure, both in the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, including “mining cooperation, civilian nuclear technology and energy production.” Appearing to concede, Trump is willing to allow Saudi Arabia, as part of the deal, to enrich uranium in Saudi Arabia. Wright tried to address longstanding criticism of that concession, saying: “The issue is control of sensitive technology. Are there solutions to that that involve enrichment here in Saudi Arabia? Yes.”

Still, a bilateral civilian nuclear agreement that permits Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium could represent a stumbling block to Trump’s ambitions for U.S.-Saudi relations. Several members of Congress have stated they would not vote to ratify any U.S.-Saudi agreement that permits the Kingdom to enrich uranium, largely out of fear that the Kingdom’s leadership could, at some point, fall to Islamist extremists. Some Israeli strategists express the same concerns. Other critics note that concessions might undermine the pillars of the U.S. argument for curbing Iran’s nuclear program – that enriching uranium provides a pathway to developing a nuclear weapon. UAE leaders complain that their 2009 civilian nuclear agreement with the U.S., signed in accordance with Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (1-2-3 Agreement), adhered to an anti-proliferation “gold standard” by prohibiting the Emirates from enriching uranium, and Saudi Arabia should not be held to a more permissive standard. Whether Trump will be able to organize all the bilateral geostrategic, commercial, nuclear, and other files into a cohesive and consolidated U.S.-Saudi program of action when he visits the Kingdom in the coming weeks, remains unclear.