April 14, 2025

SHARE |

U.S.-Iran Talks Pass Their First Test

Iranian Foreign Ministry via AP

Iranian and U.S. officials engaged in talks met in Muscat on Saturday, mediated by Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi, who hosted this initial Trump-Iran contact at his home near the Omani capital’s international airport. The two-and-a-half-hour session theoretically satisfied both Iran’s demand for “indirect talks” as well as President Trump’s insistence the two countries talk directly. Busaidi shuttled ideas between the two delegations for the formal talks, but U.S. Special Representative to the Middle East Steven Witkoff and Iran’s lead negotiator, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, reportedly exchanged pleasantries as the two sides were leaving the venue. The Iranian delegation included officials responsible for Iran’s nuclear program, the core issue for any accord, as well as experts on sanctions – particularly the effect of Trump’s restored “maximum pressure” campaign on the beleaguered Iranian economy. The composition of the U.S. delegation beyond Witkoff, if any, was not disclosed by U.S. officials. Witkoff arrived in Muscat following a visit to Russia to meet with President Vladimir Putin on U.S.-led efforts to achieve a settlement of the Ukraine war, demonstrating the reach of Witkoff’s portfolio. Witkoff has also been the lead Trump envoy working with U.S. allies in the region to achieve a settlement of the Gaza war.

The Muscat talks, which both Tehran and the White House described as “constructive” and “positive,” resulted in agreement to reconvene next Saturday. Omani officials told regional media outlets they would again mediate the talks, but the venue might be moved to Europe, which is more equidistant between Tehran and Washington. Meeting in Europe also facilitates Witkoff’s efforts to work with U.S. partners there to exchange ideas with Tehran. The UK, France, and Germany (as well as Russia and China) are parties to the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear accord (JCPOA) that Trump seeks to replace with a “stronger, better” deal with the Iranians.

Few specifics of the Muscat discussions were released by either side, but the meeting appeared to focus on outlining a negotiating process and timetable for achieving an interim accord that would provide time for the complex negotiations needed to reach a final pact. Trump had set a two-month deadline for an agreement – a short timeframe intended to prevent what many experts assess will be an Iranian effort to drag out the negotiations. However, it appears the two-month timeline might apply to reaching an interim deal, perhaps along the lines of a “freeze-for-freeze” plan discussed repeatedly during past impasses. Under that temporary plan, Iran would not enlarge its stockpiles of enriched uranium – now estimated at enough to produce six nuclear weapons, if enriched further – and the U.S. would agree not to further expand its sanctions campaign against the Iranian economy.

The Muscat meeting was characterized as a “success” in part because the two sides downplayed their sharpest differences – over their opposing visions of the end stage for Iran’s nuclear program. Many Trump officials and the key U.S. regional partner, Israel, view Iran’s uranium enrichment program as a cover for an effort to eventually produce nuclear weapons, should Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei decide to do so. Most of the officials in Trump’s foreign policy team join Israel’s Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu in insisting that, in contrast to the 2015 JCPOA, which Trump exited in 2018 as insufficiently strict, any new agreement requires Iran to fully dismantle its uranium enrichment program. National Security Adviser Michael Waltz said on CBS’s “Face the Nation” in March that: “Iran has to give up its program in a way that the entire world can see…This isn't some kind of, you know, kind of tit-for-tat that we had under the Obama administration or Biden…This is the full program. Give it up or there will be consequences." Prime Minister Netanyahu met with Trump last Monday, sitting alongside him in the Oval Office as he announced the U.S.-Iran meeting in Muscat. Netanyahu has insisted that any new Iran agreement resemble the “Libya model” – the concession by then Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi, under U.S. pressure, to dismantle its entire nuclear program.

Yet, perhaps in order to ensure the Muscat meeting’s success, Witkoff adhered to his March 21 statement that the U.S. seeks a “verification program” to ensure the non-diversion of Iran’s nuclear energy program. That formulation is far less stringent than an insistence on full dismantlement and is an arrangement Tehran has previously expressed openness towards. Araghchi suggested Trump might have softened his demands upon recognizing that full dismantlement is a non-started for Tehran. Araghchi hinted he restated Tehran’s non-negotiable objection to that outcome in Muscat, telling journalists, “I elaborated Iran's viewpoints in a firm yet forward-looking manner.” Still, it is unclear whether Witkoff’s positioning in Muscat reflected an effort to ensure the Muscat talks did not break down, or an intent by Trump to compromise on his longstanding demands about the end stage of a nuclear accord with Tehran.

One unnamed Iranian political source told Amwaj media he attributed the success in Muscat to the fact that “no threatening language was used” by Witkoff – a reference to Trump’s threats to use military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities if no agreement is reached. U.S. officials and many outside experts claimed a U.S. military buildup in the region, coupled with Trump’s public threats, drove Iran to the bargaining table in Muscat. Iran agreed to enter into negotiations with Trump despite repeated expressions of distrust of U.S. intentions by the Supreme Leader. When addressing the issue of talks with Washington, Khamenei always makes reference to Trump’s 2018 exit from the JCPOA, even though the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was certifying Iran’s compliance with the accord.

Yet, other members of the Trump team did not withdraw the threat of force, should the talks fail. On Sunday, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated: “The President is very serious that if we don’t reach agreement at the negotiating table, we will resort to other options, including the Department of Defense, to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear bomb. We hope we don’t reach that point, but what we are doing with the Houthis (referring to the Trump team’s consistent bombing of Houthi targets) and the region has demonstrated that our capabilities extend far and strike deeply and powerfully. I repeat, we do not want to do that, but if we have to, we will do it to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear bomb.” The Hegseth comments might undo the relief expressed by Omani and other regional leaders that the decision by Washington and Tehran to continue talking eased the threat of another regional war. The U.S.-Iran meetings furthermore do not resolve whether Israel, which insists Iran’s nuclear program is an “existential threat,” might strike Iran’s nuclear facilities to prevent Iran from obtaining a working nuclear weapon – and with or without explicit U.S. approval for Tel Aviv’s action. Israel asserts it has a sovereign right to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.

U.S.-Iran talks, as they progress, face additional challenges that might have been sidestepped in Muscat. Trump’s team has indicated that any new deal will need to place restrictions not only on Iran’s nuclear program but also on its production of extended-range ballistic missiles and its support for armed non-state actors in the region. Araghchi and other Iranian leaders have repeatedly ruled out broadening the talks to include those issues and Witkoff outwardly focused only on nuclear issues in Muscat. Some accounts indicate there might be room for compromise on these issues, particularly insofar as key Iran-backed actors, including Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas, have suffered significant setbacks from recent Israeli military action. And, a key Iranian ally, President Bashar al-Assad, has been toppled from power by Sunni Islamists vowing to prevent Iran from rebuilding its influence in Syria or using Syrian territory to resupply Hezbollah. The missile issue is potentially thornier, because Tehran considers its missile arsenal a cornerstone of its regional deterrent and refuses any binding restrictions on that program.

Differences over U.S. sanctions relief present another major threat to any agreement. Iran is demanding a new accord that provides more extensive sanctions relief than was contained in the original JCPOA. Trump and his team have cited sanctions relief as precipitating the first-term decision to exit the accord, claiming the sanctions easing provided Tehran with the funds it needed to support its regional allies against U.S interests, forces, and allies. Even if Iran accepts many other Trump demands, providing that level of sanctions relief would open Trump to criticism that he accepted a deal no better than the one negotiated by President Obama. Trump abrogated the JCPOA because, in his view, it was “One of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into.”