August 13, 2024

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Messaging, Deterrence, Diplomacy Seek to Mute Iran and Hezbollah Response

AP Photo/Mustafa Jamalddine

Iran has vowed it will retaliate to “punish” Israel for its July 31 assassination in Tehran of Hamas top leader Ismail Haniyeh. Hezbollah has threatened to escalate significantly in response to that strike as well as Israel’s attack hours earlier that killed the top leader of Hezbollah’s military wing, Fuad Shukr, in Beirut. According to Israeli military planners, Shukr had been responsible for the missile strike that killed 12 Druze Arab children playing football in Majdal Shams in the occupied Golan Heights one week earlier. Hezbollah, for its part, denied responsibility for the strike.

Iranian and Hezbollah leaders, who have faced repeated challenges from Israeli targeted strikes since the October 7 Hamas attack, assess they must respond to Israel’s brazen attacks in order to re-establish a measure of deterrence with Israel. Iranian and Hezbollah strategists appear to assess that Israel’s targeted strikes, if continued, have the potential to disrupt the Iran-led “unity of fronts” strategy intended to force Israel to end its Gaza offensive, accept the establishment of a Palestinian state, and raise questions about the long-term viability of the State of Israel. U.S. intelligence officials have repeatedly warned that Iran and Hezbollah were poised to strike, with major retaliation by either Iran or Hezbollah possible at any time (at the time this IntelBrief was published, no response had yet taken place). The delays suggest their leaders are weighing a variety of complex considerations and warnings from U.S., Israeli, and regional officials.

While recognizing the imperative of restoring deterrence, Iranian and Hezbollah leaders, as well as figures atop other members of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” recognize potential political constraints on their responses. Iran inaugurated a new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, in late July - a ceremony that prompted Haniyeh’s fatal visit to Iran. Although subordinate to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the final decision maker on any Iranian retaliation, Pezeshkian has promised the Iranian public to reverse the country’s economic deterioration. He has told the Iranian public that doing so will require engagement with the West, including the United States, to achieve a measure of relief from the comprehensive sanctions that are holding Iran’s economy back. A major Iranian retaliation is certain to interfere with Pezeshkian’s policy agenda.

Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah faces political considerations that are potentially even more complicated than those weighing on Khamenei and Pezeshkian. Foremost among them is the political complexion of Lebanon in which the other major communities, including Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, Druze Arabs, and others, do not support Hezbollah’s ideology of permanent “resistance” to Israel and want the security and stability that would come from a peace agreement with Israel. Many Lebanese, challenged by an economy that has virtually collapsed over the past several years, did not support Hezbollah’s decision to escalate cross-border attacks on Israel in sympathy with Hamas and the Gaza Palestinians and did not want Hezbollah to provoke another devastating war with Israel.

U.S., Israeli, and regional officials have played on these Iranian and Hezbollah concerns to formulate a strategy to try to persuade Tehran and Hezbollah to stand down. The allied strategy is based on messaging Tehran that retaliation would have potentially devastating consequences, combined with incentives that might enable Iran and Hezbollah to argue their vows of retaliation achieved concrete results. Israeli leaders have signaled they would escalate if Iran and/or Hezbollah launched major retaliatory attacks. The Israelis have communicated this message by continuing to target key leaders, including a strike last week that killed Samer al-Haj, the head of security for Hamas in Lebanon. Israel Air Force (IAF) combat aircraft have, in recent days, frequently flown over Beirut as a signal that Israel is capable of inflicting widespread devastation on economic infrastructure not only in areas populated by Lebanese Shias and other Hezbollah supporters but more broadly.

U.S. officials appear to be stressing not only the potential for Iran and Lebanon to suffer widespread devastation as a consequence of major escalation but also expressing some willingness to satisfy Iran’s concerns. First and foremost, U.S. officials have moved additional combat aircraft, ships, and air defense equipment to the region to send a message to Tehran that the United States can control the level of Iranian escalation, if needed. In addition, according to the Wall Street Journal, U.S. officials, although not necessarily threatening direct U.S. military action, have suggested to Iranian leaders, via intermediaries, that they would not - or could not - restrain any Israeli counterstrike to a major Iranian and Hezbollah attack.

One U.S. official told journalists on background: “The United States has sent clear messaging to Iran that the risk of a major escalation if they do a significant retaliatory attack against Israel is extremely high.” Apparently taking advantage of reports that Pezeshkian has warned Khamenei of potential damage to the Iranian economy and political structure, the U.S. official reportedly added: “There is a serious risk of consequences for Iran’s economy and the stability of its newly elected government if it goes down that path.” However, U.S. officials have reportedly clarified to their Iranian counterparts that the U.S. warnings pertain to the risks of provoking a military response from Israel and deepening the conflict - and are not threatening military action by U.S. forces. U.S. officials have said, however, that U.S. forces would help Israel defend against any Iranian missile or drone attack, as they did against Iran’s April 13 missile barrage.

At the same time, U.S. officials have vigorously pursued diplomatic options to enable Iran and Hezbollah to potentially save face from a decision to stand down on a major response – or perhaps to agree to limit their military attack to a scope that is purely symbolic, and not one that is full-throated and comprehensive. As part of the diplomatic efforts, although not specifically directed by Washington, on August 4, Jordan’s Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi became the first senior Jordanian official to pay an official visit to Iran in over 20 years. In meetings with Pezeshkian and other Iranian officials, Safadi condemned the Haniyeh killing and called it a violation of Iranian sovereignty, while also urging Iran to stand down on a major retaliation by pleading for "peace, stability, and security" in the region. The visit came as he and Saudi officials - countries that both helped U.S. and Israeli forces intercept Iran’s April 13 attack - indicated they would again join U.S.-led defensive action.

U.S. officials also appear to be signaling Tehran by expanding their efforts to compel Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to finalize a ceasefire and hostage release deal with Hamas – the selection of the hardline Yahya Sinwar as top Hamas chief notwithstanding. Achieving a ceasefire in Gaza might enable Iranian leaders to justify a decision to “stand down” on a major retaliatory attack by arguing they had compelled Israel and its U.S. mentors to agree to end Israel’s offensive in Gaza. Leaders of Iran and its Axis partners have all stated they would cease their attacks on Israel, U.S. forces, and global shipping if and when the war in Gaza ends. At the same time, Iranian officials and commentators close to government circles in Tehran argue that, no matter the incentives, Iran must respond to the Haniyeh assassination in order to signal Israel that it cannot be attacked with impunity.

Another open question is whether U.S. officials might offer Iran a degree of sanctions relief if Iran and its partners agree to stand down or sharply limit their retaliatory attack. Sanctions relief has been part of every U.S.-Iran discussion over the past several decades. In recent years, U.S. officials have been prepared to offer financial incentives to Iran, for example, to release improperly detained American citizens. U.S. officials have also, at times, suggested they would oppose additional international censure of Iranian nuclear and other violations. Still, Iran sanctions relief is often a sensitive political issue in the United States, particularly in a U.S. election year, possibly explaining why financial and other incentives for Iran in the current crisis are receiving little official public discussion.