September 23, 2024

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Israeli Escalation Against Hezbollah Risks Wider War

AP Photo/Baz Ratner

Israel’s leadership appears emboldened by recent intelligence and military operations against Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran, and other actors to escalate an offensive against the Lebanese organization. However, U.S., regional, and global officials are warning Israel of the costs and risks of further offensive action as they seek to de-escalate regional conflict resulting from the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel.

As the Israeli war effort against Hamas in the Gaza Strip has evolved into a low-intensity counterinsurgency operation, Israeli leaders are turning their full attention to the threat posed by Lebanese Hezbollah. The group has engaged in mostly tit-for-tat cross border exchanges with Israeli forces since the October 7 Hamas incursion in an effort to tie down Israeli forces and relieve pressure on its Axis of Resistance partner in Gaza. The exchanges have caused an estimated 60,000 civilians in Israel, and more than 95,000 in southern Lebanon, to leave their homes to avoid the crossfire. The displacement has led to mounting political pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to pressure Hezbollah to cease its shelling and redeploy its forces away from the Israel-Lebanon border. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, already formally bans Hezbollah from operating in the areas near the border with Israel, but the Resolution has not been enforced by the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) or the Lebanese Armed Forces. Last week, Israel’s security cabinet—the top national security decision-making body of the country—formally updated Israel’s objectives of the war in Gaza to include the return of the residents of the north securely to their homes.

The security cabinet’s declaration of intent both reflected and foreshadowed escalating Israeli intelligence and military operations against the group. Israel killed Hezbollah’s top military commander, Fuad Shukr, in a targeted strike on the southern suburb of Beirut July 30.

In late August, Israel conducted a broad pre-emptive strike on Hezbollah’s missile and armed drone arsenal to disrupt what Israeli and U.S. officials said was an imminent major retaliation by Hezbollah for Shukr’s death. In response, Hezbollah launched several hundred rockets and other weapons directed at, among other targets, a key Israeli base, but Israeli officials stated the barrage was mostly intercepted and did no significant damage. Perhaps emboldened by what they perceived as increasing success against Hezbollah operatives and installations, last week, Israel proceeded to activate a long-planned and complex intelligence operation that detonated personal communication devices held by Hezbollah fighters and facilitators throughout Lebanon, killing 37 and wounding more than 3,000.

On Friday, another major Israeli airstrike in Beirut killed Ibrahim Aqil, the top leader of Hezbollah’s Radwan unit, as well as several other Radwan commanders. On Saturday, U.S National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan called the killing of Aqil “a good outcome,” reflecting the apparent U.S. view that Hezbollah, despite its entrenchment in Lebanon’s politics and society, remains a militant organization linked to Iran’s regional strategy. Referencing his alleged role in the 1983 bombings of the U.S. Marine barracks and U.S. Embassy in Beirut, for which a $7 million U.S. reward for his capture was offered, Sullivan added: “That individual has American blood on his hands and has a Rewards for Justice price on his head. And he is somebody who the United States promised long ago we would do everything we could to see brought to justice.” Hezbollah has vowed to retaliate for the Israeli actions, and experts assess that its vast, Iran-supplied arsenal of missiles, rockets, and armed drones can do significant damage, Israel’s sophisticated defenses notwithstanding.

Despite the risks of Hezbollah retaliation, the Netanyahu government appears intent on continuing its escalation until the group agrees to redeploy from the Israel-Lebanon border. The Israeli leadership might also be pursuing additional goals, including degrading Hezbollah’s military infrastructure and arsenal, incapacitating and disrupting its command structure, and weakening the group’s grip over internal Lebanese political and security affairs. Mairav Zonszein, the International Crisis Group’s senior analyst on Israel, was quoted as saying Israel is trying to “peel away Hezbollah’s abilities, take apart its confidence, restore its deterrence, and see if it can be successful in getting Hezbollah to break this Gaza front…” Yet, Hezbollah is so deeply embedded in Lebanon’s political, social, economic, and security structure that most experts assess that Israel is militarily incapable of crippling the group to any significant extent.

