November 25, 2024

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Iran Nuclear Program Returns to the Fore as Trump Returns to Office

AP Photo/Heinz-Peter Bader

As Donald Trump prepares to return to the U.S. presidency, Iran’s nuclear program will factor prominently, as it did during his former term, in U.S. strategy to address the Iranian threat to regional stability and U.S. allies throughout the region. Yet, the legacy of the first Trump administration’s withdrawal from the delicately crafted 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) still looms large in Iranian thinking. The pullout renders Iranian leaders skeptical of entering into any new agreements with Trump’s incoming foreign policy team. More practically, Iran reacted to the 2018 U.S. exit from the agreement by expanding its nuclear program significantly, to the point where Iran now has enough enriched uranium for at least four nuclear weapons – if the material were enriched further and Iran was to develop was the needed detonation mechanism. Trump will return to the presidency facing an Iran not only at the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability but also at the center of regional warfare sparked by the attack by Tehran’s ally, Hamas, against Israel on October 7, 2023.

Evidently hoping to avoid intensified U.S. scrutiny when Trump takes office, Iranian officials sought to demonstrate a degree of cooperation with U.N.-backed nuclear monitors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which remains engaged in Iran despite the essential dissolution of the JCPOA. Iran invited IAEA Director-General Mariano Grossi to visit from November 13-15 to work on implementing a March 2023 Iran-IAEA agreement providing for additional Iranian cooperation with the agency. Hoping to head off another censure by the IAEA Board of Governors, Iran offered to refrain from further expanding its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium and accept four IAEA monitors to replace those Iran banned from the country in September 2023. However, European leaders, backed by U.S. officials, viewed Iran’s proposals as purely symbolic, and the Board of Governors voted Thursday to censure Iran for non-cooperation. The European countries that pushed for the censure (Germany, the United Kingdom, and France, composing the so-called “EU-3”) seek to pressure Iran not only for its nuclear advances but to message Tehran that its sales of armed drones to Moscow for use against Ukraine, have cost the Islamic Republic consistent engagement with Europe.

The censure immediately weakened those Iranian officials arguing that compromise and cooperation with the U.S. and its allies could pave the way for a revised nuclear agreement with the Trump administration. Soon after the censure vote, Iran’s officials formally responsible for its nuclear program announced plans to start the operation of new, more advanced centrifuges for enriching uranium. However, Iranian leaders sought to assure the international community that their reaction to the censure did not preclude renewed cooperation going forward, stating that Iran remains open to cooperation with the IAEA.

Iran’s still unchecked nuclear advances set the stage for the EU-3 to work with the incoming Trump administration to trigger a “snap-back” of all U.N. sanctions potentially. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 of 2015, which enshrined the JCPOA in international law, provides for any party to the agreement to snap back all U.N. sanctions if Iran is in non-compliance with the accord. The provision expires in October 2025, when all JCPOA-related restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program end. The expiration would leave in place only those commitments Iran is required to uphold as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Trump has nominated foreign policy officials such as Senator Marco Rubio, tapped to be Secretary of State, and Rep. Michael Waltz, picked to be National Security Advisor, who have expressed support for a snap-back of U.N. sanctions, as well as additional U.S. steps to constrain Iran’s economy. A reinstatement of U.N. sanctions on Iran would, at least formally, bind China to reduce its purchases of Iranian oil. The imports, which reached 1.6 million barrels per day in September, have played a significantly role in Iran’s ability to avoid an economic collapse, despite separate U.S.-led secondary sanctions against buyers of Iran’s oil and exporters of key goods to Iran.

Additional U.N., European, or U.S. sanctions on Tehran will instill greater urgency in the debate among Iranian officials over how to respond to Trump’s return to office and to the setbacks Iran, Hamas, and Lebanese Hezbollah have suffered from Israel’s intensified military campaign. Following Israel’s late September strike that killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, a number of Iranian officials, including several of Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i’s foreign policy advisors, have joined a growing chorus of hardliners arguing for a dramatic change in strategy. They argue Iran might respond to mounting Western and Israeli pressure by reconsidering the Supreme Leader’s formal edict prohibiting the development of a working nuclear weapon.

Those suggesting this course of action insist a nuclear weapon might be the only means to restore deterrence of Israel and the United States and preserve Iran’s sovereignty, prestige, and ability to support its network of regional Axis of Resistance partners. However, the pursuit of a working nuclear weapon is sure to result in conflict not only with Israel but also with the Trump administration, which echoes Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s vow to take any steps necessary to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. During his campaign in October, Trump indicated he would back a decision by Netanyahu to strike Iranian nuclear facilities in retaliation for Iran’s October 1 missile barrage on Israel, saying Israel should "hit the nuclear first and worry about the rest later."

Arguing for a different strategy, despite the IAEA censure vote and Western threats of additional pressure, are those officials who believe a decision to build a nuclear weapon would spark a regional nuclear arms race. Those Iranian figures advocating compromise also assert Iran’s economy cannot withstand additional sanctions or a major conflict, particularly with the United States. Leaders in this camp include reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian, his close ally and Vice President for Strategic Affairs (and former Foreign Minister who negotiated the JCPOA, Mohammad Javad Zarif), and current Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. These Iranian leaders argue it is in Iran’s interests to test Trump’s public insistence that he seeks a revised nuclear deal with Iran and that he intends to end wars rather than start new conflicts.

Yet, Iranian officials arguing to test Trump’s intent claim any new nuclear deal would need to provide Tehran clearer and irrevocable economic benefits, as well as restrain the United States and Israel from attacking its nuclear and energy facilities. The JCPOA lifted restrictions on Iranian sales of oil and other goods and reintegrated Tehran into the international banking system, but kept Iranian banks shut out of the US financial system - thereby constraining Iran’s ability to conduct dollar-denominated transactions.

However, the incoming Trump team of U.S. hardliners are insistent that any new deal requires more sweeping concessions from Tehran – not additional benefits from the U.S. Trump’s foreign policy nominees have all advocated that any new agreement not only prohibit all Iranian enrichment of uranium and eliminate all its existing stockpiles of the material but also contain binding restraints on Iran’s support for its Axis of Resistance allies. Trump’s nominees criticized the 2015 nuclear deal on that same basis – that the agreement only addressed nuclear issues rather than the whole range of Iranian threats and allowed Iran to continue to enrich uranium. Experts assess the broad spectrum of Iranian leaders to resist U.S. demands, viewing them as tantamount to requiring a wholesale dismantlement of the Islamic Republic itself. The second inauguration of President Trump is unlikely to bring Iran and the U.S. any closer to a lasting resolution of longstanding disputes and differences or alter the forecast of most experts for continued conflict.