October 21, 2024

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U.S. and Israel at Odds on Way Forward After Sinwar’s Death

AP Photo, File

Israel’s killing of top Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in Rafah, Gaza, has apparently not closed the wide gap between the strategies of U.S. and Israeli leaders on an end-game for the conflict raging in the region. Landing in Berlin late last week, after Israel confirmed Sinwar’s death, President Biden, referring not only to the war in Gaza but also the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, stated firmly: “It is time for this war to end.” Attempting to use the death of Sinwar to accomplish the longstanding objective to wind down the post-October 7 regional warfare, Biden said he had called Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, with whom relations have been strained, to urge him to “move on” from the conflicts against Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Iran itself, which supports both non-state actors and others.

Washington has long hoped to achieve regional de-escalation before the November 5 U.S. presidential election. Many voters have questioned the U.S. inability, despite being Israel’s largest financial and military backer, to compel Israel to avoid Palestinian and Lebanese civilian casualties and facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid to Gaza. At the same time, reflecting the longstanding U.S. alliance with Israel, senior U.S. officials both congratulated Israel and claimed a degree of credit for providing it with U.S. intelligence that might have contributed to cornering Sinwar. While often critical of Israel’s tactics in Gaza that have led to more than 40,000 Palestinian deaths (including militants), U.S. officials have generally supported Israel’s operations against Hezbollah, which U.S. officials view and much of the U.S. public as a terrorist movement that has harnessed Lebanon to its pro-Iranian goals to destroy Israel. Israeli operations in Lebanon have caused several thousand deaths there.

Addressing the Israeli people after Sinwar’s death was confirmed, Netanyahu largely dashed Washington’s hopes that the killing would convince Israel to change course, saying: “The war [in Gaza] is not over.” Netanyahu’s comments clearly indicated he rejects the reported U.S. effort to seize on the Sinwar killing to promote a multi-front de-escalation consisting of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas as well as Hezbollah, an exchange of remaining Israeli hostages in Gaza for Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, and an Israeli decision to stand down on any retaliation for the Iranian missile strike on October 1. Some press reports indicate that U.S. officials, cognizant of Netanyahu’s likely rejection of a broad de-escalation, are pressing a more modest proposal for a brief “pause” in fighting in Gaza and the release by Hamas of remaining hostages.

The U.S. difficulty converting Israel’s recent military successes into an agreement by Israel to end its offensives on various fronts is inherent in the seemingly irreconcilable perceptions of the two governments. Netanyahu and his associates believe the achievements of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in decapitating the Hamas and Hezbollah leadership vindicate their insistence on pursuing “victory” over both adversaries. Israeli leaders perceive they have, to a large extent, extinguished the Iran-constructed “ring of fire” around Israel, rendering Iran’s regime itself without a viable deterrent and vulnerable to military pressure. The relative failure of two major Iranian missile barrages against Israel thus far in 2024 (April and October) has reinforced the Israelis’ perception that Tehran is weak and that Israel is in a position to affirm “escalation dominance” over Tehran.

The U.S. view that Israel’s policy, despite its successes, lacks a strategic “end game” is based on its past experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam, and elsewhere, in which only a credible post-war governance and security plan can prevent insurgent and terrorist organizations from regrouping to fight on indefinitely. On all the fronts throughout the region, U.S. officials, backed by a wide range of experts, have argued to Israeli leaders that it is not possible to “eliminate” either Hamas or Hezbollah as viable armed national movements. Vows by leaders of both groups to continue fighting Israel, even after the decimation of their command structures, would seem to support the U.S. viewpoint.

For Gaza, U.S. leaders question Israel’s repeated rejection of proposals advanced by the United States and several Arab states to end the conflict and ultimately turn over governance and security of Gaza to Palestinians linked to the Palestinian Authority (PA) on the West Bank. Israeli leaders, however, distrust that any multilateral or Palestinian force in Gaza would be able to permanently prevent Hamas from returning to power there. For Lebanon, U.S. officials argue that Hezbollah, having lost much of its arsenal and leadership to Israeli strikes and ground action, is ready to accept a ceasefire and Israel’s demands to withdraw its forces north of the Litani River, in keeping with UN Security Council Resolution 1701 that ended their 2006 conflict. U.S. officials also maintain that Hezbollah’s setbacks provide an opportunity for Lebanon’s other major factions - Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Druze Arabs - to finally agree on a new President (by longstanding agreement a Maronite) who might be willing and able to begin to curb Hezbollah’s autonomy. That post has been vacant for two years because of Hezbollah’s insistence that its ally be selected. Israel counters that it must continue to operate in south Lebanon to further diminish Hezbollah’s ability to launch rocket, missile, and drone barrages at military bases and infrastructure in Israel, some of which have caused IDF losses and substantial damage.

Compounding the differences with Netanyahu over Gaza and Lebanon, President Biden and Vice President and Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris are said to be highly concerned that Netanyahu’s approach to the conflict will yet drag the United States into direct conflict with Iran. The Sinwar killing occurred as Israel reportedly was completing preparations for a significant retaliation against Iran for its October 1 missile barrage against Israel – the scope of which has itself been a source of debate between Israel and the United States for the past several weeks. The Iranian launches were a response primarily to Israel’s air strike on September 27 that killed Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah.

U.S. officials argue a disproportionate strike on Iranian energy infrastructure or nuclear sites would ignite regional warfare by provoking Iranian escalation, which might even include missile attacks by Iran or its allies on the Arab monarchy states of the Persian Gulf. U.S. leaders have sought - and claim they have obtained - assurances that Israel will limit its response, although still likely significant in scale, to military facilities in Iran. However, several close associates of Netanyahu have pushed for a more punishing strike on key Iranian economic targets, and some U.S. officials believe Israel’s retaliatory strike on Iran will be more extensive than Israel is portraying, particularly after Hezbollah’s recent drone attack targeting one of Netanyahu’s homes in Caesarea, Israel over the weekend.

President Biden and Vice President Harris, perhaps hesitant to trigger a U.S. domestic backlash, have not sought to restrain Israel on various fronts by halting U.S. weapons deliveries or aid. Instead, the leaders have apparently opted for an alternative approach – building leverage over Netanyahu by assuring him and his government that U.S. support for Israel is unshakeable. In recent weeks, the U.S. military has announced it will deploy a battery of the advanced THAAD (Theater High-Altitude Area Defense) system in Israel, along with U.S. units that run the weapon. The deployment was reportedly approved following assurances from the Netanyahu government that its retaliatory attack on Iran would be proportionate. Perhaps complicating the matter further, CNN reported that the U.S. is currently investigating a leak of highly classified U.S. intelligence purportedly related to Israel’s preparations to retaliate against Iran, which appeared on a pro-Iranian Telegram channel.

Hours before Sinwar’s death was announced, the Department of Defense revealed it had used B-2 bombers, for the first time since 2017, to strike hardened weapons storage sites in territory controlled by the pro-Iranian Houthi movement in Yemen. Seeming to send a message to Tehran about U.S. capabilities, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stated: “This was a unique demonstration of the United States' ability to target facilities that our adversaries seek to keep out of reach, no matter how deeply buried underground, hardened, or fortified.” The strike, intended to destroy weapons the Houthis have used to attack commercial ships in the Red Sea, also appeared intended to signal Netanyahu that there is no need for Israel to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. The bombing run indicated a U.S. willingness and ability to take out Iran’s nuclear facilities if Iran launches a “break out” attempt to rapidly construct a working nuclear weapon.