August 14, 2024

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Knockin’ on Kremlin’s Door: Ukraine’s Kursk Offensive Unmasks Russian Vulnerabilities

Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP

The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) advanced into Russia’s Kursk region on August 6, shocking both the Kremlin and Western allies alike. This assault marks the largest incursion into Russian territory since World War II. Within the first 24 hours of the assault, Ukrainian troops equipped with Western provided Stryker and Marder armored vehicles advanced several miles beyond the border. Facing no organized resistance, Ukrainian forces quickly seized several settlements and captured dozens of Russian prisoners, including conscripted soldiers.

By August 7, Alexei Smirnov, the acting governor of Kursk, had declared a state of emergency in the region, reporting that 28 settlements in the oblast were under Ukrainian control. That same day, Ukrainian forces seized the Sudzha gas hub, a critical waypoint on the Urengoy–Pomary–Uzhhorod pipeline, which supplied nearly half of Russia’s gas exports to Europe in 2023. Russian civilian and military leadership were caught flatfooted by the audacious Ukrainian incursion, and Russian forces redeployed to the area have only partially stabilized the situation there.

Unlike previous incursions into Russia, which were quick raids conducted by pro-Ukrainian Russian paramilitary groups, the recent incursion appears to be a longer-term operation executed by regular Ukrainian forces. Ukraine’s initial success in Kursk was enabled by its ability to achieve operational surprise. Experienced and well-equipped AFU units redeployed from the Donetsk front had a clear advantage over the unprepared FSB security services, Akhmat special forces unit, and Rosgvardia national guard, all of which were responsible for defending this section of Russia’s border. Operational security surrounding the planning and preparation for the offensive was a critical factor in achieving this surprise.

Ukrainian intelligence had likely identified this region as particularly vulnerable during the operation’s planning process. Like many areas of Russia’s border, it was lightly defended, with much of Russia’s available combat power dedicated to seizing ground in the Donbas, one of the Kremlin’s primary war aims. Furthermore, the Russian military command and force structures in this region recently underwent a reorganization, leaving them temporarily understaffed and less organized than they might have been otherwise. Many of the combat elements assigned to this military district have been tied down in the Russian offensive against Kharkiv over the past several months, leaving the region without significant reserves to readily respond to such an attack.

The incursion has once again highlighted the difficulty with which Russian forces respond to sudden changes on the battlefield. Unclear leadership structures and a lack of coordination between the piecemeal collection of inexperienced units redeployed to the Kursk salient initially hindered Russia’s response to the attack. In past examples, Russian forces have been able to slowly adapt to changing conditions, aided in large part by their quantitative advantages in manpower and equipment. Although the Kremlin will more than likely find a way to stabilize the Kursk salient in the coming days, the embarrassment of seeing foreign forces capture Russian towns for the first time since World War II cannot be undone.

In response, Russian President Vladimir Putin has claimed that this is an attempt by Ukraine to "destabilize” the border regions and is an act of terrorism and aggression. By branding Ukraine's military incursion as an act of terror, the Kremlin has sought to shift the narrative from one of Russian failure to alleged Ukrainian barbarism. It portrays Ukraine’s highly coordinated military operation as a decentralized, disorganized effort to briefly capture villages before being potentially driven out by powerful Russian forces, similar to the raids conducted by paramilitary groups in the past. While Ukraine's ability to maintain its current territorial gains is uncertain, the fact that it managed to achieve operational surprise and penetrate so deeply into Russian territory is undeniably impressive and poses a significant danger to the Kremlin's narrative.

Russian media has also amplified similar talking points. According to Russian sources, Ukrainian troops in the Kursk region only number around 1,000, yet the number of dead Ukrainian soldiers being reported by Russian media number anywhere between 1,000 to 2,000. These seemingly impossible death tolls are not only circulated by the media but are also reported by the Russian Defense Ministry. Russian media also largely suggests that Ukraine’s incursion is ultimately an operational failure – it was an effort that required a large amount of energy and resources but will yield little result, and a large and “adequate” response from Russia.

However, the Kremlin and Russian media are unable to completely conceal the concern and shock felt by the Russian people and their government. Just yesterday, President Vladimir Putin appointed Alexey Dyumin, a former military officer and current secretary of the State Council, to lead the response to the Ukrainian incursion. Putin’s decision to appoint Dyumin, a member of his inner circle, underscores both his desire to keep close control of the response and his lack of trust in the military. Russian journalists also point out the chaos and confusion the operation has caused. One article from a Russian newspaper, Kommersant, details, quite candidly, the scale of destruction the Kursk oblast has faced from Ukraine’s assault.

Russian media has also expressed uncertainty surrounding Ukraine’s exact objectives, which has assisted in supporting their narrative of Ukrainian barbarism and lack of coordination. Indeed, this question has eluded Western observers as well. The incursion may have been a simple attempt to compel Russia to dedicate resources to defending its extensive borders. Though many analysts believe that the offensive is an effort by the Ukrainian military to divert Russian combat power away from the bitter fighting in the Donbas, where Russian forces have been steadily advancing towards strategic settlements like Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk. Similarly, the incursion could serve to relieve pressure on the nearby Kharkiv front. Depending on how Russian leadership decide to respond, such an outcome is possible. Stabilizing the Kursk pocket may be possible without significant redeployments.

However, if Putin demands Ukrainian forces be pushed out of Russia, a likely scenario, veteran units currently engaged along the Donetsk front will need to be reassigned to lead the fight in Kursk. Such a strategy is not without risk, as many Ukrainian elements now fighting in Kursk had to be pulled from elsewhere on the front, leaving areas of potential vulnerability. Another potential objective was to affect both sides’ will to fight, a critical factor in determining the war’s outcome. Such an offensive could serve to boost Ukrainian civilian and military morale at Russia’s expense. Simultaneously, renewed Ukrainian battlefield success could reignite Western enthusiasm for supporting Ukraine in the critical months ahead.