A major question is whether Israel might escalate to the point of a ground incursion into Lebanon to force Hezbollah units off the border. Journalists reported last week that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were moving substantial quantities of ground armor up to the northern border with Lebanon. It is possible the diminished operational tempo of the Gaza war has enabled the IDF to refresh itself to the point where it is ready to undertake ground operations inside Lebanon. However, a ground operation against an organization as well-armed as Hezbollah could produce large numbers of IDF casualties, and it is not clear Israeli leaders intend to escalate to this level. The Israeli ground offensive against Hezbollah in their 2006 war was inconclusive, and raised questions about IDF preparedness, training, and leadership at that time. Any thoughts of an offensive followed by an occupation are likely off the table given the memories of Israel’s eighteen-year occupation of southern Lebanon (1982-2000), especially given the negative reaction this would engender throughout the region.

Observing a potential spiral into a much larger Israel-Hezbollah conflict, which might conceivably bring Iran or other actors into the fighting, regional leaders are looking to U.S. officials to compel Netanyahu and his allies to de-escalate. However, it is not clear that American officials are willing to use all elements of U.S. leverage to compel the Israeli government to alter course, particularly with six weeks to go until the November presidential election. No U.S. official has indicated consideration of withholding any arms or aid to Israel unless it lessens attacks on the group. Reflecting the apparent perception among Israeli leaders that U.S. officials will not act to constrain their actions against Hezbollah, Netanyahu and his top aides appear to have largely dismissed U.S. appeals to stand down in the north. The relatively modest U.S. diplomatic pressure on Israel, with respect to Hezbollah, stands in contrast to Washington’s intensive and consistent engagement with Netanyahu and his associates to achieve a ceasefire and war termination in Gaza—an issue that appears to be far more salient in the upcoming U.S. presidential election than Israel-Hezbollah conflict.

Last Monday, Netanyahu met with U.S. Presidential Special Envoy Amos Hochstein and, according to an official Netanyahu social media (X) account: “…made it very clear that it will not be possible to return our residents without a fundamental change in the security situation in the north.” Reflecting Netanyahu’s apparent intent to resist U.S. pressure, the prime minister’s official account added that he told Hochstein: “…while Israel appreciates and respects the support of the U.S., it will—ultimately—do what is necessary to safeguard its security and return the residents of the north securely to their homes.”

Still, U.S. officials have indicated the northern border issue remains open, and they continue to hope to dissuade the prime minister from further escalation. Their messages to their Israeli counterparts stress the risks of Hezbollah retaliation, including the potential for widening the war to include Iran and other adversarial actors. In comments on September 20, the White House Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa, Brett McGurk, said the U.S. shares Israel’s objective of returning Israelis to their homes in the north, but disagrees that a war in Lebanon is the way to achieve the objective. McGurk added he is “confident that through diplomacy, deterrence and other means, we'll work our way out of it…we want a diplomatic settlement in the north. That is the objective, and that's what we're working towards."

Hezbollah’s retaliation over the weekend remained within the parameters of its current strategy, with the objective of regaining lost ground while expanding the rules of engagement yet avoiding a full-scale conflict. Their response also implied that Israel's efforts to bring northern residents back to their homes could instead prompt a further exodus, potentially reaching as far as Haifa.

Hezbollah demonstrated its military capability by striking strategic targets, including the Ramat David airbase and Rafael, a key defense technology manufacturer. Notably, they positioned these actions as a response to an incident involving pagers or walkie-talkie communications, while suggesting that they have yet to fully retaliate for the assassination of leaders from the elite Radwan unit.

Several notable aspects of this weekend’s operations underscore their strategic intent. First, Hezbollah deployed previously unused weapons and extended their reach, targeting locations approximately 50 kilometers beyond the border. Second, their response came within 48 hours—significantly faster than the usual month-long delay—demonstrating that their operational and military capacities remain undeterred by recent Israeli offensives. Third, the timing of the attack was important as it came immediately, following a day of intense Israeli bombardment in Lebanon, signaling that Israel’s preemptive strikes did not prevent Hezbollah from successfully launching its missiles.

Hezbollah may further escalate its attacks on additional towns and cities in northern Israel, aiming to demonstrate that Israel’s operations against the group have not restored stability in the region. The militant group seeks to convey that Israel's recent efforts have neither deterred Hezbollah's military operations in support of Hamas in Gaza nor encouraged the return of displaced residents to the north. Instead, these developments may drive even more civilians from their homes. Both Hezbollah and Israel are now operating under a significantly altered framework of engagement, with multiple red lines already breached, pushing the region closer to a wider conflict.