September 19, 2024

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Gaza Ceasefire Talks Stall on Fundamental Differences

Abir Sultan/Pool via AP

The negotiations on a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and return of Israeli hostages still held by Hamas appear to have become mired over fundamentally divergent Israeli and Hamas visions of their respective futures. Outwardly, both sides have blamed each other for “moving the goalposts” on relatively minor issues to obscure their basic concerns over the terms on which the Gaza war will end. Over the past week, Hamas has increased its demands for the number of Palestinian prisoners Israel would release under any deal. Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has hardened his insistence that Israel not be required to cede control of the narrow border strip (Philadelphi Corridor) that separates Gaza from Egypt. Hamas and many regional commentators have blamed U.S. officials for refusing to utilize U.S. leverage on Israel to compel Netanyahu to accept the compromises offered.

U.S., Qatari, and Egyptian mediators are expressing growing frustration at the prospects for ending the Gaza war. The latest rounds of talks among mediators and representatives of Israel and Hamas, which took place in Doha, by all accounts made little progress. On September 11, Hamas said its negotiations team emphasized to Qatari and Egyptian leaders that Hamas "see[s] positively reaching a ceasefire agreement that will include the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the entire Gaza Strip." However, negotiators failed to persuade Hamas to give up its demands for a broader Palestinian prisoner release. Senior American officials said that these new Hamas demands are the main obstacle in the current negotiations.

Other mediators cited Prime Minister Netanyahu's insistence on Israeli control over the Egypt-Gaza border as the main hindrance to an agreement. Netanyahu’s critics assert his insistence that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) remain in the Philadelphi Corridor – the narrow strip of land between Gaza and Egypt – is a cover for his more fundamental rejection of a ceasefire and war termination agreement. Egyptian officials, in particular, claimed Netanyahu’s concerns about the potential for new weapons shipments to reach Hamas, from across the Egyptian border, are unfounded. They cited an Israeli army investigation that found that the nine tunnels that cross the Gaza border into Sinai had been blocked by Egypt prior to the October 7 Hamas-led attack and ensuing war. None of the nine tunnels were believed to have been used for smuggling. The IDF assesses that most of Hamas’ weapons production took place in the Gaza Strip, with the materials Hamas used smuggled through above-ground border crossings.

The difficulty in completing the talks - even as senior U.S. officials have said repeatedly in recent weeks that a deal is “close” - has prompted U.S. officials to consider offering a final “take-it-or-leave-it” proposal to close the gaps between the parties. However, the failure of the latest round of negotiations in Doha reportedly has caused the United States to reassess whether there is a point in presenting a new proposal as Hamas and Israel both take tougher positions in negotiations.

Yet, it is likely the failure to achieve a ceasefire and hostage release agreement after many months of intensive negotiations reflects fundamental differences that transcend the number of prisoners to be released and specific Israeli military positioning. Rather, both sides see some of the existing provisions of a potential agreement as existential and non-negotiable threats. Hamas has consistently demanded any agreement provide for a complete end to the war and an IDF withdrawal from all of the Gaza Strip. The intent of that demand, Israeli leaders believe, is to position Hamas to recover from its losses at the hands of the IDF and reassert political and security control of Gaza. Surviving the war, in the view of Hamas leaders, will enable the group to exploit the popularity it has earned among Palestinians for its October 7 attack and dominate Palestinian politics thereafter.

Netanyahu and his allies, for their part, seem willing to parry pressure from the families of the remaining Israeli hostages to insist on pursuing the offensive in Gaza until Hamas is more thoroughly degraded militarily and politically. Despite advice from the Israeli security establishment that the war effort’s additional gains would be limited, the prime minister has expressed an unwillingness to agree to a permanent end to IDF operations in Gaza.

Underpinning Netanyahu’s insistence on permanent IDF access to the enclave is his apparent lack of trust in U.S.-led efforts to assemble political and security arrangements for “the day after” in Gaza. Israeli leaders often cite the failure of a UN peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon - UNIFIL- to carry out the mandate under UN Security Council Resolution 1701 to prevent Lebanese Hezbollah from operating up to the border with Israel. Recent events in Lebanon with the suspected Mossad attack emplacing explosives in the pagers and walkie-talkies further underscore Israel's growing sense of urgency to engage Hezbollah. Netanyahu and his close associates reportedly believe that any outside peacekeeping force in Gaza will fail to prevent Hamas from regenerating its political and military control over the Gaza Strip and re-emerging as a significant threat to Israeli security. Top Israeli leaders broadly, but Netanyahu in particular, have rejected U.S. and Arab official suggestions that security forces and administrators of the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority (PA) assume responsibility for post-war Gaza.

Israeli leaders also cite statements by Arab leaders conditioning their participation in a post-war peacekeeping force on the formation – or at least a clear roadmap towards – an independent Palestinian state. Israeli officials maintain the October 7 Hamas attack has shifted Israeli public opinion even further from supporting a Palestinian state than was the case prior, viewing that outcome as constituting a “reward” for the October 7 incursion. With no movement toward Israeli acceptance of a Palestinian state, Israeli officials argue, there are no prospects to assemble an interim Arab-led peacekeeping force for post-war Gaza.

Several statements by regional leaders over the past week appear to have reinforced Israel’s argument that no viable alternative to perpetual IDF control over Gaza is materializing. On September 14, United Arab Emirates (UAE) Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan issued a tweet stating: “The United Arab Emirates is not ready to support the day after the war in Gaza without the establishment of a Palestinian state.” The UAE has emerged as a significant donor of humanitarian aid to wartime Gaza and U.S. officials have long hoped UAE forces would contribute to an interim Arab-led peacekeeping force for post-war Gaza.

The UAE’s reiteration of its conditionality coincided with similar statements by leading Saudi figures. On September 14, Prince Turki Al-Faisal, former head of the Kingdom’s intelligence services, spoke at the London-based Chatham House and warned that there will be no normalization of ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel until an independent Palestinian state is established. Although Prince Turki’s comments did not refer specifically to post-war Gaza, his statements reflected official Saudi leadership thinking that the Kingdom would not help Israel stabilize or rebuild post-war Gaza as long as Israeli leaders categorically reject the establishment of a Palestinian state.

With few, if any, signs of a plan emerging to establish a post-Hamas governing and security authority in Gaza, it appears likely the IDF will continue to operate in Gaza for many more months, or longer. U.S. leaders have urged Israeli leaders that Gaza must not be allowed to become “another Mogadishu” – a reference to a lawless, ungoverned space with minimal access for humanitarian organizations. But, in the absence of a clear alternative, Israeli leaders appear to favor the Mogadishu scenario in Gaza to an alternative that yields power to Palestinian or other regional leaders they do not view as capable of preventing Hamas’ re-emergence.