November 1, 2024

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Hidden Warfare: Iran’s Growing Dependence on Criminal Networks

Henrik Montgomery/TT News Agency via AP

Since 2018, Iran has intensified its use of criminal networks as proxies to conduct attacks abroad, particularly in Europe, as part of its broader national security strategy. A 2024 report by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, authored by Matthew Levitt, analyzes a dataset of Iranian external assassination, surveillance, and abduction plots, and found that over half of all Iranian plots have occurred in Europe between 2021 and 2024. The United Kingdom, Sweden, and the Netherlands have accused Iran of employing local criminal gangs to carry out strikes, including assassination attempts against individuals deemed enemies by Tehran. This transition, extending operations from terrorist proxies to criminal proxies, became apparent following a foiled 2018 Iranian bomb plot in Paris that resulted in the arrest and conviction of an Iranian diplomat. The merging of state power and organized crime is an evolving threat in Iran’s hybrid warfare strategy, one that is both deniable and highly effective, blurring the lines between legitimate governance and criminality.

In Sweden, criminal groups such as Foxtrot and Rumba have been implicated in attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets, including an unexploded grenade found at the Israeli Embassy in Stockholm in 2024 and a shooting outside the embassy involving a 14-year-old suspect. In March 2024, exiled Iranian journalist Pouria Zeraati was non-fatally stabbed in London, with reports indicating that Eastern European criminals hired by the Iranian government were responsible. Moreover, MI5 has identified 20 Iranian-backed plots targeting UK citizens and residents since January 2022, many involving criminal proxies. Similar plots have recently appeared in Germany, France, and Belgium, where Iranian agents have enlisted various criminal groups to conduct surveillance and execute attacks on Jewish and Israeli targets.

The recent surge in alleged hit attempts reflects an escalation in tensions between Iran and Israel, especially following the back-and-forth attacks of the past several months. According to Reuters, at least six of the plots identified in Europe since 2020 have involved Israeli or Jewish targets, with nearly all allegedly involving hired hitmen. Iran's strategy encompasses waging a war of attrition against Israel on multiple fronts. Beyond targeting Israel along its own borders through proxy terrorist organizations and special operatives of the infamous Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) "Qods Force" unit, Tehran has prioritized the destabilization, elimination, and damage of Israeli assets and interests abroad by leveraging organized crime. While initially focused on Iranian dissidents, Iran's use of criminal gangs has expanded to target Israeli and Jewish interests, journalists, LGBTQ+ activists, and others perceived as threats to the regime.

Iran's engagement in extraterritorial practices reflects an autocratic strategy of targeting exiles and diaspora communities to enforce political control and advance its revolutionary ideals. Since its founding, the Islamic Republic has compensated for its conventional military limitations against adversaries like the U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia by developing asymmetric capabilities. While primarily relying on non-state actors to execute its covert foreign policy objectives, including terrorist groups, Iran has evolved this approach by employing European criminal gangs in its grey zone strategy of targeted assassinations. This adaptation leverages embedded criminal networks to evade detection, capitalize on the operational limitations of foreign governments, and maintain regime security.

This transition to criminal syndicates indicates an evolution in Iran's asymmetric warfare approach, influenced by Western intelligence agencies’ increased scrutiny of Iranian operatives. This shift has been intensified by Iran’s broader geopolitical aims. As a revisionist power, Iran seeks to reconfigure the regional and global order by subverting the influence of the United States, Western Europe, and Israel. This ambition to dominate the Middle East underscores Iran's strategic emphasis on subversion and proxy warfare, allowing it to challenge existing power structures without direct military confrontation. Thus, the growing role of transnational organized crime in Iran’s strategy not only underscores its adaptability but also reflects a broader trend of authoritarian regimes incorporating criminal networks into their irregular warfare arsenals amid the new era of strategic competition.

Iran’s integration of criminal networks is rooted in its long-standing role in global illicit markets, with the IRGC, particularly its Qods Force, playing a central role. By leveraging transnational organized crime — including Latin American and Mexican cartels — Tehran generates significant revenue for its proxies, with estimates suggesting Hezbollah alone raises around $300 million annually from illegal activities, many including the Latin American drug trade. The IRGC’s strategic involvement in arms and narcotics trafficking, underscored by its ties to Latin American cartels and the prominent role of Captagon (a drug often called the “the drug of jihad”), supports Iran’s influence within its regional Axis and bolsters the confidence and resources of its affiliates across the Middle East.

These operations grant Iran a competitive advantage in exploiting criminal networks for its geopolitical goals, primarily in the narcotics trade across the Middle East, the U.S., and beyond. The Qods Force has facilitated relationships between criminal syndicates and terrorist groups, establishing a global framework that combines licit and illicit market control, covert finance, and extensive procurement channels. This network not only strengthens Iran’s operational reach in foreign territories but also intensifies social and economic strain in Western societies. Altogether, Iran’s control over drug trafficking and black markets empowers its regional proxies, advancing ideological ambitions while destabilizing Iran's adversaries through a blend of economic leverage and social disruption.

Iran's decision to outsource its operations to criminal groups is driven by strategic considerations. This approach allows Iran to leverage existing infrastructure for illicit activities, minimize risk to Iranian intelligence personnel, access a diverse pool of operatives familiar with local environments, and bypass scrutiny from Western intelligence agencies. Analysts have highlighted that the intensification of grey zone activities in Europe can be attributed to the relative apathy demonstrated by Western powers and their failure to act quickly against these threats. European states are appearing to be increasingly cognizant of the threat, with the European Parliament passing a 2023 resolution calling for the IRGC to be added to the EU terrorist list. However, the cost of engaging in grey zone aggression remains low, encouraging more states to adopt similar tactics. As a result, grey zone conflicts are likely to become increasingly common in the years to come, particularly given the high costs associated with conventional warfare.

Iran’s collaboration with criminal organizations not only advances its geopolitical objectives but also strengthens these groups’ operational capacities and can enable radicalization, furthering the crime-terror nexus convergence of organized crime and terrorism as well as the cooperation between these groups – which complicates detection and enables the potential exportation of extremist ideologies to local criminal networks. By supplying local gangs with financial resources, international connections, and sophisticated tactics, Iranian actions may contribute to an intensification of gang violence. This poses a significant problem as Iran seeks to exploit entrenched criminal networks, particularly evident in its infiltration of Sweden's organized crime landscape, which has been plagued by an epidemic of gang violence. This alliance facilitates logistical cooperation and mutual protection among criminal actors, further obstructing the identification and tracking of suspects. Moreover, Iran’s financial and strategic support likely incentivizes increased gang activity, thereby compounding the threat landscape and potentially destabilizing society as organized crime becomes more pervasive and more closely intertwined with terrorist organizations and state sponsors of terrorism.