INTELBRIEF
October 8, 2024
Iran and Israel Evaluate Escalatory Options
Bottom Line up Front
- Israel is weighing U.S. entreaties to calibrate its response to an October 1 Iranian missile barrage to minimize the potential for an all-out war against Iran.
- No matter what targets Israel strikes, Iran is vowing to respond, increasing the likelihood of spiraling escalation and the likely further involvement of U.S. forces.
- Israel has long sought to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities, but U.S. officials insist on managing Iran’s nuclear program through established diplomatic channels and processes.
- While some believe that Iran might refocus its national security strategy from supporting its “Axis of Resistance” partners toward developing a nuclear deterrent, which would have widespread implications throughout the region, Tehran has consistently separated the issues and has argued that they are not mutually exclusive.
In the year since the October 7 Hamas attack, Israel and Iran have moved beyond their decade-long “shadow war” of tit-for-tat intelligence operations against each other’s interests to direct conflict bordering on sustained, all-out war. As a consequence, Iranian and Israeli leaders are each searching for “escalation dominance” against the other. Israel’s Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu seeks, through military operations against Hamas and Hezbollah, to break what is widely perceived as Iran’s “ring of fire” around Israel. Iranian leaders view their support for Hamas, Hezbollah, militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthi movement in Yemen as a non-negotiable “unity of fronts” strategy to pressure Israel into ending its occupation of Palestinian territories. To demonstrate that it is willing and able to come to its allies’ defense and that significant concessions to Israel’s demands are not warranted, on two occasions in 2024, Iran launched significant missile barrages against Israel. The attacks, the latter of which came days after Israel struck and killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, have been intended not only to reinforce Iran’s allies, but also to demonstrate that Tehran is willing and able to cause major destruction inside Israel with its own capabilities.
In the October 1 Iranian barrage, more missiles penetrated Israel’s sophisticated defenses than did in the April 13 Iranian missile strike. However, in both cases, the brunt of the attack was intercepted by Israel, helped by U.S. forces and some Arab partner countries, and caused little material damage. Global diplomats fear that the relative failure of both Iranian missile strikes - although constituting only a small portion of Iran’s estimated arsenal of more than 3,000 ballistic missiles – might embolden Israel as it prepares to retaliate for October 1.
In line with its longstanding doctrine of responding to attacks with overwhelming force, Israeli officials reportedly are discussing with their U.S. counterparts a number of possible Iranian targets – each of which would send different messages about Israel’s intended goals. U.S. officials, including the commander of U.S. Central Command Michael Kurilla, who visited Israel on Saturday, are counseling that Israel’s retaliation be proportional and demonstrate a measure of restraint. U.S. leaders continue to assert that all-out regional war remains avoidable if Israel’s response is measured. Prime Minister Netanyahu and his aides, although repeatedly refusing to defer to Washington, reportedly do weigh U.S. advice when formulating strategy.
A “proportional” Israeli response might target only Iranian military assets, for example the bases and facilities from which Iran’s missiles and armed drones are produced and launched. Other purely military options might include Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) command centers, Iranian combat aircraft, the Russia-supplied S-300 air defense system, and perhaps Iranian naval vessels in and around the Persian Gulf.
U.S. leaders have counseled Israel not to target high-value economic assets such as oil and gas facilities. Doing so is likely to cause a spike in world energy prices as well as potentially cause large numbers of Iranian civilian casualties. U.S. officials and leaders in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf are concerned an Israeli strike on Iranian energy facilities could prompt Iranian retaliation not only against similar facilities in Israel but also against Gulf energy installations. Gulf leaders have sought to remain engaged with Iranian leaders since October 7, 2023, and reiterated the intent to retain ties to Tehran even as Israel escalated its battle against Hezbollah’s leadership.
