December 2, 2024

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Rebel Groups Overrun Aleppo, Reigniting Syrian Civil War and Challenging Assad

AP Photo/Omar Albam

An alliance of Syrian rebel groups launched a significant offensive in Aleppo on Wednesday, November 27, marking a dramatic escalation in the Syrian civil war, which has raged since 2011 but gone through long stretches of semi-dormancy at times in certain parts of the country, particularly over the last several years. The offensive, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) (Organization for the Liberation of the Levant)—a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization with historic ties to Al-Qaeda, since renounced—is led by Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, who was also at the helm of the group’s predecessors, Jabhat al-Nusra (Al-Nusra Front) and then Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (Front for the Conquest of Syria/the Levant). Al-Jolani first swore bayat to then-Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri back in April 2013 before a public fallout and separation four years later. The original group, al-Nusra, was progeny of the split that went on to produce the Islamic State under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

HTS functions as part of a broader coalition called the "Military Operations Command," which was proclaimed in response to alleged escalating attacks by the Syrian army and Iranian-backed militias. Elements of the rebel coalition are backed by Türkiye, which provides funding and equips the rebels to keep pressure on the Assad regime. The rebels' successful entry into Aleppo represents the first such breakthrough since Bashar al-Assad's Syrian government retook the city in 2016. The offensive's scope has also seen numerous villages in Idlib and Aleppo province fall to the forces, as the rebels are pushing south to Hama, Syria’s fourth largest city.

In response to the rebel offensive, Syrian government forces have pulled back from several positions across Aleppo and are reportedly awaiting reinforcements to launch a counteroffensive against the insurgents in the city. Meanwhile, Syrian and Russian forces have conducted limited airstrikes on targets in Aleppo and surrounding areas, which they claim have been captured by terrorist groups. However, the scope of these airstrikes has remained narrow. Russia's relatively limited involvement in Syria so far and its call to "restore order" reflect the fact that Moscow has largely shifted its focus to the war in Ukraine, leaving it with insufficient will and capabilities in Syria to effectively counter the rebel advance. Syria's other key ally, Iran, and its extensive network of proxy groups have also seen their priorities shift over the past two years. The October 7 Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent war between Israel and Hezbollah have diverted Iranian attention and resources away to Lebanon and Israel. Lebanese Hezbollah, a critical Iran-backed group in Syria's conflict and ally to the Assad government, has increasingly focused on its operations in Lebanon, where it has engaged in strikes against Israel. Meanwhile, Tehran has recalibrated its focus toward the escalating conflict with Israel, equally impacting its involvement in Syria. Allies of the Assad regime, including Iranian-backed Iraqi, Afghan, and Pakistani Shia groups are, however, present on the ground to some extent: The Popular Mobilization Forces, an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia, has, for example, reportedly been deployed in the streets around Damascus.

The unexpected success of the operation has caught both analysts and Syrian government forces off guard, with reports indicating that government troops have withdrawn largely from Aleppo and are suffering losses in surrounding areas. This development signals a significant shift in the dynamics of the conflict and raises questions about the stability of territory controlled by the Assad regime and the capabilities of its most prominent allies, Russia and Iran, with Moscow and Tehran embroiled in other conflicts, namely Ukraine for the former and Gaza, Lebanon, and the broader Middle East for the latter. The rebel forces have been able to take over nearly the entire city of Aleppo, a feat they did not accomplish at the height of their power there in 2015. Throughout parts of northwestern Syria, the rebels have started setting up and building upon already established proto-governance structures, indicating their ambition to govern and maintain control. Some of these efforts date back years, with sophisticated attempts to subsidize the cost of food and stabilize the banking and energy sectors in the areas under HTS control. The Kurdish YPG militia, which has also expanded its presence during the Aleppo offensive, has clashed with some rebel forces. According to the Syrian Human Rights Observatory, 277 people have been killed in the northwestern Syria offensive so far.

The Assad regime has faced significant challenges in recent years, including a struggling economy and increasing geopolitical isolation. Assad and his inner circle have turned Syria into a narco-state, fueling the Captagon epidemic throughout the region and relying on the drug trade as an economic lifeline. There is speculation that Damascus’ focus on this illicit trade has distracted it from other pressing issues, including the readiness of its military forces and security services, which suffer from low morale and high levels of corruption. The recent successful rebel offensive in Aleppo underscores the ongoing vulnerabilities of Assad's government. Despite its heavy reliance on external support, particularly from Iran and Russia, Assad’s forces remain weak, with these allies failing to provide the decisive backing needed to counter the opposition's advances. Compounding Assad's difficulties is the deteriorating relationship between Damascus and Tehran, exacerbated by Assad's recent diplomatic outreach to the Gulf states. Efforts to normalize relations have yielded little tangible progress, further straining Syria’s alliances. Despite these challenges, the regime should have anticipated such developments. The Aleppo offensive by rebel forces had apparently been planned for mid-October, initially, but was delayed when Türkiye intervened, altering the timing and dynamics of the conflict. This shift in strategy suggests that the Assad regime's precarious position may be even more fragile than previously thought.

The implications are vast: the largely stagnant battle lines in Syria have shifted dramatically over the course of four days. Additionally, the Syrian civil war, which became the golden opportunity for Sunni extremists to fill the power vacuum, culminating in the declaration of the Islamic State Caliphate in June 2014, renders an objective assessment of the rebels and their goals incredibly important. While there are signs that minorities and non-Sunnis will be respected by even extreme elements of the rebels such as HTS, terrorist organizations’ participation in the offensive causes some alarm. The Uyghur-led Turkestan Islamic Party, for example, has said it was involved in the insurgent offensive, a development sure to cause concern in Beijing. To safeguard legitimacy and prevent atrocities, it will be crucial for the rebel forces to expunge radical elements. Additionally, the rebel forces will likely see a significant counteroffensive. In the earlier years of the civil war, a common tactic by Assad’s forces was to withdraw, reinforce their position, and then counterattack.

Implications extend beyond Syria. The country is the key transshipment point for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Qods Force (IRGC-QF) to produce weapons that are funneled to Hezbollah in Lebanon. With the ceasefire deal between Lebanon and Israel seemingly again in question with Israeli airstrikes in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah will likely continue to rely on this now potentially interrupted supply chain. According to Channel 12, Israeli intelligence officers believe that Iranian infrastructure in Syria has been negatively impacted by the rebel forces. Additionally, while the Assad regime has allowed Iran and its proxies to operate within Syria, it has been careful to not provoke Israel directly. Depending on how the situation evolves and whether Hezbollah acts emboldened in Syria, this may change Israeli perception of the threat emanating from Syria.

The conflict in Syria epitomizes the importance of both state and non-state actors in an era of great power competition, with various sub-state armed groups active in the country and numerous countries jockeying for position and seeking to back their respective proxies and clients. The more attention and resources that Russia and Iran need to dedicate to Syria, the less both countries will be able to focus on other pressing issues more directly related to their respective national interests. One immediate loser could be Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar, who receives backing from the Kremlin to prop up his fiefdom. In the near term, Moscow may lean more on private military and security contractors as a temporary stopgap to fill emerging power vacuums. The incoming Trump administration will have a lot on its foreign policy agenda early on, with Syria yet another complex situation that Washington will need to address with urgency. To be sure, myriad other countries –Türkiye, Israel, Russia, Iran, and several Gulf nations—will also be maneuvering in response to shifting geopolitical dynamics within Syria and the broader region.