April 18, 2025

SHARE |

Are Israel and Türkiye on a Collision Course in Syria?

AP Photo/Francisco Seco

Israel and Türkiye met in Azerbaijan last week in an effort to de-escalate rising tensions over each country’s growing military presence in Syria, where both states are competing for influence. Following the demise of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in late December, Iranian and Russian influence has been significantly attenuated, and filling that void has been an increasingly more aggressive role by both the Israelis and the Turks. The meeting in Azerbaijan was arranged to discuss a deconfliction mechanism and seek an open line of communication to prevent the Israeli and Turkish militaries from coming into conflict. Since the fall of Assad, the Israelis have conducted hundreds of bombing raids against a range of targets in Syria, including military bases and ammunition depots.

While Israel is relieved to see a drastically reduced Iranian footprint in Syria, it also likely views Türkiye as the long-term pacing threat and is preparing accordingly. Relations between Israel and Türkiye have deteriorated since the onset of Israel’s war in Gaza, following the October 7, 2023, Hamas terrorist attacks. While Türkiye maintains close relations with Ahmed al-Sharaa, the current head of Syria’s government and a former leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Islamist rebel group previously aligned with al-Qaeda, Israel has moved to create a large security buffer zone in southern Syria, extending out well beyond the Golan Heights. Ankara, which is looking to become the major player in Syria, has offered military and security assistance to the Syrian government in the form of basing, training, and equipment and also maintains close ties to groups like the Syrian National Army (SNA), often described as a Turkish proxy force.

Although tensions between Türkiye and Israel have been deteriorating since October 7, the situation escalated last week after Israel bombed several bases in Syria which Türkiye had reportedly offered to use and upgrade, according to media in the region. Türkiye viewed the attack, which Syria stated wounded dozens of soldiers and civilians, as a threat to Turkish security. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated

last week: “We cannot watch Syria be exposed one more time to domestic turmoil, to an operation, a provocation that would threaten Türkiye’s national security.”

Due to the severity of the Israel-Türkiye dispute, U.S. President Donald Trump offered to mediate between the two countries during Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to the White House last week. President Trump praised Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan for being “very smart” during the meeting, suggesting that his relationship with the leader could help avoid an escalation of the conflict. Some have criticized Trump’s praise of the autocratic Erdogan, particularly in the aftermath of the detention of his main opposition rival, Ekrem Imamoglu, and the subsequent unrest in Türkiye. In his offer to mediate between the two countries, Trump also directly addressed Israel’s role, telling Netanyahu that he has “to be reasonable” for a deal to take place.

After last week’s meeting, U.S. defense officials have reportedly informed their Israeli counterparts that the U.S. plans to begin a phased troop withdrawal from Syria within two months, according to Israeli newspaper Ynet news. The recent tentative agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa, which was partly facilitated by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), was an important prerequisite for the announcement. The agreement will begin the work of integrating the Kurdish-led SDF into the new Syrian army, key to addressing the future of northeastern Syria and the stabilization and economic recovery of the country more broadly. The area is controlled by the SDF and includes 95 percent of the country’s oil and gas reserves.

The announcement also fulfills a long-promised, yet unfulfilled, campaign talking point of President Trump to end “forever wars”. He abruptly ordered the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria in both 2018 and 2019 during his first presidency. Yet, both times he was convinced to leave a residual force in Syria, reportedly between 200-400 troops. Anonymous reports, as well as subsequent revelations of former Syrian Envoy Jim Jeffery, suggest that the number was much higher – potentially upwards of 900 troops. The U.S. announced late last year that it had roughly doubled the number of troops in Syria to around 2,000. U.S. troops are stationed at several key points in eastern and northern Syria, playing a stabilizing role.

Reports suggest that Israel is trying to prevent a complete U.S. withdrawal, fearing that its absence will further embolden Türkiye and spur its efforts to seize strategic military assets in Syria. President Erdogan has capitalized on the shifting regional dynamics – including apparent U.S. retrenchment – to further assert Türkiye’s status a regional power player. Türkiye’s ambitions and its desire to step into a power vacuum left by the U.S. are not solely limited to the region, however, and the country, with its robust arms industry and NATO membership, has presented itself as a relatively ideal defense alternative to Europe in the face of an uncertain U.S. partnership.

Further, a full withdrawal of U.S. troops could also provide space for a resurgent Islamic State, which has shown a renewed vigor in post-Assad Syria, according to both UN and U.S. officials. Although Islamic State has not grown near to its height in 2014, including its control of territory, there is a risk that the group could successfully attempt to free thousands of its ideologically-hardened fighters held in prisons guarded by the U.S.-backed SDF. Between 9,000 and 10,000 Islamic State fighters and approximately 40,000 of their family members – 95 percent of whom are women and children – are detained in northeastern Syria. The prisons and camps have become protracted humanitarian situations, often lacking access to basic services, and, in some cases, are incubators for radicalization. Facilitating prison breaks would not only provide an important propaganda moment, aiding recruitment efforts, but would also free experienced fighters ready to rejoin the organization.

Whether the Azerbaijan meeting results in a sustained de-escalation between Türkiye and Israel remains to be seen, as the countries’ competing interests may potentially stifle mediation efforts. Türkiye believes it is entitled to its influence in post-Assad Syria due to Erdogan’s close support and alignment with al-Sharaa and is likely concerned that Israel could derail such ambitions and destabilize the nascent Syrian government. Israel, for its part, remains concerned about al-Sharaa's past ties to al-Qaeda and wants to prevent Syria from being an attack launchpad. Moreover, the country fears that an expansion of Turkish military presence in Syria could potentially limit its operational freedom, including Israeli flights in the region, and pose a threat along the Golan border.  Erdogan’s comments following the Azerbaijan meeting personifies the remaining tensions, accusing Israel of trying to sabotage Syria’s “revolution” and that “anyone seeking to inflict more pain on the Syrian people must be prepared to pay the price.”