Perhaps hoping to intimidate and deter Netanyahu, deputy IRGC commander Ali Fadavi said Iran would strike Israeli energy and gas installations if Israel attacked similar facilities in Iran. He stated: "If the occupiers make such a mistake, we will target all their energy sources, installations, and all refineries and gas fields," according to the semi-official Iranian news agency SNN. A senior figure in the Iran-aligned Iraqi militia Kata’ib Hezbollah warned that: “if the energy war begins, the world will lose 12 million barrels of oil per day. Either everyone will enjoy the blessings of energy, or everyone will be deprived.” Within Israel, experts note the potential for Iran to severely damage Israel’s vital energy sector by launching a retaliatory strike against Israel’s power plants, oil and natural gas fields, refineries, and desalination plants, which supply 50 percent of Israel's domestic water needs.
An Israeli move up the escalation ladder - for example, by striking high-profile government sites, including the Iranian presidential complex and the compound hosting the office of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei - would suggest Washington was unable to prevail on Israel’s leadership to restrain its response. An attack of that scope would be certain to unleash as large a response as Tehran is able to muster, particularly if a senior Iranian leader is killed. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said during a Saturday visit to Syria that Iran’s response to an Israeli attack would be “stronger and more severe” than Israel’s strike. The comments echoed remarks in Supreme Leader Khamenei’s rare Friday prayer sermon at Tehran University on October 4 saying Iran will not "procrastinate nor act hastily to carry out its duty" in confronting Israel, adding that the missile attack on Israel (October 1) was "legal and legitimate."
The potential for an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities remains front and center among analysts. U.S. President Joe Biden pointedly told journalists last week the United States opposes an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities – widely considered among the highest rung on the escalation ladder. Asserting an Iranian nuclear weapon would constitute an “existential threat,” Israeli leaders have built a large intelligence file on Iran’s nuclear facilities. However, some of Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities, particularly the Fordow facility, are hardened and at least partially embedded in mountains. Experts assess Israel likely cannot destroy Iran’s nuclear program, and an Israeli strike on these facilities would inevitably necessitate U.S. involvement to ensure Iran’s nuclear capabilities could not easily be reconstituted. In seeking to dissuade Israel from such a strike, U.S. leaders assert that Iran’s nuclear program is a global issue under the purview of the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). U.S. officials argue there remains room for diplomacy to restore Iran’s adherence to agreed curbs on its program, such as those contained in the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear agreement (JCPOA).
Some experts assess that, whether or not Israel strikes any Iranian nuclear facilities, U.S. and allied officials need to concentrate their focus on Iran’s nuclear program in the context of escalating regional warfare. Experts and some officials argue that the damage Israel has caused to both Hamas and Hezbollah, coupled with Tehran’s inability to demonstrate the effectiveness of its missile arsenal, might cause Iranian leaders to conclude Iran’s security can be assured only by acquiring a deliverable nuclear weapon. At the same time, many Iranian strategists argue that a concerted drive toward a nuclear weapon would increase the potential for a large Israeli or U.S. strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, trigger even more comprehensive U.S.-led sanctions, derail Iranian efforts toward rapprochement and cooperation with the Gulf states and stimulate Saudi Arabia or other Gulf countries to develop nuclear weapons, leading to an arms race in one of the most unstable and highly volatile regions in the world.
Whereas an Iranian drive for a nuclear weapon remains hypothetical, all indications are that the Supreme Leader remains committed to the Axis of Resistance and the unity of fronts strategy, at least for now. In his Friday prayer sermon on October 4, Khamenei stated: "Our resistant people in Lebanon and Palestine, all these testimonies and spilled blood will not shake your will, but rather strengthen your steadfastness.” Foreign Minister Araghchi stated, during his visit to Syria: “My visit to Damascus and Beirut is a message that Iran will always stand by the resistance under any circumstances.” Whether Tehran remains committed to its unity of fronts approach - or abandons it in favor of an alternative - might depend on the degree to which Hamas and Hezbollah can survive and recover from Israel’s ongoing offensives.